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From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
To: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: virtio-fs@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
	Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Subject: Re: [Virtio-fs] [PATCH 0/2] virtiofsd: drop Linux capabilities(7)
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2020 20:16:55 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200618191655.GI2769@work-vm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200618190816.GD3814@redhat.com>

* Vivek Goyal (vgoyal@redhat.com) wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 16, 2020 at 05:49:05PM +0100, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote:
> > virtiofsd doesn't need of all Linux capabilities(7) available to root.  Keep a
> > whitelisted set of capabilities that we require.  This improves security in
> > case virtiofsd is compromised by making it hard for an attacker to gain further
> > access to the system.
> 
> Hi Stefan,
> 
> I just noticed that this patch set breaks overlayfs on top of virtiofs.
> 
> overlayfs sets "trusted.overlay.*" and xattrs in trusted domain
> need CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> 
> man xattr says.
> 
>    Trusted extended attributes
>        Trusted  extended  attributes  are  visible and accessible only to pro‐
>        cesses that have the  CAP_SYS_ADMIN  capability.   Attributes  in  this
>        class are used to implement mechanisms in user space (i.e., outside the
>        kernel) which keep information in extended attributes to which ordinary
>        processes should not have access.
> 
> There is a chance that overlay moves away from trusted xattr in future.
> But for now we need to make it work. This is an important use case for
> kata docker in docker build.
> 
> May be we can add an option to virtiofsd say "--add-cap <capability>" and
> ask user to pass in "--add-cap cap_sys_admin" if they need to run daemon
> with this capaibility.

I'll admit I don't like the idea of giving it cap_sys_admin.
Can you explain:
  a) What overlayfs uses trusted for?
  b) If something nasty was to write junk into the trusted attributes,
    what would happen?
  c) I see overlayfs has a fallback check if xattr isn't supported at
all - what is the consequence?

Dave

> Thanks
> Vivek
> 
> > 
> > Stefan Hajnoczi (2):
> >   virtiofsd: only retain file system capabilities
> >   virtiofsd: drop all capabilities in the wait parent process
> > 
> >  tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  1 file changed, 51 insertions(+)
> > 
> > -- 
> > 2.25.1
> > 
> > _______________________________________________
> > Virtio-fs mailing list
> > Virtio-fs@redhat.com
> > https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/virtio-fs
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Virtio-fs mailing list
> Virtio-fs@redhat.com
> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/virtio-fs
--
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
To: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: virtio-fs@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
	Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>,
	Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Subject: Re: [Virtio-fs] [PATCH 0/2] virtiofsd: drop Linux capabilities(7)
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2020 20:16:55 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200618191655.GI2769@work-vm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200618190816.GD3814@redhat.com>

* Vivek Goyal (vgoyal@redhat.com) wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 16, 2020 at 05:49:05PM +0100, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote:
> > virtiofsd doesn't need of all Linux capabilities(7) available to root.  Keep a
> > whitelisted set of capabilities that we require.  This improves security in
> > case virtiofsd is compromised by making it hard for an attacker to gain further
> > access to the system.
> 
> Hi Stefan,
> 
> I just noticed that this patch set breaks overlayfs on top of virtiofs.
> 
> overlayfs sets "trusted.overlay.*" and xattrs in trusted domain
> need CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> 
> man xattr says.
> 
>    Trusted extended attributes
>        Trusted  extended  attributes  are  visible and accessible only to pro‐
>        cesses that have the  CAP_SYS_ADMIN  capability.   Attributes  in  this
>        class are used to implement mechanisms in user space (i.e., outside the
>        kernel) which keep information in extended attributes to which ordinary
>        processes should not have access.
> 
> There is a chance that overlay moves away from trusted xattr in future.
> But for now we need to make it work. This is an important use case for
> kata docker in docker build.
> 
> May be we can add an option to virtiofsd say "--add-cap <capability>" and
> ask user to pass in "--add-cap cap_sys_admin" if they need to run daemon
> with this capaibility.

I'll admit I don't like the idea of giving it cap_sys_admin.
Can you explain:
  a) What overlayfs uses trusted for?
  b) If something nasty was to write junk into the trusted attributes,
    what would happen?
  c) I see overlayfs has a fallback check if xattr isn't supported at
all - what is the consequence?

Dave

> Thanks
> Vivek
> 
> > 
> > Stefan Hajnoczi (2):
> >   virtiofsd: only retain file system capabilities
> >   virtiofsd: drop all capabilities in the wait parent process
> > 
> >  tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  1 file changed, 51 insertions(+)
> > 
> > -- 
> > 2.25.1
> > 
> > _______________________________________________
> > Virtio-fs mailing list
> > Virtio-fs@redhat.com
> > https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/virtio-fs
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Virtio-fs mailing list
> Virtio-fs@redhat.com
> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/virtio-fs
--
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK



  reply	other threads:[~2020-06-18 19:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-16 16:49 [Virtio-fs] [PATCH 0/2] virtiofsd: drop Linux capabilities(7) Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-04-16 16:49 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-04-16 16:49 ` [Virtio-fs] [PATCH 1/2] virtiofsd: only retain file system capabilities Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-04-16 16:49   ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-04-28 11:48   ` [Virtio-fs] " Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-04-28 11:48     ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-04-16 16:49 ` [Virtio-fs] [PATCH 2/2] virtiofsd: drop all capabilities in the wait parent process Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-04-16 16:49   ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-04-16 17:50   ` [Virtio-fs] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-04-16 17:50     ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-04-16 20:10 ` [Virtio-fs] [PATCH 0/2] virtiofsd: drop Linux capabilities(7) Vivek Goyal
2020-04-16 20:10   ` Vivek Goyal
2020-04-17  9:42   ` [Virtio-fs] " Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-04-17  9:42     ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-05-01 18:28 ` [Virtio-fs] " Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-05-01 18:28   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-18 19:08 ` [Virtio-fs] " Vivek Goyal
2020-06-18 19:16   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert [this message]
2020-06-18 19:16     ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-18 19:27     ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-18 19:27       ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19  4:46       ` Chirantan Ekbote
2020-06-19  4:46         ` Chirantan Ekbote
2020-06-19  8:39         ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-19  9:17           ` Chirantan Ekbote
2020-06-19 11:12             ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-19 19:15         ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 19:15           ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-25  3:19           ` Chirantan Ekbote
2020-06-25  3:19             ` Chirantan Ekbote
2020-06-25 12:55             ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-25 12:55               ` Vivek Goyal
2020-07-13  8:54               ` Chirantan Ekbote
2020-07-13  8:54                 ` Chirantan Ekbote
2020-07-13 13:39                 ` Vivek Goyal
2020-07-13 13:39                   ` Vivek Goyal
2020-07-13 21:39                 ` Daniel Walsh
2020-07-14 12:33                   ` Vivek Goyal
2020-07-14 17:16                     ` Daniel Walsh
2020-06-19  8:27       ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-19  8:27         ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-19 11:39         ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-19 11:39           ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-19 11:49           ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-19 11:49             ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-19 12:05             ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-19 12:05               ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-19 17:41               ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 17:41                 ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 19:12           ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 19:12             ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-26 11:26             ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-26 11:26               ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-19 16:09         ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 16:09           ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 16:16           ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-19 16:16             ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-19 17:11             ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 17:11               ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 17:16               ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-19 17:16                 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-19 14:16   ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-06-19 14:16     ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-06-19 14:25     ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 14:25       ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 15:26       ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-06-19 15:26         ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-06-19 15:57         ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 15:57           ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 14:29     ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 14:29       ` Vivek Goyal

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