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From: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
To: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: oe-kbuild-all@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v11 08/19] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support
Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2023 21:00:50 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202310052054.nkVLpCCa-lkp@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1696457386-3010-9-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com>

Hi Fan,

[This is a private test report for your RFC patch.]
kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:

[auto build test WARNING on device-mapper-dm/for-next]
[also build test WARNING on axboe-block/for-next lwn/docs-next linus/master v6.6-rc4 next-20231005]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]

url:    https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Fan-Wu/security-add-ipe-lsm/20231005-061243
base:   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm.git for-next
patch link:    https://lore.kernel.org/r/1696457386-3010-9-git-send-email-wufan%40linux.microsoft.com
patch subject: [RFC PATCH v11 08/19] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support
config: sh-allyesconfig (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20231005/202310052054.nkVLpCCa-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: sh4-linux-gcc (GCC) 13.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20231005/202310052054.nkVLpCCa-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)

If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202310052054.nkVLpCCa-lkp@intel.com/

All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):

>> security/ipe/audit.c:76: warning: Excess function parameter 'enforce' description in 'ipe_audit_match'
>> security/ipe/audit.c:118: warning: Function parameter or member 'audit_format' not described in 'audit_policy'
>> security/ipe/audit.c:158: warning: Function parameter or member 'op' not described in 'ipe_audit_policy_activation'
>> security/ipe/audit.c:158: warning: Function parameter or member 'np' not described in 'ipe_audit_policy_activation'
>> security/ipe/audit.c:158: warning: Excess function parameter 'p' description in 'ipe_audit_policy_activation'


vim +76 security/ipe/audit.c

    61	
    62	/**
    63	 * ipe_audit_match - audit a match for IPE policy.
    64	 * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the evaluation context that was used in the
    65	 *	 evaluation.
    66	 * @match_type: Supplies the scope of the match: rule, operation default,
    67	 *		global default.
    68	 * @act: Supplies the IPE's evaluation decision, deny or allow.
    69	 * @r: Supplies a pointer to the rule that was matched, if possible.
    70	 * @enforce: Supplies the enforcement/permissive state at the point
    71	 *	     the enforcement decision was made.
    72	 */
    73	void ipe_audit_match(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx,
    74			     enum ipe_match match_type,
    75			     enum ipe_action_type act, const struct ipe_rule *const r)
  > 76	{
    77		struct inode *inode;
    78		struct audit_buffer *ab;
    79		const char *op = audit_op_names[ctx->op];
    80	
    81		if (act != IPE_ACTION_DENY && !READ_ONCE(success_audit))
    82			return;
    83	
    84		ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_IPE_ACCESS);
    85		if (!ab)
    86			return;
    87	
    88		if (ctx->file) {
    89			audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", &ctx->file->f_path);
    90			inode = file_inode(ctx->file);
    91			if (inode) {
    92				audit_log_format(ab, " dev=");
    93				audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id);
    94				audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu ", inode->i_ino);
    95			}
    96		}
    97	
    98		if (match_type == IPE_MATCH_RULE)
    99			audit_rule(ab, r);
   100		else if (match_type == IPE_MATCH_TABLE)
   101			audit_log_format(ab, "rule=\"DEFAULT op=%s action=%s\"", op,
   102					 ACTSTR(act));
   103		else
   104			audit_log_format(ab, "rule=\"DEFAULT action=%s\"",
   105					 ACTSTR(act));
   106	
   107		audit_log_end(ab);
   108	}
   109	
   110	/**
   111	 * audit_policy - Audit a policy's name, version and thumbprint to @ab.
   112	 * @ab: Supplies a pointer to the audit buffer to append to.
   113	 * @p: Supplies a pointer to the policy to audit.
   114	 */
   115	static void audit_policy(struct audit_buffer *ab,
   116				 const char *audit_format,
   117				 const struct ipe_policy *const p)
 > 118	{
   119		u8 *digest = NULL;
   120		struct crypto_shash *tfm;
   121		SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
   122	
   123		tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(IPE_AUDIT_HASH_ALG, 0, 0);
   124		if (IS_ERR(tfm))
   125			return;
   126	
   127		desc->tfm = tfm;
   128	
   129		digest = kzalloc(crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
   130		if (!digest)
   131			goto out;
   132	
   133		if (crypto_shash_init(desc))
   134			goto out;
   135	
   136		if (crypto_shash_update(desc, p->pkcs7, p->pkcs7len))
   137			goto out;
   138	
   139		if (crypto_shash_final(desc, digest))
   140			goto out;
   141	
   142		audit_log_format(ab, audit_format, p->parsed->name,
   143				 p->parsed->version.major, p->parsed->version.minor,
   144				 p->parsed->version.rev);
   145		audit_log_n_hex(ab, digest, crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm));
   146	
   147	out:
   148		kfree(digest);
   149		crypto_free_shash(tfm);
   150	}
   151	
   152	/**
   153	 * ipe_audit_policy_activation - Audit a policy being made the active policy.
   154	 * @p: Supplies a pointer to the policy to audit.
   155	 */
   156	void ipe_audit_policy_activation(const struct ipe_policy *const op,
   157					 const struct ipe_policy *const np)
 > 158	{
   159		struct audit_buffer *ab;
   160	
   161		ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
   162				     AUDIT_IPE_CONFIG_CHANGE);
   163		if (!ab)
   164			return;
   165	
   166		audit_policy(ab, AUDIT_OLD_ACTIVE_POLICY_FMT, op);
   167		audit_log_format(ab, " ");
   168		audit_policy(ab, AUDIT_NEW_ACTIVE_POLICY_FMT, np);
   169		audit_log_format(ab, " auid=%u ses=%u lsm=ipe res=1",
   170				 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
   171				 audit_get_sessionid(current));
   172	
   173		audit_log_end(ab);
   174	}
   175	

