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From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de, davem@davemloft.net,
	hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
	peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
	mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
	eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org,
	scarybeasts@gmail.com, pmoore@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net,
	eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org,
	coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	jmorris@namei.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v17 08/15] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF
Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2012 13:00:17 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120410130017.0d20e1b2.akpm@linux-foundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CABqD9hYE0S4EL6yH-57SfNs+D8GFKJgWVN21VzXpQmRuh2ow=w@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, 9 Apr 2012 14:59:00 -0500
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> wrote:

> >> I think this gives userspace an easy way of causing page allocation
> >> failure warnings, by permitting large kmalloc() attempts. __Add
> >> __GFP_NOWARN?
> >
> > Max is 32kb. sk_attach_filter() in net/core/filter.c is worse,
> > it allocates up to 512kb before even checking the length.
> >
> > What about using GFP_USER (and adding __GFP_NOWARN to GFP_USER) instead?
> 
> It looks like GFP_USER|__GFP_NOWARN would make sense here.  I'll change it.

I'm not really sure why GFP_USER exists.  It's very rarely used, and
most usages are probably inappropriate.  To me it means "same as
GFP_HIGHUSER, only don't use highmem".  That's relevant to blockdev
pagecache and nothing else as far as I can tell.  And good luck working
out what the __GFP_HARDWALL does ;)

This is a regular old allocation of kernel memory - the thing to use
here is GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN.

(I'm surprised that we didn't remove __GFP_NOWARN ages ago - warning by
default is pretty obnoxious.  But the warning continues to be
occasionally useful and false positives are rare).

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de, davem@davemloft.net,
	hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
	peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
	mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
	eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org,
	scarybeasts@gmail.com, pmoore@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net,
	eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org,
	coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	jmorris@namei.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 08/15] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF
Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2012 13:00:17 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120410130017.0d20e1b2.akpm@linux-foundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CABqD9hYE0S4EL6yH-57SfNs+D8GFKJgWVN21VzXpQmRuh2ow=w@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, 9 Apr 2012 14:59:00 -0500
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> wrote:

> >> I think this gives userspace an easy way of causing page allocation
> >> failure warnings, by permitting large kmalloc() attempts. __Add
> >> __GFP_NOWARN?
> >
> > Max is 32kb. sk_attach_filter() in net/core/filter.c is worse,
> > it allocates up to 512kb before even checking the length.
> >
> > What about using GFP_USER (and adding __GFP_NOWARN to GFP_USER) instead?
> 
> It looks like GFP_USER|__GFP_NOWARN would make sense here.  I'll change it.

I'm not really sure why GFP_USER exists.  It's very rarely used, and
most usages are probably inappropriate.  To me it means "same as
GFP_HIGHUSER, only don't use highmem".  That's relevant to blockdev
pagecache and nothing else as far as I can tell.  And good luck working
out what the __GFP_HARDWALL does ;)

This is a regular old allocation of kernel memory - the thing to use
here is GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN.

(I'm surprised that we didn't remove __GFP_NOWARN ages ago - warning by
default is pretty obnoxious.  But the warning continues to be
occasionally useful and false positives are rare).

