From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com,
frankja@linux.ibm.com, pair@us.ibm.com, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
cohuck@redhat.com, Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>,
Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 00/18] Refactor configuration of guest memory protection
Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2020 09:20:12 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200604162012.GA30456@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200604031129.GB228651@umbus.fritz.box>
On Thu, Jun 04, 2020 at 01:11:29PM +1000, David Gibson wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 01, 2020 at 10:16:18AM +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> > * Sean Christopherson (sean.j.christopherson@intel.com) wrote:
> > > On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 01:42:46PM +1000, David Gibson wrote:
> > > > Note: I'm using the term "guest memory protection" throughout to refer
> > > > to mechanisms like this. I don't particular like the term, it's both
> > > > long and not really precise. If someone can think of a succinct way
> > > > of saying "a means of protecting guest memory from a possibly
> > > > compromised hypervisor", I'd be grateful for the suggestion.
> > >
> > > Many of the features are also going far beyond just protecting memory, so
> > > even the "memory" part feels wrong. Maybe something like protected-guest
> > > or secure-guest?
> > >
> > > A little imprecision isn't necessarily a bad thing, e.g. memory-encryption
> > > is quite precise, but also wrong once it encompasses anything beyond plain
> > > old encryption.
> >
> > The common thread I think is 'untrusted host' - but I don't know of a
> > better way to describe that.
>
> Hrm.. UntrustedHost? CompromisedHostMitigation? HostTrustMitigation
> (that way it has the same abbreviation as hardware transactional
> memory for extra confusion)? HypervisorPowerLimitation?
GuestWithTrustIssues? Then we can shorten it to InsecureGuest and cause all
kinds of confusion :-D.
> HostTrustLimitation? "HTL". That's not too bad, actually, I might go
> with that unless someone suggests something better.
DePrivelegedHost? "DPH". The "de-privelege" phrase seems to be another
recurring theme.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: pair@us.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
cohuck@redhat.com, "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 00/18] Refactor configuration of guest memory protection
Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2020 09:20:12 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200604162012.GA30456@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200604031129.GB228651@umbus.fritz.box>
On Thu, Jun 04, 2020 at 01:11:29PM +1000, David Gibson wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 01, 2020 at 10:16:18AM +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> > * Sean Christopherson (sean.j.christopherson@intel.com) wrote:
> > > On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 01:42:46PM +1000, David Gibson wrote:
> > > > Note: I'm using the term "guest memory protection" throughout to refer
> > > > to mechanisms like this. I don't particular like the term, it's both
> > > > long and not really precise. If someone can think of a succinct way
> > > > of saying "a means of protecting guest memory from a possibly
> > > > compromised hypervisor", I'd be grateful for the suggestion.
> > >
> > > Many of the features are also going far beyond just protecting memory, so
> > > even the "memory" part feels wrong. Maybe something like protected-guest
> > > or secure-guest?
> > >
> > > A little imprecision isn't necessarily a bad thing, e.g. memory-encryption
> > > is quite precise, but also wrong once it encompasses anything beyond plain
> > > old encryption.
> >
> > The common thread I think is 'untrusted host' - but I don't know of a
> > better way to describe that.
>
> Hrm.. UntrustedHost? CompromisedHostMitigation? HostTrustMitigation
> (that way it has the same abbreviation as hardware transactional
> memory for extra confusion)? HypervisorPowerLimitation?
GuestWithTrustIssues? Then we can shorten it to InsecureGuest and cause all
kinds of confusion :-D.
> HostTrustLimitation? "HTL". That's not too bad, actually, I might go
> with that unless someone suggests something better.
