From: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
To: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Cc: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>,
pair@us.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
dgilbert@redhat.com, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 18/18] guest memory protection: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests
Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2020 15:21:59 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200610152159.0b892016.pasic@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200610104842.2687215a.cohuck@redhat.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 4040 bytes --]
On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 10:48:42 +0200
Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 14:39:22 +1000
> David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> wrote:
>
> > On Tue, Jun 09, 2020 at 12:16:41PM +0200, Cornelia Huck wrote:
> > > On Sun, 7 Jun 2020 13:07:35 +1000
> > > David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> wrote:
> > >
> > > > On Sat, Jun 06, 2020 at 04:21:31PM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > > > On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 01:43:04PM +1000, David Gibson wrote:
> > > > > > The default behaviour for virtio devices is not to use the platforms normal
> > > > > > DMA paths, but instead to use the fact that it's running in a hypervisor
> > > > > > to directly access guest memory. That doesn't work if the guest's memory
> > > > > > is protected from hypervisor access, such as with AMD's SEV or POWER's PEF.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > So, if a guest memory protection mechanism is enabled, then apply the
> > > > > > iommu_platform=on option so it will go through normal DMA mechanisms.
> > > > > > Those will presumably have some way of marking memory as shared with the
> > > > > > hypervisor or hardware so that DMA will work.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
> > > > > > ---
> > > > > > hw/core/machine.c | 11 +++++++++++
> > > > > > 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > > > index 88d699bceb..cb6580954e 100644
> > > > > > --- a/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > > > +++ b/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > > > @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
> > > > > > #include "hw/mem/nvdimm.h"
> > > > > > #include "migration/vmstate.h"
> > > > > > #include "exec/guest-memory-protection.h"
> > > > > > +#include "hw/virtio/virtio.h"
> > > > > > +#include "hw/virtio/virtio-pci.h"
> > > > > >
> > > > > > GlobalProperty hw_compat_5_0[] = {};
> > > > > > const size_t hw_compat_5_0_len = G_N_ELEMENTS(hw_compat_5_0);
> > > > > > @@ -1159,6 +1161,15 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine)
> > > > > > * areas.
> > > > > > */
> > > > > > machine_set_mem_merge(OBJECT(machine), false, &error_abort);
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + /*
> > > > > > + * Virtio devices can't count on directly accessing guest
> > > > > > + * memory, so they need iommu_platform=on to use normal DMA
> > > > > > + * mechanisms. That requires disabling legacy virtio support
> > > > > > + * for virtio pci devices
> > > > > > + */
> > > > > > + object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_PCI, "disable-legacy", "on");
> > > > > > + object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_DEVICE, "iommu_platform", "on");
> > > > > > }
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > I think it's a reasonable way to address this overall.
> > > > > As Cornelia has commented, addressing ccw as well
> > > >
> > > > Sure. I was assuming somebody who actually knows ccw could do that as
> > > > a follow up.
> > >
> > > FWIW, I think we could simply enable iommu_platform for protected
> > > guests for ccw; no prereqs like pci's disable-legacy.
> >
> > Right, and the code above should in fact already do so, since it
> > applies that to TYPE_VIRTIO_DEVICE, which is common. The
> > disable-legacy part should be harmless for s390, since this is
> > effectively just setting a default, and we don't expect any
> > TYPE_VIRTIO_PCI devices to be instantiated on z.
>
> Well, virtio-pci is available on s390, so people could try to use it --
> however, forcing disable-legacy won't hurt in that case, as it won't
> make the situation worse (I don't expect virtio-pci to work on s390
> protected guests.)
Currently we don't have to worry about virtio-pci when running in
protected mode, because PCI is not supported currently, and this is
enforced by the ultravisor which would inject operation exceptions should
a PV guest try to use our PCI instructions.
[..]
