From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Pa
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v6 06/26] x86/cet: Add control protection exception handler
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 13:47:49 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181119214809.6086-7-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181119214809.6086-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
A control protection exception is triggered when a control flow transfer
attempt violated shadow stack or indirect branch tracking constraints.
For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the
safe copy on the shadow stack; or a JMP instruction arrives at a non-
ENDBR instruction.
The control protection exception handler works in a similar way as the
general protection fault handler.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 3 ++
arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 4 +++
arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h | 3 +-
6 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index ce25d84023c0..660b56706d91 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -976,7 +976,7 @@ idtentry spurious_interrupt_bug do_spurious_interrupt_bug has_error_code=0
idtentry coprocessor_error do_coprocessor_error has_error_code=0
idtentry alignment_check do_alignment_check has_error_code=1
idtentry simd_coprocessor_error do_simd_coprocessor_error has_error_code=0
-
+idtentry control_protection do_control_protection has_error_code=1
/*
* Reload gs selector with exception handling
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
index 3de69330e6c5..20841d301e93 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ asmlinkage void invalid_TSS(void);
asmlinkage void segment_not_present(void);
asmlinkage void stack_segment(void);
asmlinkage void general_protection(void);
+asmlinkage void control_protection(void);
asmlinkage void page_fault(void);
asmlinkage void async_page_fault(void);
asmlinkage void spurious_interrupt_bug(void);
@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ dotraplinkage void do_stack_segment(struct pt_regs *, long);
dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *, long);
#endif
dotraplinkage void do_general_protection(struct pt_regs *, long);
+dotraplinkage void do_control_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
dotraplinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *, unsigned long);
dotraplinkage void do_spurious_interrupt_bug(struct pt_regs *, long);
dotraplinkage void do_coprocessor_error(struct pt_regs *, long);
@@ -142,6 +144,7 @@ enum {
X86_TRAP_AC, /* 17, Alignment Check */
X86_TRAP_MC, /* 18, Machine Check */
X86_TRAP_XF, /* 19, SIMD Floating-Point Exception */
+ X86_TRAP_CP = 21, /* 21 Control Protection Fault */
X86_TRAP_IRET = 32, /* 32, IRET Exception */
};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
index 01adea278a71..66ebc8cb16e2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
@@ -104,6 +104,10 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data def_idts[] = {
#elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32)
SYSG(IA32_SYSCALL_VECTOR, entry_INT80_32),
#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ INTG(X86_TRAP_CP, control_protection),
+#endif
};
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
index 9ccbf0576cd0..c572a3de1037 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static inline void signal_compat_build_tests(void)
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGILL != 11);
BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGFPE != 15);
- BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSEGV != 7);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSEGV != 8);
BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGBUS != 5);
BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGTRAP != 5);
BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGCHLD != 6);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 9b7c4ca8f0a7..0bef2e914d5f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -569,6 +569,63 @@ do_general_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_general_protection);
+static const char *control_protection_err[] = {
+ "unknown",
+ "near-ret",
+ "far-ret/iret",
+ "endbranch",
+ "rstorssp",
+ "setssbsy",
+};
+
+/*
+ * When a control protection exception occurs, send a signal
+ * to the responsible application. Currently, control
+ * protection is only enabled for the user mode. This
+ * exception should not come from the kernel mode.
