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From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Pa
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v6 17/26] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 13:48:00 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181119214809.6086-18-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181119214809.6086-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

can_follow_write_pte/pmd look for the (RO & DIRTY) PTE/PMD to
verify an exclusive RO page still exists after a broken COW.

A shadow stack PTE is RO & PAGE_DIRTY_SW when it is shared,
otherwise RO & PAGE_DIRTY_HW.

Introduce pte_exclusive() and pmd_exclusive() to also verify a
shadow stack PTE is exclusive.

Also rename can_follow_write_pte/pmd() to can_follow_write() to
make their meaning clear; i.e. "Can we write to the page?", not
"Is the PTE writable?"

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c         | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 include/asm-generic/pgtable.h |  4 ++++
 mm/gup.c                      |  8 +++++---
 mm/huge_memory.c              |  8 +++++---
 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index 4275c80f5832..7629156d30b0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -909,4 +909,22 @@ inline bool arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags)
 {
 	return (vm_flags & VM_SHSTK);
 }
+
+inline bool pte_exclusive(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHSTK)
+		return pte_dirty_hw(pte);
+	else
+		return pte_dirty(pte);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
+inline bool pmd_exclusive(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHSTK)
+		return pmd_dirty_hw(pmd);
+	else
+		return pmd_dirty(pmd);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER */
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
index b0b375d8bb34..c8685df71521 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
@@ -1147,10 +1147,14 @@ static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void)
 #define pte_set_vma_features(pte, vma) pte
 #define pmd_set_vma_features(pmd, vma) pmd
 #define arch_copy_pte_mapping(vma_flags) false
+#define pte_exclusive(pte, vma) pte_dirty(pte)
+#define pmd_exclusive(pmd, vma) pmd_dirty(pmd)
 #else
 pte_t pte_set_vma_features(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
 pmd_t pmd_set_vma_features(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
 bool arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags);
+bool pte_exclusive(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+bool pmd_exclusive(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
 #endif
 
 #endif /* _ASM_GENERIC_PGTABLE_H */
diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c
index aa43620a3270..abc200ed1e4a 100644
--- a/mm/gup.c
+++ b/mm/gup.c
@@ -69,10 +69,12 @@ static int follow_pfn_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
  * FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pte's, but only
  * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty.
  */
-static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags)
+static inline bool can_follow_write(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags,
+				    struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	return pte_write(pte) ||
-		((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pte_dirty(pte));
+		((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) &&
+		 pte_exclusive(pte, vma));
 }
 
 static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -110,7 +112,7 @@ static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	}
 	if ((flags & FOLL_NUMA) && pte_protnone(pte))
 		goto no_page;
-	if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write_pte(pte, flags)) {
+	if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write(pte, flags, vma)) {
 		pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
 		return NULL;
 	}
diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index 12148a5b60e0..f7476eeed83a 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -1403,10 +1403,12 @@ vm_fault_t do_huge_pmd_wp_page(struct vm_fault *vmf, pmd_t orig_pmd)
  * FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pmd's, but only
  * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty.
  */
-static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd(pmd_t pmd, unsigned int flags)
+static inline bool can_follow_write(pmd_t pmd, unsigned int flags,
+				    struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	return pmd_write(pmd) ||
-	       ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pmd_dirty(pmd));
+	       ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) &&
+		pmd_exclusive(pmd, vma));
 }
 
 struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -1419,7 +1421,7 @@ struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 
 	assert_spin_locked(pmd_lockptr(mm, pmd));
 
-	if (flags & FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write_pmd(*pmd, flags))
+	if (flags & FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write(*pmd, flags, vma))
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Avoid dumping huge zero page */
-- 
2.17.1

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v6 17/26] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 13:48:00 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181119214809.6086-18-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
Message-ID: <20181119214800.-q8AK_JFO5u-mWp2YEIbMCrDdEYMUbuPFaEKR_0t29U@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181119214809.6086-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

can_follow_write_pte/pmd look for the (RO & DIRTY) PTE/PMD to
verify an exclusive RO page still exists after a broken COW.

A shadow stack PTE is RO & PAGE_DIRTY_SW when it is shared,
otherwise RO & PAGE_DIRTY_HW.

Introduce pte_exclusive() and pmd_exclusive() to also verify a
shadow stack PTE is exclusive.

Also rename can_follow_write_pte/pmd() to can_follow_write() to
make their meaning clear; i.e. "Can we write to the page?", not
"Is the PTE writable?"