  parent reply	other threads:[~2012-04-10 20:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 146+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-03-29 20:01 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 00/15] seccomp_filter: BPF-based syscall filtering Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01   ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 19:49   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 19:49     ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 19:55     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2012-04-06 19:55       ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-04-06 19:55       ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-04-06 20:47     ` [kernel-hardening] " Markus Gutschke
2012-04-06 20:47       ` Markus Gutschke
2012-04-06 20:54       ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 20:54         ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 21:04         ` [kernel-hardening] " Markus Gutschke
2012-04-06 21:04           ` Markus Gutschke
2012-04-06 21:15           ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 21:15             ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 21:32             ` [kernel-hardening] " Markus Gutschke
2012-04-06 21:32               ` Markus Gutschke
2012-04-10 19:12     ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-10 19:12       ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 19:55   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 19:55     ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 19:55     ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 20:01     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 20:01       ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 20:28       ` [kernel-hardening] " Jonathan Corbet
2012-04-06 20:28         ` Jonathan Corbet
2012-04-06 20:37         ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 20:37           ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-11 19:31         ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-04-11 19:31           ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-04-12  0:15           ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-04-12  0:15             ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-04-12  0:50           ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-12  0:50             ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-16 19:11           ` [kernel-hardening] " Rob Landley
2012-04-16 19:11             ` Rob Landley
2012-04-10 20:37       ` [kernel-hardening] " Rob Landley
2012-04-10 20:37         ` Rob Landley
2012-04-10 19:03     ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-10 19:03       ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 02/15] Fix apparmor for PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01   ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 03/15] sk_run_filter: add BPF_S_ANC_SECCOMP_LD_W Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01   ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 04/15] net/compat.c,linux/filter.h: share compat_sock_fprog Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01   ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 05/15] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01   ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 06/15] arch/x86: add syscall_get_arch to syscall.h Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01   ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 07/15] asm/syscall.h: add syscall_get_arch Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01   ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 20:05   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 20:05     ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:24     ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:24       ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 08/15] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01   ` Will Drewry
2012-03-31  4:40   ` [kernel-hardening] " Vladimir Murzin
2012-03-31  4:40     ` Vladimir Murzin
2012-03-31 18:14     ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-03-31 18:14       ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 20:23   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 20:23     ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 20:44     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-04-06 20:44       ` Kees Cook
2012-04-06 21:05       ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:05         ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:06         ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2012-04-06 21:06           ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-04-06 21:09           ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:09             ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-08 18:22     ` [kernel-hardening] " Indan Zupancic
2012-04-08 18:22       ` Indan Zupancic
2012-04-09 19:59       ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:59         ` Will Drewry
2012-04-10  9:48         ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2012-04-10  9:48           ` James Morris
2012-04-10 20:00         ` Andrew Morton [this message]
2012-04-10 20:00           ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-10 20:16           ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-10 20:16             ` Will Drewry
2012-04-10 20:16             ` Will Drewry
2012-04-10 10:34       ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Dumazet
2012-04-10 10:34         ` Eric Dumazet
2012-04-10 19:54       ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-10 19:54         ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-10 20:15         ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-10 20:15           ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 09/15] seccomp: remove duplicated failure logging Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01   ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 21:14   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:14     ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:26     ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:26       ` Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:26       ` Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:32       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-04-09 19:32         ` Kees Cook
2012-04-09 19:33       ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Paris
2012-04-09 19:33         ` Eric Paris
2012-04-09 19:39         ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-04-09 19:39           ` Kees Cook
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 10/15] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01   ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 21:19   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:19     ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:19     ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:19       ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 11/15] signal, x86: add SIGSYS info and make it synchronous Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01   ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 12/15] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01   ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 13/15] ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01   ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 21:24   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:24     ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:38     ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:38       ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 14/15] x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01   ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:02 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 15/15] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:02   ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 21:26   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:26     ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:46     ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:46       ` Will Drewry
2012-04-09 20:47       ` [kernel-hardening] " Markus Gutschke
2012-04-09 20:47         ` Markus Gutschke
2012-04-09 20:58         ` [kernel-hardening] " Ryan Ware
2012-04-09 20:58           ` Ryan Ware
2012-04-09 20:58           ` Ryan Ware
2012-04-09 22:47           ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-09 22:47             ` Will Drewry
2012-04-10 17:49             ` [kernel-hardening] " Ryan Ware
2012-04-10 17:49               ` Ryan Ware
2012-04-10 17:49               ` Ryan Ware
2012-03-29 23:11 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v17 00/15] seccomp_filter: BPF-based syscall filtering James Morris
2012-03-29 23:11   ` James Morris
2012-04-06 21:28   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:28     ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:28     ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09  3:48     ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2012-04-09  3:48       ` James Morris
2012-04-09  3:48       ` James Morris

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