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From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Pa
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v6 15/26] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 13:47:58 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181119214809.6086-16-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181119214809.6086-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

When a task does fork(), its shadow stack (SHSTK) must be duplicated
for the child.  This patch implements a flow similar to copy-on-write
of an anonymous page, but for SHSTK.

A SHSTK PTE must be RO and dirty.  This dirty bit requirement is used
to effect the copying.  In copy_one_pte(), clear the dirty bit from a
SHSTK PTE to cause a page fault upon the next SHSTK access.  At that
time, fix the PTE and copy/re-use the page.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c         | 15 +++++++++++++++
 include/asm-generic/pgtable.h |  8 ++++++++
 mm/memory.c                   |  7 ++++++-
 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index 59274e2c1ac4..75dddc3d8451 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -887,3 +887,18 @@ int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
 #endif	/* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+inline pte_t pte_set_vma_features(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHSTK)
+		return pte_mkdirty_shstk(pte);
+	else
+		return pte;
+}
+
+inline bool arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags)
+{
+	return (vm_flags & VM_SHSTK);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER */
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
index 359fb935ded6..30ac390fb2d4 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
@@ -1143,4 +1143,12 @@ static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void)
 #define mm_pmd_folded(mm)	__is_defined(__PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED)
 #endif
 
+#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHSTK
+#define pte_set_vma_features(pte, vma) pte
+#define arch_copy_pte_mapping(vma_flags) false
+#else
+pte_t pte_set_vma_features(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+bool arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags);
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _ASM_GENERIC_PGTABLE_H */
diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
index 4ad2d293ddc2..f6b2e1ece4ab 100644
--- a/mm/memory.c
+++ b/mm/memory.c
@@ -775,7 +775,8 @@ copy_one_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, struct mm_struct *src_mm,
 	 * If it's a COW mapping, write protect it both
 	 * in the parent and the child
 	 */
-	if (is_cow_mapping(vm_flags) && pte_write(pte)) {
+	if ((is_cow_mapping(vm_flags) && pte_write(pte)) ||
+	    arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags)) {
 		ptep_set_wrprotect(src_mm, addr, src_pte);
 		pte = pte_wrprotect(pte);
 	}
@@ -2218,6 +2219,7 @@ static inline void wp_page_reuse(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 	flush_cache_page(vma, vmf->address, pte_pfn(vmf->orig_pte));
 	entry = pte_mkyoung(vmf->orig_pte);
 	entry = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry), vma);
+	entry = pte_set_vma_features(entry, vma);
 	if (ptep_set_access_flags(vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte, entry, 1))
 		update_mmu_cache(vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte);
 	pte_unmap_unlock(vmf->pte, vmf->ptl);
@@ -2291,6 +2293,7 @@ static vm_fault_t wp_page_copy(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 		flush_cache_page(vma, vmf->address, pte_pfn(vmf->orig_pte));
 		entry = mk_pte(new_page, vma->vm_page_prot);
 		entry = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry), vma);
+		entry = pte_set_vma_features(entry, vma);
 		/*
 		 * Clear the pte entry and flush it first, before updating the
 		 * pte with the new entry. This will avoid a race condition
@@ -2801,6 +2804,7 @@ vm_fault_t do_swap_page(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 	pte = mk_pte(page, vma->vm_page_prot);
 	if ((vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) && reuse_swap_page(page, NULL)) {
 		pte = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(pte), vma);
+		pte = pte_set_vma_features(pte, vma);
 		vmf->flags &= ~FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
 		ret |= VM_FAULT_WRITE;
 		exclusive = RMAP_EXCLUSIVE;
@@ -2943,6 +2947,7 @@ static vm_fault_t do_anonymous_page(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 	entry = mk_pte(page, vma->vm_page_prot);
 	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
 		entry = pte_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry));
+	entry = pte_set_vma_features(entry, vma);
 
 	vmf->pte = pte_offset_map_lock(vma->vm_mm, vmf->pmd, vmf->address,
 			&vmf->ptl);
-- 
2.17.1

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v6 15/26] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 13:47:58 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181119214809.6086-16-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
Message-ID: <20181119214758.L7wrdvXO7CSWlmkpUOw65vMM7Zibo6AB_t2c30byQ80@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181119214809.6086-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

When a task does fork(), its shadow stack (SHSTK) must be duplicated
for the child.  This patch implements a flow similar to copy-on-write
of an anonymous page, but for SHSTK.