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
To: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Cc: pair@us.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
dgilbert@redhat.com, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>,
mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 18/18] guest memory protection: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests
Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2020 15:21:59 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200610152159.0b892016.pasic@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200610104842.2687215a.cohuck@redhat.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 4040 bytes --]
On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 10:48:42 +0200
Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 14:39:22 +1000
> David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> wrote:
>
> > On Tue, Jun 09, 2020 at 12:16:41PM +0200, Cornelia Huck wrote:
> > > On Sun, 7 Jun 2020 13:07:35 +1000
> > > David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> wrote:
> > >
> > > > On Sat, Jun 06, 2020 at 04:21:31PM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > > > On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 01:43:04PM +1000, David Gibson wrote:
> > > > > > The default behaviour for virtio devices is not to use the platforms normal
> > > > > > DMA paths, but instead to use the fact that it's running in a hypervisor
> > > > > > to directly access guest memory. That doesn't work if the guest's memory
> > > > > > is protected from hypervisor access, such as with AMD's SEV or POWER's PEF.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > So, if a guest memory protection mechanism is enabled, then apply the
> > > > > > iommu_platform=on option so it will go through normal DMA mechanisms.
> > > > > > Those will presumably have some way of marking memory as shared with the
> > > > > > hypervisor or hardware so that DMA will work.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
> > > > > > ---
> > > > > > hw/core/machine.c | 11 +++++++++++
> > > > > > 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > > > index 88d699bceb..cb6580954e 100644
> > > > > > --- a/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > > > +++ b/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > > > @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
> > > > > > #include "hw/mem/nvdimm.h"
> > > > > > #include "migration/vmstate.h"
> > > > > > #include "exec/guest-memory-protection.h"
> > > > > > +#include "hw/virtio/virtio.h"
> > > > > > +#include "hw/virtio/virtio-pci.h"
> > > > > >
> > > > > > GlobalProperty hw_compat_5_0[] = {};
> > > > > > const size_t hw_compat_5_0_len = G_N_ELEMENTS(hw_compat_5_0);
> > > > > > @@ -1159,6 +1161,15 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine)
> > > > > > * areas.
> > > > > > */
> > > > > > machine_set_mem_merge(OBJECT(machine), false, &error_abort);
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + /*
> > > > > > + * Virtio devices can't count on directly accessing guest
> > > > > > + * memory, so they need iommu_platform=on to use normal DMA
> > > > > > + * mechanisms. That requires disabling legacy virtio support
> > > > > > + * for virtio pci devices
> > > > > > + */
> > > > > > + object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_PCI, "disable-legacy", "on");
> > > > > > + object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_DEVICE, "iommu_platform", "on");
> > > > > > }
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > I think it's a reasonable way to address this overall.
> > > > > As Cornelia has commented, addressing ccw as well
> > > >
> > > > Sure. I was assuming somebody who actually knows ccw could do that as
> > > > a follow up.
> > >
> > > FWIW, I think we could simply enable iommu_platform for protected
> > > guests for ccw; no prereqs like pci's disable-legacy.
> >
> > Right, and the code above should in fact already do so, since it
> > applies that to TYPE_VIRTIO_DEVICE, which is common. The
> > disable-legacy part should be harmless for s390, since this is
> > effectively just setting a default, and we don't expect any
> > TYPE_VIRTIO_PCI devices to be instantiated on z.
>
> Well, virtio-pci is available on s390, so people could try to use it --
> however, forcing disable-legacy won't hurt in that case, as it won't
> make the situation worse (I don't expect virtio-pci to work on s390
> protected guests.)
Currently we don't have to worry about virtio-pci when running in
protected mode, because PCI is not supported currently, and this is
enforced by the ultravisor which would inject operation exceptions should
a PV guest try to use our PCI instructions.
[..]