+ */
+dotraplinkage void
+do_control_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
+{
+ struct task_struct *tsk;
+
+ RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_is_watching(), "entry code didn't wake RCU");
+ if (notify_die(DIE_TRAP, "control protection fault", regs,
+ error_code, X86_TRAP_CP, SIGSEGV) == NOTIFY_STOP)
+ return;
+ cond_local_irq_enable(regs);
+
+ if (!user_mode(regs))
+ die("kernel control protection fault", regs, error_code);
+
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
+ !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "CET is disabled but got control protection fault\n");
+
+ tsk = current;
+ tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
+ tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_CP;
+
+ if (show_unhandled_signals && unhandled_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV) &&
+ printk_ratelimit()) {
+ unsigned int max_err;
+
+ max_err = ARRAY_SIZE(control_protection_err) - 1;
+ if ((error_code < 0) || (error_code > max_err))
+ error_code = 0;
+ pr_info("%s[%d] control protection ip:%lx sp:%lx error:%lx(%s)",
+ tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk),
+ regs->ip, regs->sp, error_code,
+ control_protection_err[error_code]);
+ print_vma_addr(KERN_CONT " in ", regs->ip);
+ pr_cont("\n");
+ }
+
+ force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, SEGV_CPERR,
+ (void __user *)uprobe_get_trap_addr(regs), tsk);
+}
+NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_control_protection);
+
dotraplinkage void notrace do_int3(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE
diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
index cb3d6c267181..693071dbe641 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
@@ -229,7 +229,8 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
#define SEGV_ACCADI 5 /* ADI not enabled for mapped object */
#define SEGV_ADIDERR 6 /* Disrupting MCD error */
#define SEGV_ADIPERR 7 /* Precise MCD exception */
-#define NSIGSEGV 7
+#define SEGV_CPERR 8
+#define NSIGSEGV 8
/*
* SIGBUS si_codes
--
2.17.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v6 06/26] x86/cet: Add control protection exception handler
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 13:47:49 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181119214809.6086-7-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
Message-ID: <20181119214749.3te77hleP6bapZ9HFekGnXQXoGwMB2yf_DYuevVGfZM@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181119214809.6086-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
A control protection exception is triggered when a control flow transfer
attempt violated shadow stack or indirect branch tracking constraints.
For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the
safe copy on the shadow stack; or a JMP instruction arrives at a non-
ENDBR instruction.
The control protection exception handler works in a similar way as the
general protection fault handler.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 3 ++
arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 4 +++
arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h | 3 +-
6 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index ce25d84023c0..660b56706d91 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -976,7 +976,7 @@ idtentry spurious_interrupt_bug do_spurious_interrupt_bug has_error_code=0
idtentry coprocessor_error do_coprocessor_error has_error_code=0
idtentry alignment_check do_alignment_check has_error_code=1
idtentry simd_coprocessor_error do_simd_coprocessor_error has_error_code=0
-
+idtentry control_protection do_control_protection has_error_code=1
/*
* Reload gs selector with exception handling
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
index 3de69330e6c5..20841d301e93 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ asmlinkage void invalid_TSS(void);
asmlinkage void segment_not_present(void);
asmlinkage void stack_segment(void);
asmlinkage void general_protection(void);
+asmlinkage void control_protection(void);
asmlinkage void page_fault(void);
asmlinkage void async_page_fault(void);
asmlinkage void spurious_interrupt_bug(void);
@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ dotraplinkage void do_stack_segment(struct pt_regs *, long);
dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *, long);
#endif
dotraplinkage void do_general_protection(struct pt_regs *, long);
+dotraplinkage void do_control_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
dotraplinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *, unsigned long);
dotraplinkage void do_spurious_interrupt_bug(struct pt_regs *, long);
dotraplinkage void do_coprocessor_error(struct pt_regs *, long);
@@ -142,6 +144,7 @@ enum {
X86_TRAP_AC, /* 17, Alignment Check */
X86_TRAP_MC, /* 18, Machine Check */
X86_TRAP_XF, /* 19, SIMD Floating-Point Exception */
+ X86_TRAP_CP = 21, /* 21 Control Protection Fault */
X86_TRAP_IRET = 32, /* 32, IRET Exception */
};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
index 01adea278a71..66ebc8cb16e2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
@@ -104,6 +104,10 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data def_idts[] = {
#elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32)
SYSG(IA32_SYSCALL_VECTOR, entry_INT80_32),
#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ INTG(X86_TRAP_CP, control_protection),
+#endif
};
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
index 9ccbf0576cd0..c572a3de1037 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static inline void signal_compat_build_tests(void)
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGILL != 11);
BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGFPE != 15);
- BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSEGV != 7);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSEGV != 8);
BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGBUS != 5);
BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGTRAP != 5);
BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGCHLD != 6);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 9b7c4ca8f0a7..0bef2e914d5f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -569,6 +569,63 @@ do_general_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_general_protection);
+static const char *control_protection_err[] = {
+ "unknown",
+ "near-ret",
+ "far-ret/iret",
+ "endbranch",
+ "rstorssp",
+ "setssbsy",
+};
+
+/*
+ * When a control protection exception occurs, send a signal
+ * to the responsible application. Currently, control
+ * protection is only enabled for the user mode. This
+ * exception should not come from the kernel mode.
