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From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
To: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com,
	frankja@linux.ibm.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, pair@us.ibm.com,
	qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
	Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>,
	Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
	Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 18/18] guest memory protection: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests
Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2020 14:39:22 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200610043922.GI494336@umbus.fritz.box> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200609121641.5b3ffa48.cohuck@redhat.com>

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On Tue, Jun 09, 2020 at 12:16:41PM +0200, Cornelia Huck wrote:
> On Sun, 7 Jun 2020 13:07:35 +1000
> David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> wrote:
> 
> > On Sat, Jun 06, 2020 at 04:21:31PM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 01:43:04PM +1000, David Gibson wrote:  
> > > > The default behaviour for virtio devices is not to use the platforms normal
> > > > DMA paths, but instead to use the fact that it's running in a hypervisor
> > > > to directly access guest memory.  That doesn't work if the guest's memory
> > > > is protected from hypervisor access, such as with AMD's SEV or POWER's PEF.
> > > > 
> > > > So, if a guest memory protection mechanism is enabled, then apply the
> > > > iommu_platform=on option so it will go through normal DMA mechanisms.
> > > > Those will presumably have some way of marking memory as shared with the
> > > > hypervisor or hardware so that DMA will work.
> > > > 
> > > > Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
> > > > ---
> > > >  hw/core/machine.c | 11 +++++++++++
> > > >  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
> > > > 
> > > > diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > index 88d699bceb..cb6580954e 100644
> > > > --- a/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > +++ b/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
> > > >  #include "hw/mem/nvdimm.h"
> > > >  #include "migration/vmstate.h"
> > > >  #include "exec/guest-memory-protection.h"
> > > > +#include "hw/virtio/virtio.h"
> > > > +#include "hw/virtio/virtio-pci.h"
> > > >  
> > > >  GlobalProperty hw_compat_5_0[] = {};
> > > >  const size_t hw_compat_5_0_len = G_N_ELEMENTS(hw_compat_5_0);
> > > > @@ -1159,6 +1161,15 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine)
> > > >           * areas.
> > > >           */
> > > >          machine_set_mem_merge(OBJECT(machine), false, &error_abort);
> > > > +
> > > > +        /*
> > > > +         * Virtio devices can't count on directly accessing guest
> > > > +         * memory, so they need iommu_platform=on to use normal DMA
> > > > +         * mechanisms.  That requires disabling legacy virtio support
> > > > +         * for virtio pci devices
> > > > +         */
> > > > +        object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_PCI, "disable-legacy", "on");
> > > > +        object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_DEVICE, "iommu_platform", "on");
> > > >      }
> > > >    
> > > 
> > > I think it's a reasonable way to address this overall.
> > > As Cornelia has commented, addressing ccw as well  
> > 
> > Sure.  I was assuming somebody who actually knows ccw could do that as
> > a follow up.
> 
> FWIW, I think we could simply enable iommu_platform for protected
> guests for ccw; no prereqs like pci's disable-legacy.

Right, and the code above should in fact already do so, since it
applies that to TYPE_VIRTIO_DEVICE, which is common.  The
disable-legacy part should be harmless for s390, since this is
effectively just setting a default, and we don't expect any
TYPE_VIRTIO_PCI devices to be instantiated on z.

> > > as cases where user has
> > > specified the property manually could be worth-while.  
> > 
> > I don't really see what's to be done there.  I'm assuming that if the
> > user specifies it, they know what they're doing - particularly with
> > nonstandard guests there are some odd edge cases where those
> > combinations might work, they're just not very likely.
> 
> If I understood Halil correctly, devices without iommu_platform
> apparently can crash protected guests on s390. Is that supposed to be a
> "if it breaks, you get to keep the pieces" situation, or do we really
> want to enforce iommu_platform?

I actually think "if you broke it, keep the pieces" is an acceptable
approach here, but that doesn't preclude some further enforcement to
improve UX.

