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From: David Brown <david.brown@linaro.org>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2016 11:39:04 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160826153904.GA19844@davidb.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1471015666-23125-1-git-send-email-catalin.marinas@arm.com>

On Fri, Aug 12, 2016 at 04:27:39PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:
>This is the first (public) attempt at emulating PAN by disabling
>TTBR0_EL1 accesses on arm64. I chose to use a per-CPU saved_ttbr0_el1
>variable to store the actual TTBR0 as, IMO, it looks better w.r.t. the
>context switching code, to the detriment of a slightly more complex
>uaccess_enable() implementation. The alternative was storing the saved
>TTBR0 in thread_info but with more complex thread switching since TTBR0
>is normally tied to switch_mm() rather than switch_to(). The latter may
>also get more complicated if we are to decouple the kernel stack from
>thread_info at some point (vmalloc'ed stacks).
>
>The code requires more testing, especially for combinations where UAO is
>present but PAN is not.

I briefly tried to run these patches on my HiKey board and I get a
panic on boot.  Unfortunately, I've had to head off to the Linux
Security Summit, so I haven't been able to try to figure out what is
going on (and I don't seem to be able to even get a capture of the log
output).  But I ran into Mark Rutland who convinced me to at least
state the failure on the list here.

The same kernel boots fine in Qemu.

David

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: david.brown@linaro.org (David Brown)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2016 11:39:04 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160826153904.GA19844@davidb.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1471015666-23125-1-git-send-email-catalin.marinas@arm.com>

On Fri, Aug 12, 2016 at 04:27:39PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:
>This is the first (public) attempt at emulating PAN by disabling
>TTBR0_EL1 accesses on arm64. I chose to use a per-CPU saved_ttbr0_el1
>variable to store the actual TTBR0 as, IMO, it looks better w.r.t. the
>context switching code, to the detriment of a slightly more complex
>uaccess_enable() implementation. The alternative was storing the saved
>TTBR0 in thread_info but with more complex thread switching since TTBR0
>is normally tied to switch_mm() rather than switch_to(). The latter may
>also get more complicated if we are to decouple the kernel stack from
>thread_info at some point (vmalloc'ed stacks).
>
>The code requires more testing, especially for combinations where UAO is
>present but PAN is not.

I briefly tried to run these patches on my HiKey board and I get a
panic on boot.  Unfortunately, I've had to head off to the Linux
Security Summit, so I haven't been able to try to figure out what is
going on (and I don't seem to be able to even get a capture of the log
output).  But I ran into Mark Rutland who convinced me to at least
state the failure on the list here.

The same kernel boots fine in Qemu.

David

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-08-26 15:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-08-12 15:27 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/7] arm64: Factor out PAN enabling/disabling into separate uaccess_* macros Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/7] arm64: Factor out TTBR0_EL1 setting into a specific asm macro Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/7] arm64: Introduce uaccess_{disable,enable} functionality based on TTBR0_EL1 Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27   ` [PATCH 3/7] arm64: Introduce uaccess_{disable, enable} " Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/7] arm64: Disable TTBR0_EL1 during normal kernel execution Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15 11:18   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 11:18     ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 16:39     ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15 16:39       ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 5/7] arm64: Handle faults caused by inadvertent user access with PAN enabled Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 6/7] arm64: xen: Enable user access before a privcmd hvc call Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15  9:58   ` [kernel-hardening] " Julien Grall
2016-08-15  9:58     ` Julien Grall
2016-08-15 18:00     ` [kernel-hardening] " Stefano Stabellini
2016-08-15 18:00       ` Stefano Stabellini
2016-08-15 18:00     ` Stefano Stabellini
2016-08-15  9:58   ` Julien Grall
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 7/7] arm64: Enable CONFIG_ARM64_TTBR0_PAN Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 18:04 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching Kees Cook
2016-08-12 18:04   ` Kees Cook
2016-08-12 18:22   ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 18:22     ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-13  9:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-13  9:13   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15  9:48   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15  9:48     ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15  9:58     ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15  9:58       ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 10:02       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:02         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:06         ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 10:06           ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 10:10           ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:10             ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:15             ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 10:15               ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 10:21               ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:21                 ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:21           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:21             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:30             ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:30               ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:31               ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:31                 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:37                 ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:37                   ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:43                   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:43                     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:52                     ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15 10:52                       ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15 10:56                       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:56                         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 11:02                         ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 11:02                           ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 16:13                         ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15 16:13                           ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15 19:04                           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 19:04                             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 11:00                     ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 11:00                       ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:30             ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 10:30               ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 10:08         ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:08           ` Will Deacon
2016-08-26 15:39 ` David Brown [this message]
2016-08-26 15:39   ` David Brown
2016-08-26 17:24   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-26 17:24     ` Catalin Marinas

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