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From: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org,
	axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org,
	eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org,
	dm-devel@redhat.com, audit@vger.kernel.org,
	roberto.sassu@huawei.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v11 06/19] security: add new securityfs delete function
Date: Wed,  4 Oct 2023 15:09:33 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1696457386-3010-7-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1696457386-3010-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com>

When deleting a directory in the security file system, the existing
securityfs_remove requires the directory to be empty, otherwise
it will do nothing. This leads to a potential risk that the security
file system might be in an unclean state when the intentded deletion
did not happen.

This commit introduces a new function securityfs_recursive_remove
to recursively delete a directory without leaving an unclean state.

Co-developed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>

---
v1-v8:
  + Not present

v9:
  + Introduced

v10:
  + No changes

v11:
  + Fix code style issues
---
 include/linux/security.h |  1 +
 security/inode.c         | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 5f16eecde00b..8fa3bab9fa10 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1985,6 +1985,7 @@ struct dentry *securityfs_create_symlink(const char *name,
 					 const char *target,
 					 const struct inode_operations *iops);
 extern void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry);
+extern void securityfs_recursive_remove(struct dentry *dentry);
 
 #else /* CONFIG_SECURITYFS */
 
diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
index 3aa75fffa8c9..e0585c2946c5 100644
--- a/security/inode.c
+++ b/security/inode.c
@@ -313,6 +313,31 @@ void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_remove);
 
+static void remove_one(struct dentry *victim)
+{
+	simple_release_fs(&mount, &mount_count);
+}
+
+/**
+ * securityfs_recursive_remove - recursively removes a file or directory
+ *
+ * @dentry: a pointer to a the dentry of the file or directory to be removed.
+ *
+ * This function recursively removes a file or directory in securityfs that was
+ * previously created with a call to another securityfs function (like
+ * securityfs_create_file() or variants thereof.)
+ */
+void securityfs_recursive_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(dentry))
+		return;
+
+	simple_pin_fs(&fs_type, &mount, &mount_count);
+	simple_recursive_removal(dentry, remove_one);
+	simple_release_fs(&mount, &mount_count);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_recursive_remove);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
 static struct dentry *lsm_dentry;
 static ssize_t lsm_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count,
-- 
2.25.1


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org,
	axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org,
	eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	roberto.sassu@huawei.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org,
	audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org,
	Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [dm-devel] [RFC PATCH v11 06/19] security: add new securityfs delete function
Date: Wed,  4 Oct 2023 15:09:33 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1696457386-3010-7-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1696457386-3010-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com>

When deleting a directory in the security file system, the existing
securityfs_remove requires the directory to be empty, otherwise
it will do nothing. This leads to a potential risk that the security
file system might be in an unclean state when the intentded deletion
did not happen.

This commit introduces a new function securityfs_recursive_remove
to recursively delete a directory without leaving an unclean state.

Co-developed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>

---
v1-v8:
  + Not present

v9:
  + Introduced

v10:
  + No changes

v11:
  + Fix code style issues
---
 include/linux/security.h |  1 +
 security/inode.c         | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 5f16eecde00b..8fa3bab9fa10 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1985,6 +1985,7 @@ struct dentry *securityfs_create_symlink(const char *name,
 					 const char *target,
 					 const struct inode_operations *iops);
 extern void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry);
+extern void securityfs_recursive_remove(struct dentry *dentry);
 
 #else /* CONFIG_SECURITYFS */
 
diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
index 3aa75fffa8c9..e0585c2946c5 100644
--- a/security/inode.c
+++ b/security/inode.c
@@ -313,6 +313,31 @@ void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_remove);
 
+static void remove_one(struct dentry *victim)
+{
+	simple_release_fs(&mount, &mount_count);
+}
+
+/**
+ * securityfs_recursive_remove - recursively removes a file or directory
+ *
+ * @dentry: a pointer to a the dentry of the file or directory to be removed.
+ *
+ * This function recursively removes a file or directory in securityfs that was
+ * previously created with a call to another securityfs function (like
+ * securityfs_create_file() or variants thereof.)
+ */
+void securityfs_recursive_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(dentry))
+		return;
+
+	simple_pin_fs(&fs_type, &mount, &mount_count);
+	simple_recursive_removal(dentry, remove_one);
+	simple_release_fs(&mount, &mount_count);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_recursive_remove);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
 static struct dentry *lsm_dentry;
 static ssize_t lsm_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count,
-- 
2.25.1

--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-10-04 22:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 105+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-10-04 22:09 [RFC PATCH v11 00/19] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 01/19] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 02/19] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC v11 2/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-10-25 22:45     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-25 22:45       ` Fan Wu
2023-10-26 21:36       ` Paul Moore
2023-10-26 21:36         ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 03/19] ipe: add evaluation loop Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC v11 3/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-10-26  0:15     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-26  0:15       ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 04/19] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-05  8:24   ` kernel test robot
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC v11 4/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 05/19] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC v11 5/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-10-26 21:33     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-26 21:33       ` Fan Wu
2023-10-26 22:12       ` Paul Moore
2023-10-26 22:12         ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02 22:46         ` Fan Wu
2023-11-03 22:15           ` Paul Moore
2023-11-03 22:30             ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` Fan Wu [this message]
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] [RFC PATCH v11 06/19] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 07/19] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-05 10:32   ` kernel test robot
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC v11 7/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 08/19] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-05 13:00   ` kernel test robot
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC v11 8/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02 22:55     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 09/19] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC v11 9/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02 22:56     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 10/19] block|security: add LSM blob to block_device Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 11/19] dm verity: set DM_TARGET_SINGLETON feature flag Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02  0:40     ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 12/19] dm: add finalize hook to target_type Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02  0:41     ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 13/19] dm verity: consume root hash digest and signature data via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02  0:41     ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 14/19] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02 22:40     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 15/19] fsverity: consume builtin signature via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-05  2:27   ` Eric Biggers
2023-10-05  2:27     ` [dm-devel] " Eric Biggers
2023-10-05  2:49     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-05  2:49       ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02  0:40     ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02  2:53       ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-02 15:42         ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02 19:33           ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 16/19] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-04 23:58   ` Randy Dunlap
2023-10-04 23:58     ` [dm-devel] " Randy Dunlap
2023-10-05  2:45     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-05  2:45       ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 17/19] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02 23:09     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 18/19] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-10-24  3:52     ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02 23:11     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 19/19] documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09   ` [dm-devel] " Fan Wu

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