-- 
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

  reply	other threads:[~2023-10-05 13:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 105+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-10-04 22:09 [RFC PATCH v11 00/19] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 01/19] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 02/19] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC v11 2/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-10-25 22:45     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-25 22:45       ` Fan Wu
2023-10-26 21:36       ` Paul Moore
2023-10-26 21:36         ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 03/19] ipe: add evaluation loop Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC v11 3/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-10-26  0:15     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-26  0:15       ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 04/19] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-05  8:24   ` kernel test robot
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC v11 4/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 05/19] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC v11 5/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-10-26 21:33     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-26 21:33       ` Fan Wu
2023-10-26 22:12       ` Paul Moore
2023-10-26 22:12         ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02 22:46         ` Fan Wu
2023-11-03 22:15           ` Paul Moore
2023-11-03 22:30             ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 06/19] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 07/19] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-05 10:32   ` kernel test robot
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC v11 7/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 08/19] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-05 13:00   ` kernel test robot [this message]
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC v11 8/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02 22:55     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 09/19] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC v11 9/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02 22:56     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 10/19] block|security: add LSM blob to block_device Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 11/19] dm verity: set DM_TARGET_SINGLETON feature flag Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02  0:40     ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 12/19] dm: add finalize hook to target_type Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02  0:41     ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 13/19] dm verity: consume root hash digest and signature data via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02  0:41     ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 14/19] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02 22:40     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 15/19] fsverity: consume builtin signature via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-05  2:27   ` Eric Biggers
2023-10-05  2:27     ` [dm-devel] " Eric Biggers
2023-10-05  2:49     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-05  2:49       ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02  0:40     ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02  2:53       ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-02 15:42         ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02 19:33           ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 16/19] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-04 23:58   ` Randy Dunlap
2023-10-04 23:58     ` [dm-devel] " Randy Dunlap
2023-10-05  2:45     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-05  2:45       ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 17/19] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02 23:09     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 18/19] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02 23:11     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 19/19] documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu

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