All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>,
	James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching
Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2016 11:10:09 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160815101009.GC13262@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160815100649.GB1996@svinekod>

On Mon, Aug 15, 2016 at 11:06:49AM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 15, 2016 at 12:02:33PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > On 15 August 2016 at 11:58, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
> > > On Mon, Aug 15, 2016 at 10:48:42AM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > >> On Sat, Aug 13, 2016 at 11:13:58AM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > >> > On 12 August 2016 at 17:27, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> wrote:
> > >> > > This is the first (public) attempt at emulating PAN by disabling
> > >> > > TTBR0_EL1 accesses on arm64.
> > >> >
> > >> > I take it using TCR_EL1.EPD0 is too expensive?
> > >>
> > >> It would require full TLB invalidation on entering/exiting the kernel
> > >> and again for any user access. That's because the architecture allows
> > >> this bit to be cached in the TLB so without TLBI we wouldn't have any
> > >> guarantee that the actual PAN was toggled. I'm not sure it's even clear
> > >> whether a TLBI by ASID or a local one would suffice (likely OK for the
> > >> latter).
> > >
> > > It's worth noting that even ignoring the TLB-caching of TCR_EL1.EPD0, the
> > > control only affects the behaviour on a TLB miss. Thus to use EPD0 we'd at
> > > least need TLB invalidation by ASID to remove previously-allocated entries from
> > > TLBs.
> > 
> > ... or update the ASID to the reserved ASID in TTBR0_EL1, but leave
> > the actual TTBR address alone.
> > 
> > This would remove the need for a zero page, and for recording the
> > original TTBR address in a per-cpu variable.
> 
> That's a good point, and a better approach.
> 
> Unfortunately, we're still left with the issue that TCR_EL1.* can be cached in
> a TLB, as Catalin pointed out. Which at minimum would require a TLBI ASIDE1,
> and may require something stronger, given the precise rules for TLB-cached
> fields isn't clear.

I suggest we get this clarified before merging the patch, as even the
author admits that it's ugly ;)

Will

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: will.deacon@arm.com (Will Deacon)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching
Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2016 11:10:09 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160815101009.GC13262@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160815100649.GB1996@svinekod>

On Mon, Aug 15, 2016 at 11:06:49AM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 15, 2016 at 12:02:33PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > On 15 August 2016 at 11:58, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
> > > On Mon, Aug 15, 2016 at 10:48:42AM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > >> On Sat, Aug 13, 2016 at 11:13:58AM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > >> > On 12 August 2016 at 17:27, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> wrote:
> > >> > > This is the first (public) attempt at emulating PAN by disabling
> > >> > > TTBR0_EL1 accesses on arm64.
> > >> >
> > >> > I take it using TCR_EL1.EPD0 is too expensive?
> > >>
> > >> It would require full TLB invalidation on entering/exiting the kernel
> > >> and again for any user access. That's because the architecture allows
> > >> this bit to be cached in the TLB so without TLBI we wouldn't have any
> > >> guarantee that the actual PAN was toggled. I'm not sure it's even clear
> > >> whether a TLBI by ASID or a local one would suffice (likely OK for the
> > >> latter).
> > >
> > > It's worth noting that even ignoring the TLB-caching of TCR_EL1.EPD0, the
> > > control only affects the behaviour on a TLB miss. Thus to use EPD0 we'd at
> > > least need TLB invalidation by ASID to remove previously-allocated entries from
> > > TLBs.
> > 
> > ... or update the ASID to the reserved ASID in TTBR0_EL1, but leave
> > the actual TTBR address alone.
> > 
> > This would remove the need for a zero page, and for recording the
> > original TTBR address in a per-cpu variable.
> 
> That's a good point, and a better approach.
> 
> Unfortunately, we're still left with the issue that TCR_EL1.* can be cached in
> a TLB, as Catalin pointed out. Which at minimum would require a TLBI ASIDE1,
> and may require something stronger, given the precise rules for TLB-cached
> fields isn't clear.

I suggest we get this clarified before merging the patch, as even the
author admits that it's ugly ;)

Will

  reply	other threads:[~2016-08-15 10:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-08-12 15:27 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/7] arm64: Factor out PAN enabling/disabling into separate uaccess_* macros Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/7] arm64: Factor out TTBR0_EL1 setting into a specific asm macro Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/7] arm64: Introduce uaccess_{disable,enable} functionality based on TTBR0_EL1 Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27   ` [PATCH 3/7] arm64: Introduce uaccess_{disable, enable} " Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/7] arm64: Disable TTBR0_EL1 during normal kernel execution Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15 11:18   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 11:18     ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 16:39     ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15 16:39       ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 5/7] arm64: Handle faults caused by inadvertent user access with PAN enabled Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 6/7] arm64: xen: Enable user access before a privcmd hvc call Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15  9:58   ` [kernel-hardening] " Julien Grall
2016-08-15  9:58     ` Julien Grall
2016-08-15 18:00     ` Stefano Stabellini
2016-08-15 18:00     ` [kernel-hardening] " Stefano Stabellini
2016-08-15 18:00       ` Stefano Stabellini
2016-08-15  9:58   ` Julien Grall
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 7/7] arm64: Enable CONFIG_ARM64_TTBR0_PAN Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 18:04 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching Kees Cook
2016-08-12 18:04   ` Kees Cook
2016-08-12 18:22   ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 18:22     ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-13  9:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-13  9:13   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15  9:48   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15  9:48     ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15  9:58     ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15  9:58       ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 10:02       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:02         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:06         ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 10:06           ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 10:10           ` Will Deacon [this message]
2016-08-15 10:10             ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:15             ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 10:15               ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 10:21               ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:21                 ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:21           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:21             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:30             ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:30               ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:31               ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:31                 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:37                 ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:37                   ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:43                   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:43                     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:52                     ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15 10:52                       ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15 10:56                       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:56                         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 11:02                         ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 11:02                           ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 16:13                         ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15 16:13                           ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15 19:04                           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 19:04                             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 11:00                     ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 11:00                       ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:30             ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 10:30               ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 10:08         ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:08           ` Will Deacon
2016-08-26 15:39 ` David Brown
2016-08-26 15:39   ` David Brown
2016-08-26 17:24   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-26 17:24     ` Catalin Marinas

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20160815101009.GC13262@arm.com \
    --to=will.deacon@arm.com \
    --cc=ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org \
    --cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
    --cc=james.morse@arm.com \
    --cc=julien.grall@arm.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.