A SHSTK PTE must be RO and dirty.  This dirty bit requirement is used
to effect the copying.  In copy_one_pte(), clear the dirty bit from a
SHSTK PTE to cause a page fault upon the next SHSTK access.  At that
time, fix the PTE and copy/re-use the page.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c         | 15 +++++++++++++++
 include/asm-generic/pgtable.h |  8 ++++++++
 mm/memory.c                   |  7 ++++++-
 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index 59274e2c1ac4..75dddc3d8451 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -887,3 +887,18 @@ int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
 #endif	/* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+inline pte_t pte_set_vma_features(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHSTK)
+		return pte_mkdirty_shstk(pte);
+	else
+		return pte;
+}
+
+inline bool arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags)
+{
+	return (vm_flags & VM_SHSTK);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER */
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
index 359fb935ded6..30ac390fb2d4 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
@@ -1143,4 +1143,12 @@ static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void)
 #define mm_pmd_folded(mm)	__is_defined(__PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED)
 #endif
 
+#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHSTK
+#define pte_set_vma_features(pte, vma) pte
+#define arch_copy_pte_mapping(vma_flags) false
+#else
+pte_t pte_set_vma_features(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+bool arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags);
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _ASM_GENERIC_PGTABLE_H */
diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
index 4ad2d293ddc2..f6b2e1ece4ab 100644
--- a/mm/memory.c
+++ b/mm/memory.c
@@ -775,7 +775,8 @@ copy_one_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, struct mm_struct *src_mm,
 	 * If it's a COW mapping, write protect it both
 	 * in the parent and the child
 	 */
-	if (is_cow_mapping(vm_flags) && pte_write(pte)) {
+	if ((is_cow_mapping(vm_flags) && pte_write(pte)) ||
+	    arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags)) {
 		ptep_set_wrprotect(src_mm, addr, src_pte);
 		pte = pte_wrprotect(pte);
 	}
@@ -2218,6 +2219,7 @@ static inline void wp_page_reuse(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 	flush_cache_page(vma, vmf->address, pte_pfn(vmf->orig_pte));
 	entry = pte_mkyoung(vmf->orig_pte);
 	entry = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry), vma);
+	entry = pte_set_vma_features(entry, vma);
 	if (ptep_set_access_flags(vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte, entry, 1))
 		update_mmu_cache(vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte);
 	pte_unmap_unlock(vmf->pte, vmf->ptl);
@@ -2291,6 +2293,7 @@ static vm_fault_t wp_page_copy(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 		flush_cache_page(vma, vmf->address, pte_pfn(vmf->orig_pte));
 		entry = mk_pte(new_page, vma->vm_page_prot);
 		entry = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry), vma);
+		entry = pte_set_vma_features(entry, vma);
 		/*
 		 * Clear the pte entry and flush it first, before updating the
 		 * pte with the new entry. This will avoid a race condition
@@ -2801,6 +2804,7 @@ vm_fault_t do_swap_page(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 	pte = mk_pte(page, vma->vm_page_prot);
 	if ((vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) && reuse_swap_page(page, NULL)) {
 		pte = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(pte), vma);
+		pte = pte_set_vma_features(pte, vma);
 		vmf->flags &= ~FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
 		ret |= VM_FAULT_WRITE;
 		exclusive = RMAP_EXCLUSIVE;
@@ -2943,6 +2947,7 @@ static vm_fault_t do_anonymous_page(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 	entry = mk_pte(page, vma->vm_page_prot);
 	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
 		entry = pte_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry));
+	entry = pte_set_vma_features(entry, vma);
 
 	vmf->pte = pte_offset_map_lock(vma->vm_mm, vmf->pmd, vmf->address,
 			&vmf->ptl);
-- 
2.17.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-11-19 21:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-11-19 21:47 [RFC PATCH v6 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-20  9:52   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-20  9:52     ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-20 20:36     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-20 20:36       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-21  7:24       ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-21  7:24         ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 02/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Change names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 04/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-12-04 16:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-12-04 16:01     ` Borislav Petkov
2018-12-04 17:08     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-12-04 17:08       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-12-04 18:16       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-12-04 18:16         ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 05/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 06/26] x86/cet: Add control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 07/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 08/26] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 09/26] mm/mmap: Prevent Shadow Stack VMA merges Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 10/26] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 11/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 12/26] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 13/26] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 14/26] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2018-11-19 21:47   ` [RFC PATCH v6 15/26] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 16/26] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 17/26] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 18/26] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 19/26] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 20/26] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 21/26] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 22/26] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-04-25 11:02   ` Dave Martin
2019-04-25 11:02     ` Dave Martin
2019-04-25 15:14     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-04-25 15:14       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-04-25 15:35       ` Dave Martin
2019-04-25 15:35         ` Dave Martin
2019-04-25 16:11         ` Dave Martin
2019-04-25 16:11           ` Dave Martin
2019-04-25 16:20         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-04-25 16:20           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 23/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 24/26] mm/mmap: Add Shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 25/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 26/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-22 16:53 ` [RFC PATCH v6 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-22 16:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-26 17:38   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-26 17:38     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-26 18:29     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-26 18:29       ` Andy Lutomirski

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