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c         | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 include/asm-generic/pgtable.h |  4 ++++
 mm/gup.c                      |  8 +++++---
 mm/huge_memory.c              |  8 +++++---
 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index 4275c80f5832..7629156d30b0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -909,4 +909,22 @@ inline bool arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags)
 {
 	return (vm_flags & VM_SHSTK);
 }
+
+inline bool pte_exclusive(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHSTK)
+		return pte_dirty_hw(pte);
+	else
+		return pte_dirty(pte);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
+inline bool pmd_exclusive(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHSTK)
+		return pmd_dirty_hw(pmd);
+	else
+		return pmd_dirty(pmd);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER */
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
index b0b375d8bb34..c8685df71521 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
@@ -1147,10 +1147,14 @@ static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void)
 #define pte_set_vma_features(pte, vma) pte
 #define pmd_set_vma_features(pmd, vma) pmd
 #define arch_copy_pte_mapping(vma_flags) false
+#define pte_exclusive(pte, vma) pte_dirty(pte)
+#define pmd_exclusive(pmd, vma) pmd_dirty(pmd)
 #else
 pte_t pte_set_vma_features(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
 pmd_t pmd_set_vma_features(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
 bool arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags);
+bool pte_exclusive(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+bool pmd_exclusive(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
 #endif
 
 #endif /* _ASM_GENERIC_PGTABLE_H */
diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c
index aa43620a3270..abc200ed1e4a 100644
--- a/mm/gup.c
+++ b/mm/gup.c
@@ -69,10 +69,12 @@ static int follow_pfn_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
  * FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pte's, but only
  * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty.
  */
-static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags)
+static inline bool can_follow_write(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags,
+				    struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	return pte_write(pte) ||
-		((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pte_dirty(pte));
+		((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) &&
+		 pte_exclusive(pte, vma));
 }
 
 static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -110,7 +112,7 @@ static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	}
 	if ((flags & FOLL_NUMA) && pte_protnone(pte))
 		goto no_page;
-	if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write_pte(pte, flags)) {
+	if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write(pte, flags, vma)) {
 		pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
 		return NULL;
 	}
diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index 12148a5b60e0..f7476eeed83a 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -1403,10 +1403,12 @@ vm_fault_t do_huge_pmd_wp_page(struct vm_fault *vmf, pmd_t orig_pmd)
  * FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pmd's, but only
  * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty.
  */
-static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd(pmd_t pmd, unsigned int flags)
+static inline bool can_follow_write(pmd_t pmd, unsigned int flags,
+				    struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	return pmd_write(pmd) ||
-	       ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pmd_dirty(pmd));
+	       ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) &&
+		pmd_exclusive(pmd, vma));
 }
 
 struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -1419,7 +1421,7 @@ struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 
 	assert_spin_locked(pmd_lockptr(mm, pmd));
 
-	if (flags & FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write_pmd(*pmd, flags))
+	if (flags & FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write(*pmd, flags, vma))
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Avoid dumping huge zero page */
-- 
2.17.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-11-19 21:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-11-19 21:47 [RFC PATCH v6 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-20  9:52   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-20  9:52     ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-20 20:36     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-20 20:36       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-21  7:24       ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-21  7:24         ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 02/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Change names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 04/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-12-04 16:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-12-04 16:01     ` Borislav Petkov
2018-12-04 17:08     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-12-04 17:08       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-12-04 18:16       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-12-04 18:16         ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 05/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 06/26] x86/cet: Add control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 07/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 08/26] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 09/26] mm/mmap: Prevent Shadow Stack VMA merges Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 10/26] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 11/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 12/26] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 13/26] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 14/26] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 15/26] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 16/26] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2018-11-19 21:48   ` [RFC PATCH v6 17/26] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 18/26] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 19/26] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 20/26] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 21/26] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 22/26] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-04-25 11:02   ` Dave Martin
2019-04-25 11:02     ` Dave Martin
2019-04-25 15:14     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-04-25 15:14       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-04-25 15:35       ` Dave Martin
2019-04-25 15:35         ` Dave Martin
2019-04-25 16:11         ` Dave Martin
2019-04-25 16:11           ` Dave Martin
2019-04-25 16:20         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-04-25 16:20           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 23/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 24/26] mm/mmap: Add Shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 25/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 26/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-22 16:53 ` [RFC PATCH v6 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-22 16:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-26 17:38   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-26 17:38     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-26 18:29     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-26 18:29       ` Andy Lutomirski

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