-- 
David Gibson			| I'll have my music baroque, and my code
david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au	| minimalist, thank you.  NOT _the_ _other_
				| _way_ _around_!
http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson

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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
To: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Cc: pair@us.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
	dgilbert@redhat.com, Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>,
	qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 18/18] guest memory protection: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests
Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2020 14:39:22 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200610043922.GI494336@umbus.fritz.box> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200609121641.5b3ffa48.cohuck@redhat.com>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 4064 bytes --]

On Tue, Jun 09, 2020 at 12:16:41PM +0200, Cornelia Huck wrote:
> On Sun, 7 Jun 2020 13:07:35 +1000
> David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> wrote:
> 
> > On Sat, Jun 06, 2020 at 04:21:31PM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 01:43:04PM +1000, David Gibson wrote:  
> > > > The default behaviour for virtio devices is not to use the platforms normal
> > > > DMA paths, but instead to use the fact that it's running in a hypervisor
> > > > to directly access guest memory.  That doesn't work if the guest's memory
> > > > is protected from hypervisor access, such as with AMD's SEV or POWER's PEF.
> > > > 
> > > > So, if a guest memory protection mechanism is enabled, then apply the
> > > > iommu_platform=on option so it will go through normal DMA mechanisms.
> > > > Those will presumably have some way of marking memory as shared with the
> > > > hypervisor or hardware so that DMA will work.
> > > > 
> > > > Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
> > > > ---
> > > >  hw/core/machine.c | 11 +++++++++++
> > > >  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
> > > > 
> > > > diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > index 88d699bceb..cb6580954e 100644
> > > > --- a/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > +++ b/hw/core/machine.c
> > > > @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
> > > >  #include "hw/mem/nvdimm.h"
> > > >  #include "migration/vmstate.h"
> > > >  #include "exec/guest-memory-protection.h"
> > > > +#include "hw/virtio/virtio.h"
> > > > +#include "hw/virtio/virtio-pci.h"
> > > >  
> > > >  GlobalProperty hw_compat_5_0[] = {};
> > > >  const size_t hw_compat_5_0_len = G_N_ELEMENTS(hw_compat_5_0);
> > > > @@ -1159,6 +1161,15 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine)
> > > >           * areas.
> > > >           */
> > > >          machine_set_mem_merge(OBJECT(machine), false, &error_abort);
> > > > +
> > > > +        /*
> > > > +         * Virtio devices can't count on directly accessing guest
> > > > +         * memory, so they need iommu_platform=on to use normal DMA
> > > > +         * mechanisms.  That requires disabling legacy virtio support
> > > > +         * for virtio pci devices
> > > > +         */
> > > > +        object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_PCI, "disable-legacy", "on");
> > > > +        object_register_sugar_prop(TYPE_VIRTIO_DEVICE, "iommu_platform", "on");
> > > >      }
> > > >    
> > > 
> > > I think it's a reasonable way to address this overall.
> > > As Cornelia has commented, addressing ccw as well  
> > 
> > Sure.  I was assuming somebody who actually knows ccw could do that as
> > a follow up.
> 
> FWIW, I think we could simply enable iommu_platform for protected
> guests for ccw; no prereqs like pci's disable-legacy.

Right, and the code above should in fact already do so, since it
applies that to TYPE_VIRTIO_DEVICE, which is common.  The
disable-legacy part should be harmless for s390, since this is
effectively just setting a default, and we don't expect any
TYPE_VIRTIO_PCI devices to be instantiated on z.

> > > as cases where user has
> > > specified the property manually could be worth-while.  
> > 
> > I don't really see what's to be done there.  I'm assuming that if the
> > user specifies it, they know what they're doing - particularly with
> > nonstandard guests there are some odd edge cases where those
> > combinations might work, they're just not very likely.
> 
> If I understood Halil correctly, devices without iommu_platform
> apparently can crash protected guests on s390. Is that supposed to be a
> "if it breaks, you get to keep the pieces" situation, or do we really
> want to enforce iommu_platform?

