From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de, davem@davemloft.net,
hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org,
scarybeasts@gmail.com, indan@nul.nu, pmoore@redhat.com,
corbet@lwn.net, eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org,
coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@chromium.org,
jmorris@namei.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v17 09/15] seccomp: remove duplicated failure logging
Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2012 14:14:15 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120406141415.93f46bc6.akpm@linux-foundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1333051320-30872-10-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org>
On Thu, 29 Mar 2012 15:01:54 -0500
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> wrote:
> From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>
> This consolidates the seccomp filter error logging path and adds more
> details to the audit log.
>
> ...
>
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
>
> ...
>
> #define audit_inode(n,d) do { (void)(d); } while (0)
> #define audit_inode_child(i,p) do { ; } while (0)
> #define audit_core_dumps(i) do { ; } while (0)
> -#define audit_seccomp(i) do { ; } while (0)
> +#define audit_seccomp(i,s,c) do { ; } while (0)
Sigh. Someone please convert all these to C. That way we get
typechecking and don't need dopey party tricks like that "(void)(d)" to
squish compilation warnings.
> ...
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
> #include <linux/syscalls.h>
> #include <linux/capability.h>
> #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
> +#include <linux/compat.h>
>
> #include "audit.h"
>
> @@ -2710,13 +2711,18 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
> audit_log_end(ab);
> }
>
> -void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall)
> +void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
> {
> struct audit_buffer *ab;
>
> ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
> - audit_log_abend(ab, "seccomp", SIGKILL);
> + audit_log_abend(ab, "seccomp", signr);
> audit_log_format(ab, " syscall=%ld", syscall);
> +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
> + audit_log_format(ab, " compat=%d", is_compat_task());
> +#endif
We don't need the ifdef for compilation reasons now.
The question is: should we emit the compat= record on
non-compat-capable architectures? Doing so would be safer - making it
conditional invites people to write x86-only usersapce.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de, davem@davemloft.net,
hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org,
scarybeasts@gmail.com, indan@nul.nu, pmoore@redhat.com,
corbet@lwn.net, eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org,
coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@chromium.org,
jmorris@namei.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 09/15] seccomp: remove duplicated failure logging
Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2012 14:14:15 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120406141415.93f46bc6.akpm@linux-foundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1333051320-30872-10-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org>
On Thu, 29 Mar 2012 15:01:54 -0500
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> wrote:
> From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>
> This consolidates the seccomp filter error logging path and adds more
> details to the audit log.
>
> ...
>
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
>
> ...
>
> #define audit_inode(n,d) do { (void)(d); } while (0)
> #define audit_inode_child(i,p) do { ; } while (0)
> #define audit_core_dumps(i) do { ; } while (0)
> -#define audit_seccomp(i) do { ; } while (0)
> +#define audit_seccomp(i,s,c) do { ; } while (0)
Sigh. Someone please convert all these to C. That way we get
typechecking and don't need dopey party tricks like that "(void)(d)" to
squish compilation warnings.
> ...
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
> #include <linux/syscalls.h>
> #include <linux/capability.h>
> #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
> +#include <linux/compat.h>
>
> #include "audit.h"
>
> @@ -2710,13 +2711,18 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
> audit_log_end(ab);
> }
>
> -void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall)
> +void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
> {
> struct audit_buffer *ab;
>
> ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
> - audit_log_abend(ab, "seccomp", SIGKILL);
> + audit_log_abend(ab, "seccomp", signr);
> audit_log_format(ab, " syscall=%ld", syscall);
> +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
> + audit_log_format(ab, " compat=%d", is_compat_task());
> +#endif
We don't need the ifdef for compilation reasons now.
The question is: should we emit the compat= record on
non-compat-capable architectures? Doing so would be safer - making it
conditional invites people to write x86-only usersapce.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-04-06 21:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 146+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-03-29 20:01 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 00/15] seccomp_filter: BPF-based syscall filtering Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 19:49 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 19:49 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 19:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2012-04-06 19:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-04-06 19:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-04-06 20:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Markus Gutschke
2012-04-06 20:47 ` Markus Gutschke
2012-04-06 20:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 20:54 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 21:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Markus Gutschke
2012-04-06 21:04 ` Markus Gutschke
2012-04-06 21:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 21:15 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 21:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " Markus Gutschke
2012-04-06 21:32 ` Markus Gutschke
2012-04-10 19:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-10 19:12 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 19:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 19:55 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 19:55 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 20:01 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 20:28 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jonathan Corbet
2012-04-06 20:28 ` Jonathan Corbet
2012-04-06 20:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-06 20:37 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-11 19:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-04-11 19:31 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-04-12 0:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-04-12 0:15 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-04-12 0:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-12 0:50 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-04-16 19:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rob Landley
2012-04-16 19:11 ` Rob Landley
2012-04-10 20:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rob Landley
2012-04-10 20:37 ` Rob Landley
2012-04-10 19:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-10 19:03 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 02/15] Fix apparmor for PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 03/15] sk_run_filter: add BPF_S_ANC_SECCOMP_LD_W Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 04/15] net/compat.c,linux/filter.h: share compat_sock_fprog Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 05/15] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 06/15] arch/x86: add syscall_get_arch to syscall.h Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 07/15] asm/syscall.h: add syscall_get_arch Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 20:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 20:05 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:24 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 08/15] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-31 4:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vladimir Murzin
2012-03-31 4:40 ` Vladimir Murzin
2012-03-31 18:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-03-31 18:14 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 20:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 20:23 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 20:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-04-06 20:44 ` Kees Cook
2012-04-06 21:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:05 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2012-04-06 21:06 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-04-06 21:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:09 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-08 18:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Indan Zupancic
2012-04-08 18:22 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-04-09 19:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:59 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-10 9:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2012-04-10 9:48 ` James Morris
2012-04-10 20:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-10 20:00 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-10 20:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-10 20:16 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-10 20:16 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-10 10:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Dumazet
2012-04-10 10:34 ` Eric Dumazet
2012-04-10 19:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-10 19:54 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-10 20:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-10 20:15 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 09/15] seccomp: remove duplicated failure logging Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 21:14 ` Andrew Morton [this message]
2012-04-06 21:14 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:26 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:26 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-04-09 19:32 ` Kees Cook
2012-04-09 19:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Paris
2012-04-09 19:33 ` Eric Paris
2012-04-09 19:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-04-09 19:39 ` Kees Cook
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 10/15] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 21:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:19 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:19 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 11/15] signal, x86: add SIGSYS info and make it synchronous Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 12/15] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 13/15] ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 21:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:24 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:38 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 14/15] x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:02 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 15/15] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry
2012-03-29 20:02 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-06 21:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:26 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 19:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-09 19:46 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-09 20:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Markus Gutschke
2012-04-09 20:47 ` Markus Gutschke
2012-04-09 20:58 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ryan Ware
2012-04-09 20:58 ` Ryan Ware
2012-04-09 20:58 ` Ryan Ware
2012-04-09 22:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-04-09 22:47 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-10 17:49 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ryan Ware
2012-04-10 17:49 ` Ryan Ware
2012-04-10 17:49 ` Ryan Ware
2012-03-29 23:11 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v17 00/15] seccomp_filter: BPF-based syscall filtering James Morris
2012-03-29 23:11 ` James Morris
2012-04-06 21:28 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:28 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-06 21:28 ` Andrew Morton
2012-04-09 3:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2012-04-09 3:48 ` James Morris
2012-04-09 3:48 ` James Morris
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