DePrivelegedHost? "DPH". The "de-privelege" phrase seems to be another
recurring theme.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-06-04 16:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 156+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-21 3:42 [RFC v2 00/18] Refactor configuration of guest memory protection David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 01/18] target/i386: sev: Remove unused QSevGuestInfoClass David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-05-29 9:01 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-06-02 3:04 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 02/18] target/i386: sev: Move local structure definitions into .c file David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-05-29 9:03 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-06-02 3:05 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 03/18] target/i386: sev: Rename QSevGuestInfo David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-05-29 9:05 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-06-02 3:06 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 04/18] target/i386: sev: Embed SEVState in SevGuestState David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-05-29 9:09 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-06-04 3:15 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 3:15 ` David Gibson
2020-06-02 3:07 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 05/18] target/i386: sev: Partial cleanup to sev_state global David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-06-02 3:08 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 06/18] target/i386: sev: Remove redundant cbitpos and reduced_phys_bits fields David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-05-29 9:11 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-06-02 3:09 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 07/18] target/i386: sev: Remove redundant policy field David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-06-02 3:13 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 08/18] target/i386: sev: Remove redundant handle field David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-06-02 3:16 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 09/18] target/i386: sev: Unify SEVState and SevGuestState David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-05-29 9:13 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-06-02 3:18 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 10/18] guest memory protection: Add guest memory protection interface David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-05-25 10:27 ` Greg Kurz
2020-05-25 10:27 ` Greg Kurz
2020-06-03 10:09 ` David Gibson
2020-06-03 10:09 ` David Gibson
2020-06-02 1:44 ` Richard Henderson
2020-06-03 10:09 ` David Gibson
2020-06-03 10:09 ` David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 11/18] guest memory protection: Handle memory encrption via interface David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-05-25 10:26 ` Greg Kurz
2020-05-25 10:26 ` Greg Kurz
2020-06-04 3:27 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 3:27 ` David Gibson
2020-06-02 3:21 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 12/18] guest memory protection: Perform KVM init " David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-06-02 3:39 ` Richard Henderson
2020-06-02 3:45 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 13/18] guest memory protection: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-06-02 3:41 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:43 ` [RFC v2 14/18] guest memory protection: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:43 ` David Gibson
2020-06-02 3:54 ` Richard Henderson
2020-06-04 5:56 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 5:56 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 6:19 ` Thomas Huth
2020-06-04 6:19 ` Thomas Huth
2020-06-04 6:25 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 6:25 ` David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:43 ` [RFC v2 15/18] guest memory protection: Decouple kvm_memcrypt_*() helpers from KVM David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:43 ` David Gibson
2020-06-02 4:13 ` Richard Henderson
2020-06-03 10:18 ` David Gibson
2020-06-03 10:18 ` David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:43 ` [RFC v2 16/18] guest memory protection: Add Error ** to GuestMemoryProtection::kvm_init David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:43 ` David Gibson
2020-05-29 9:16 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-06-02 4:15 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:43 ` [RFC v2 17/18] spapr: Added PEF based guest memory protection David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:43 ` David Gibson
2020-05-25 11:14 ` Greg Kurz
2020-05-25 11:14 ` Greg Kurz
2020-05-29 7:59 ` Ram Pai
2020-05-29 7:59 ` Ram Pai
2020-06-04 3:46 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 3:46 ` David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:43 ` [RFC v2 18/18] guest memory protection: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:43 ` David Gibson
2020-06-05 10:45 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-05 10:45 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-05 16:04 ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-05 16:04 ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-06 20:21 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-06 20:21 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-07 3:07 ` David Gibson
2020-06-07 3:07 ` David Gibson
2020-06-09 10:16 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-09 10:16 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-09 15:40 ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-09 15:40 ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-09 15:57 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-09 15:57 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-09 16:01 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-09 16:01 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-10 4:45 ` David Gibson
2020-06-10 4:45 ` David Gibson
2020-06-10 4:39 ` David Gibson
2020-06-10 4:39 ` David Gibson
2020-06-10 8:48 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-10 8:48 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-10 10:07 ` David Gibson
2020-06-10 10:07 ` David Gibson
2020-06-10 13:21 ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-10 13:21 ` Halil Pasic
2020-05-29 22:19 ` [RFC v2 00/18] Refactor configuration of guest memory protection Sean Christopherson
2020-05-29 22:19 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-01 9:16 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-01 9:16 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-04 3:11 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 3:11 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 16:20 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2020-06-04 16:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-04 3:05 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 3:05 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 4:39 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-04 4:39 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-04 6:21 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 6:21 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 21:54 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-04 21:54 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-04 22:47 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-06-04 22:47 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-06-04 23:30 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-04 23:30 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-04 23:41 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-06-04 23:41 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-06-05 20:01 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-05 20:01 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-06 8:24 ` David Gibson
2020-06-06 8:24 ` David Gibson
2020-06-08 15:10 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-08 15:10 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-04 6:44 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 6:44 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 9:08 ` Greg Kurz
2020-06-04 9:08 ` Greg Kurz
2020-06-06 8:45 ` David Gibson
2020-06-06 8:45 ` David Gibson
2020-06-05 10:55 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-05 10:55 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-06 8:44 ` David Gibson
2020-06-06 8:44 ` David Gibson
2020-06-09 10:11 ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-09 10:11 ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-10 4:36 ` David Gibson
2020-06-10 4:36 ` David Gibson
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