I actually think "if you broke it, keep the pieces" is an acceptable
approach here, but that doesn't preclude some further enforcement to
improve UX.

-- 
David Gibson			| I'll have my music baroque, and my code
david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au	| minimalist, thank you.  NOT _the_ _other_
				| _way_ _around_!
http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-06-10  4:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 156+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-21  3:42 [RFC v2 00/18] Refactor configuration of guest memory protection David Gibson
2020-05-21  3:42 ` David Gibson
2020-05-21  3:42 ` [RFC v2 01/18] target/i386: sev: Remove unused QSevGuestInfoClass David Gibson
2020-05-21  3:42   ` David Gibson
2020-05-29  9:01   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-06-02  3:04   ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21  3:42 ` [RFC v2 02/18] target/i386: sev: Move local structure definitions into .c file David Gibson
2020-05-21  3:42   ` David Gibson
2020-05-29  9:03   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-06-02  3:05   ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21  3:42 ` [RFC v2 03/18] target/i386: sev: Rename QSevGuestInfo David Gibson
2020-05-21  3:42   ` David Gibson
2020-05-29  9:05   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-06-02  3:06   ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21  3:42 ` [RFC v2 04/18] target/i386: sev: Embed SEVState in SevGuestState David Gibson
2020-05-21  3:42   ` David Gibson
2020-05-29  9:09   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-06-04  3:15     ` David Gibson
2020-06-04  3:15       ` David Gibson
2020-06-02  3:07   ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21  3:42 ` [RFC v2 05/18] target/i386: sev: Partial cleanup to sev_state global David Gibson
2020-05-21  3:42   ` David Gibson
2020-06-02  3:08   ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21  3:42 ` [RFC v2 06/18] target/i386: sev: Remove redundant cbitpos and reduced_phys_bits fields David Gibson
2020-05-21  3:42   ` David Gibson
2020-05-29  9:11   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-06-02  3:09   ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21  3:42 ` [RFC v2 07/18] target/i386: sev: Remove redundant policy field David Gibson
2020-05-21  3:42   ` David Gibson
2020-06-02  3:13   ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21  3:42 ` [RFC v2 08/18] target/i386: sev: Remove redundant handle field David Gibson
2020-05-21  3:42   ` David Gibson
2020-06-02  3:16   ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21  3:42 ` [RFC v2 09/18] target/i386: sev: Unify SEVState and SevGuestState David Gibson
2020-05-21  3:42   ` David Gibson
2020-05-29  9:13   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-06-02  3:18   ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21  3:42 ` [RFC v2 10/18] guest memory protection: Add guest memory protection interface David Gibson
2020-05-21  3:42   ` David Gibson
2020-05-25 10:27   ` Greg Kurz
2020-05-25 10:27     ` Greg Kurz
2020-06-03 10:09     ` David Gibson
2020-06-03 10:09       ` David Gibson
2020-06-02  1:44   ` Richard Henderson
2020-06-03 10:09     ` David Gibson
2020-06-03 10:09       ` David Gibson
2020-05-21  3:42 ` [RFC v2 11/18] guest memory protection: Handle memory encrption via interface David Gibson
2020-05-21  3:42   ` David Gibson
2020-05-25 10:26   ` Greg Kurz
2020-05-25 10:26     ` Greg Kurz
2020-06-04  3:27     ` David Gibson
2020-06-04  3:27       ` David Gibson
2020-06-02  3:21   ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21  3:42 ` [RFC v2 12/18] guest memory protection: Perform KVM init " David Gibson
2020-05-21  3:42   ` David Gibson
2020-06-02  3:39   ` Richard Henderson
2020-06-02  3:45     ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21  3:42 ` [RFC v2 13/18] guest memory protection: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson
2020-05-21  3:42   ` David Gibson
2020-06-02  3:41   ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21  3:43 ` [RFC v2 14/18] guest memory protection: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson
2020-05-21  3:43   ` David Gibson
2020-06-02  3:54   ` Richard Henderson
2020-06-04  5:56     ` David Gibson
2020-06-04  5:56       ` David Gibson
2020-06-04  6:19       ` Thomas Huth
2020-06-04  6:19         ` Thomas Huth
2020-06-04  6:25         ` David Gibson
2020-06-04  6:25           ` David Gibson
2020-05-21  3:43 ` [RFC v2 15/18] guest memory protection: Decouple kvm_memcrypt_*() helpers from KVM David Gibson
2020-05-21  3:43   ` David Gibson
2020-06-02  4:13   ` Richard Henderson
2020-06-03 10:18     ` David Gibson
2020-06-03 10:18       ` David Gibson