+ */
+dotraplinkage void
+do_control_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
+{
+ struct task_struct *tsk;
+
+ RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_is_watching(), "entry code didn't wake RCU");
+ if (notify_die(DIE_TRAP, "control protection fault", regs,
+ error_code, X86_TRAP_CP, SIGSEGV) == NOTIFY_STOP)
+ return;
+ cond_local_irq_enable(regs);
+
+ if (!user_mode(regs))
+ die("kernel control protection fault", regs, error_code);
+
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
+ !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "CET is disabled but got control protection fault\n");
+
+ tsk = current;
+ tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
+ tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_CP;
+
+ if (show_unhandled_signals && unhandled_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV) &&
+ printk_ratelimit()) {
+ unsigned int max_err;
+
+ max_err = ARRAY_SIZE(control_protection_err) - 1;
+ if ((error_code < 0) || (error_code > max_err))
+ error_code = 0;
+ pr_info("%s[%d] control protection ip:%lx sp:%lx error:%lx(%s)",
+ tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk),
+ regs->ip, regs->sp, error_code,
+ control_protection_err[error_code]);
+ print_vma_addr(KERN_CONT " in ", regs->ip);
+ pr_cont("\n");
+ }
+
+ force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, SEGV_CPERR,
+ (void __user *)uprobe_get_trap_addr(regs), tsk);
+}
+NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_control_protection);
+
dotraplinkage void notrace do_int3(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE
diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
index cb3d6c267181..693071dbe641 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
@@ -229,7 +229,8 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
#define SEGV_ACCADI 5 /* ADI not enabled for mapped object */
#define SEGV_ADIDERR 6 /* Disrupting MCD error */
#define SEGV_ADIPERR 7 /* Precise MCD exception */
-#define NSIGSEGV 7
+#define SEGV_CPERR 8
+#define NSIGSEGV 8
/*
* SIGBUS si_codes
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-11-19 21:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-11-19 21:47 [RFC PATCH v6 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-20 9:52 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-20 9:52 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-20 20:36 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-20 20:36 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-21 7:24 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-21 7:24 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 02/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Change names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 04/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-12-04 16:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-12-04 16:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-12-04 17:08 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-12-04 17:08 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-12-04 18:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-12-04 18:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 05/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 06/26] x86/cet: Add control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 07/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 08/26] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 09/26] mm/mmap: Prevent Shadow Stack VMA merges Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 10/26] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 11/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 12/26] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 13/26] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 14/26] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 15/26] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 16/26] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 17/26] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 18/26] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 19/26] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 20/26] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 21/26] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 22/26] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-04-25 11:02 ` Dave Martin
2019-04-25 11:02 ` Dave Martin
2019-04-25 15:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-04-25 15:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-04-25 15:35 ` Dave Martin
2019-04-25 15:35 ` Dave Martin
2019-04-25 16:11 ` Dave Martin
2019-04-25 16:11 ` Dave Martin
2019-04-25 16:20 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-04-25 16:20 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 23/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 24/26] mm/mmap: Add Shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 25/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 26/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-22 16:53 ` [RFC PATCH v6 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-22 16:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-26 17:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-26 17:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-26 18:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-26 18:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
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