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-06-10 13:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 156+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-21 3:42 [RFC v2 00/18] Refactor configuration of guest memory protection David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 01/18] target/i386: sev: Remove unused QSevGuestInfoClass David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-05-29 9:01 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-06-02 3:04 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 02/18] target/i386: sev: Move local structure definitions into .c file David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-05-29 9:03 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-06-02 3:05 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 03/18] target/i386: sev: Rename QSevGuestInfo David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-05-29 9:05 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-06-02 3:06 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 04/18] target/i386: sev: Embed SEVState in SevGuestState David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-05-29 9:09 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-06-04 3:15 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 3:15 ` David Gibson
2020-06-02 3:07 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 05/18] target/i386: sev: Partial cleanup to sev_state global David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-06-02 3:08 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 06/18] target/i386: sev: Remove redundant cbitpos and reduced_phys_bits fields David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-05-29 9:11 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-06-02 3:09 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 07/18] target/i386: sev: Remove redundant policy field David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-06-02 3:13 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 08/18] target/i386: sev: Remove redundant handle field David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-06-02 3:16 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 09/18] target/i386: sev: Unify SEVState and SevGuestState David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-05-29 9:13 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-06-02 3:18 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 10/18] guest memory protection: Add guest memory protection interface David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-05-25 10:27 ` Greg Kurz
2020-05-25 10:27 ` Greg Kurz
2020-06-03 10:09 ` David Gibson
2020-06-03 10:09 ` David Gibson
2020-06-02 1:44 ` Richard Henderson
2020-06-03 10:09 ` David Gibson
2020-06-03 10:09 ` David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 11/18] guest memory protection: Handle memory encrption via interface David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-05-25 10:26 ` Greg Kurz
2020-05-25 10:26 ` Greg Kurz
2020-06-04 3:27 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 3:27 ` David Gibson
2020-06-02 3:21 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 12/18] guest memory protection: Perform KVM init " David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-06-02 3:39 ` Richard Henderson
2020-06-02 3:45 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` [RFC v2 13/18] guest memory protection: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-06-02 3:41 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:43 ` [RFC v2 14/18] guest memory protection: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:43 ` David Gibson
2020-06-02 3:54 ` Richard Henderson
2020-06-04 5:56 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 5:56 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 6:19 ` Thomas Huth
2020-06-04 6:19 ` Thomas Huth
2020-06-04 6:25 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 6:25 ` David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:43 ` [RFC v2 15/18] guest memory protection: Decouple kvm_memcrypt_*() helpers from KVM David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:43 ` David Gibson
2020-06-02 4:13 ` Richard Henderson
2020-06-03 10:18 ` David Gibson
2020-06-03 10:18 ` David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:43 ` [RFC v2 16/18] guest memory protection: Add Error ** to GuestMemoryProtection::kvm_init David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:43 ` David Gibson
2020-05-29 9:16 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-06-02 4:15 ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21 3:43 ` [RFC v2 17/18] spapr: Added PEF based guest memory protection David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:43 ` David Gibson
2020-05-25 11:14 ` Greg Kurz
2020-05-25 11:14 ` Greg Kurz
2020-05-29 7:59 ` Ram Pai
2020-05-29 7:59 ` Ram Pai
2020-06-04 3:46 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 3:46 ` David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:43 ` [RFC v2 18/18] guest memory protection: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson
2020-05-21 3:43 ` David Gibson
2020-06-05 10:45 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-05 10:45 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-05 16:04 ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-05 16:04 ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-06 20:21 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-06 20:21 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-07 3:07 ` David Gibson
2020-06-07 3:07 ` David Gibson
2020-06-09 10:16 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-09 10:16 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-09 15:40 ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-09 15:40 ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-09 15:57 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-09 15:57 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-09 16:01 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-09 16:01 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-10 4:45 ` David Gibson
2020-06-10 4:45 ` David Gibson
2020-06-10 4:39 ` David Gibson
2020-06-10 4:39 ` David Gibson
2020-06-10 8:48 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-10 8:48 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-10 10:07 ` David Gibson
2020-06-10 10:07 ` David Gibson
2020-06-10 13:21 ` Halil Pasic [this message]
2020-06-10 13:21 ` Halil Pasic
2020-05-29 22:19 ` [RFC v2 00/18] Refactor configuration of guest memory protection Sean Christopherson
2020-05-29 22:19 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-01 9:16 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-01 9:16 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-04 3:11 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 3:11 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 16:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-04 16:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-04 3:05 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 3:05 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 4:39 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-04 4:39 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-04 6:21 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 6:21 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 21:54 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-04 21:54 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-04 22:47 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-06-04 22:47 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-06-04 23:30 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-04 23:30 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-04 23:41 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-06-04 23:41 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-06-05 20:01 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-05 20:01 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-06 8:24 ` David Gibson
2020-06-06 8:24 ` David Gibson
2020-06-08 15:10 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-08 15:10 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-04 6:44 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 6:44 ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 9:08 ` Greg Kurz
2020-06-04 9:08 ` Greg Kurz
2020-06-06 8:45 ` David Gibson
2020-06-06 8:45 ` David Gibson
2020-06-05 10:55 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-05 10:55 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-06 8:44 ` David Gibson
2020-06-06 8:44 ` David Gibson
2020-06-09 10:11 ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-09 10:11 ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-10 4:36 ` David Gibson
2020-06-10 4:36 ` David Gibson
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