2020-05-21  3:43 ` [RFC v2 16/18] guest memory protection: Add Error ** to GuestMemoryProtection::kvm_init David Gibson
2020-05-21  3:43   ` David Gibson
2020-05-29  9:16   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-06-02  4:15   ` Richard Henderson
2020-05-21  3:43 ` [RFC v2 17/18] spapr: Added PEF based guest memory protection David Gibson
2020-05-21  3:43   ` David Gibson
2020-05-25 11:14   ` Greg Kurz
2020-05-25 11:14     ` Greg Kurz
2020-05-29  7:59   ` Ram Pai
2020-05-29  7:59     ` Ram Pai
2020-06-04  3:46     ` David Gibson
2020-06-04  3:46       ` David Gibson
2020-05-21  3:43 ` [RFC v2 18/18] guest memory protection: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson
2020-05-21  3:43   ` David Gibson
2020-06-05 10:45   ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-05 10:45     ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-05 16:04     ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-05 16:04       ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-06 20:21   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-06 20:21     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-07  3:07     ` David Gibson
2020-06-07  3:07       ` David Gibson
2020-06-09 10:16       ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-09 10:16         ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-09 15:40         ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-09 15:40           ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-09 15:57           ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-09 15:57             ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-09 16:01           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-09 16:01             ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-10  4:45           ` David Gibson
2020-06-10  4:45             ` David Gibson
2020-06-10  4:39         ` David Gibson [this message]
2020-06-10  4:39           ` David Gibson
2020-06-10  8:48           ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-10  8:48             ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-10 10:07             ` David Gibson
2020-06-10 10:07               ` David Gibson
2020-06-10 13:21             ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-10 13:21               ` Halil Pasic
2020-05-29 22:19 ` [RFC v2 00/18] Refactor configuration of guest memory protection Sean Christopherson
2020-05-29 22:19   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-01  9:16   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-01  9:16     ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-04  3:11     ` David Gibson
2020-06-04  3:11       ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 16:20       ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-04 16:20         ` Sean Christopherson
2020-06-04  3:05   ` David Gibson
2020-06-04  3:05     ` David Gibson
2020-06-04  4:39 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-04  4:39   ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-04  6:21   ` David Gibson
2020-06-04  6:21     ` David Gibson
2020-06-04 21:54     ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-04 21:54       ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-04 22:47       ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-06-04 22:47         ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-06-04 23:30         ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-04 23:30           ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-04 23:41           ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-06-04 23:41             ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-06-05 20:01             ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-05 20:01               ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-06  8:24               ` David Gibson
2020-06-06  8:24                 ` David Gibson
2020-06-08 15:10                 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-08 15:10                   ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2020-06-04  6:44   ` David Gibson
2020-06-04  6:44     ` David Gibson
2020-06-04  9:08     ` Greg Kurz
2020-06-04  9:08       ` Greg Kurz
2020-06-06  8:45       ` David Gibson
2020-06-06  8:45         ` David Gibson
2020-06-05 10:55 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-05 10:55   ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-06  8:44   ` David Gibson
2020-06-06  8:44     ` David Gibson
2020-06-09 10:11     ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-09 10:11       ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-10  4:36       ` David Gibson
2020-06-10  4:36         ` David Gibson

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