From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
To: Chirantan Ekbote <chirantan@chromium.org>
Cc: virtio-fs-list <virtio-fs@redhat.com>,
Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Subject: Re: [Virtio-fs] [PATCH 0/2] virtiofsd: drop Linux capabilities(7)
Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2020 09:39:35 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200713133935.GA271133@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAJFHJrpwvEMa_OkxRg3XHXp+=Wuzwwc8shhCZd3xDsmVVJG7aw@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Jul 13, 2020 at 05:54:19PM +0900, Chirantan Ekbote wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 9:55 PM Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 12:19:39PM +0900, Chirantan Ekbote wrote:
> > [..]
> > > > Chirantan,
> > > >
> > > > So you ended up renaming all "trusted", "security" and "system" xattrs?
> > > > Only "user" xattrs are complete passthrough?
> > > >
> > >
> > > No, we only rename "security" xattrs (except for selinux).
> > >
> > > >
> > > > IOW, security.selinux will be renamed to user.virtiofs.security.selinux
> > > > on host?
> > > >
> > >
> > > We don't relabel security.selinux because it only requires CAP_FOWNER
> > > in the process's user namespace and it also does its own MAC-based
> > > checks. Also we have some tools that label files beforehand so it
> > > seemed easier to leave them unchanged.
> >
> > If we rename selinux xattr also, then we can support selinux both in
> > guest and host and they both can have their own independent policies.
> >
>
> This works as long as you don't need to support setfscreatecon, which
> exists to guarantee that an inode is atomically created with the
> correct selinux context. It's kind of possible for files with
> O_TMPFILE + fsetxattr + linkat but there is no equivalent for
> directories. You're basically forced to create the directory and then
> set the xattr and while it's possible to prevent other threads in the
> server from seeing the unfinished directories with a rwlock or similar
> there is no protection against power loss. If the machine loses power
> after the directory is created but before the selinux xattr is set
> then that directory will have the wrong selinux context and the guest
> would need to run restorecon at boot to assign the correct label.
Overlayfs has this notion of work directory where they create directory
(and file if O_TMPFILE is not supported), and then rename it to correct
place. I am wondering if we could do something similar. If server is
given a work directory where.
A. Create new directory
B. set selinux lables
C. rename directory
That way if machine crashes after step A or step B, that directory
never becomes visible to guest and no relabeling is required.
Thanks
Vivek
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
To: Chirantan Ekbote <chirantan@chromium.org>
Cc: virtio-fs-list <virtio-fs@redhat.com>,
Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Subject: Re: [Virtio-fs] [PATCH 0/2] virtiofsd: drop Linux capabilities(7)
Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2020 09:39:35 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200713133935.GA271133@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAJFHJrpwvEMa_OkxRg3XHXp+=Wuzwwc8shhCZd3xDsmVVJG7aw@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Jul 13, 2020 at 05:54:19PM +0900, Chirantan Ekbote wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 9:55 PM Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 12:19:39PM +0900, Chirantan Ekbote wrote:
> > [..]
> > > > Chirantan,
> > > >
> > > > So you ended up renaming all "trusted", "security" and "system" xattrs?
> > > > Only "user" xattrs are complete passthrough?
> > > >
> > >
> > > No, we only rename "security" xattrs (except for selinux).
> > >
> > > >
> > > > IOW, security.selinux will be renamed to user.virtiofs.security.selinux
> > > > on host?
> > > >
> > >
> > > We don't relabel security.selinux because it only requires CAP_FOWNER
> > > in the process's user namespace and it also does its own MAC-based
> > > checks. Also we have some tools that label files beforehand so it
> > > seemed easier to leave them unchanged.
> >
> > If we rename selinux xattr also, then we can support selinux both in
> > guest and host and they both can have their own independent policies.
> >
>
> This works as long as you don't need to support setfscreatecon, which
> exists to guarantee that an inode is atomically created with the
> correct selinux context. It's kind of possible for files with
> O_TMPFILE + fsetxattr + linkat but there is no equivalent for
> directories. You're basically forced to create the directory and then
> set the xattr and while it's possible to prevent other threads in the
> server from seeing the unfinished directories with a rwlock or similar
> there is no protection against power loss. If the machine loses power
> after the directory is created but before the selinux xattr is set
> then that directory will have the wrong selinux context and the guest
> would need to run restorecon at boot to assign the correct label.
Overlayfs has this notion of work directory where they create directory
(and file if O_TMPFILE is not supported), and then rename it to correct
place. I am wondering if we could do something similar. If server is
given a work directory where.
A. Create new directory
B. set selinux lables
C. rename directory
That way if machine crashes after step A or step B, that directory
never becomes visible to guest and no relabeling is required.
Thanks
Vivek
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-13 13:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-04-16 16:49 [Virtio-fs] [PATCH 0/2] virtiofsd: drop Linux capabilities(7) Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-04-16 16:49 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-04-16 16:49 ` [Virtio-fs] [PATCH 1/2] virtiofsd: only retain file system capabilities Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-04-16 16:49 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-04-28 11:48 ` [Virtio-fs] " Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-04-28 11:48 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-04-16 16:49 ` [Virtio-fs] [PATCH 2/2] virtiofsd: drop all capabilities in the wait parent process Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-04-16 16:49 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-04-16 17:50 ` [Virtio-fs] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-04-16 17:50 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-04-16 20:10 ` [Virtio-fs] [PATCH 0/2] virtiofsd: drop Linux capabilities(7) Vivek Goyal
2020-04-16 20:10 ` Vivek Goyal
2020-04-17 9:42 ` [Virtio-fs] " Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-04-17 9:42 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-05-01 18:28 ` [Virtio-fs] " Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-05-01 18:28 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-18 19:08 ` [Virtio-fs] " Vivek Goyal
2020-06-18 19:16 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-18 19:16 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-18 19:27 ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-18 19:27 ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 4:46 ` Chirantan Ekbote
2020-06-19 4:46 ` Chirantan Ekbote
2020-06-19 8:39 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-19 9:17 ` Chirantan Ekbote
2020-06-19 11:12 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-19 19:15 ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 19:15 ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-25 3:19 ` Chirantan Ekbote
2020-06-25 3:19 ` Chirantan Ekbote
2020-06-25 12:55 ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-25 12:55 ` Vivek Goyal
2020-07-13 8:54 ` Chirantan Ekbote
2020-07-13 8:54 ` Chirantan Ekbote
2020-07-13 13:39 ` Vivek Goyal [this message]
2020-07-13 13:39 ` Vivek Goyal
2020-07-13 21:39 ` Daniel Walsh
2020-07-14 12:33 ` Vivek Goyal
2020-07-14 17:16 ` Daniel Walsh
2020-06-19 8:27 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-19 8:27 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-19 11:39 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-19 11:39 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-19 11:49 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-19 11:49 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-19 12:05 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-19 12:05 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-19 17:41 ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 17:41 ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 19:12 ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 19:12 ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-26 11:26 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-26 11:26 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-19 16:09 ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 16:09 ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 16:16 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-19 16:16 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-19 17:11 ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 17:11 ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 17:16 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-19 17:16 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-06-19 14:16 ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-06-19 14:16 ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-06-19 14:25 ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 14:25 ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 15:26 ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-06-19 15:26 ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-06-19 15:57 ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 15:57 ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 14:29 ` Vivek Goyal
2020-06-19 14:29 ` Vivek Goyal
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