From: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
To: elver@google.com
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Luc Van Oostenryck <luc.vanoostenryck@gmail.com>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>,
Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>,
Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>,
Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>,
Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraj.upadhyay@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com>,
Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
llvm@lists.linux.dev, rcu@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-serial@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 26/34] kfence: Enable capability analysis
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2025 10:21:25 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250304092417.2873893-27-elver@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250304092417.2873893-1-elver@google.com>
Enable capability analysis for the KFENCE subsystem.
Notable, kfence_handle_page_fault() required minor restructure, which
also fixed a subtle race; arguably that function is more readable now.
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
---
v2:
* Remove disable/enable_capability_analysis() around headers.
* Use __capability_unsafe() instead of __no_capability_analysis.
---
mm/kfence/Makefile | 2 ++
mm/kfence/core.c | 20 +++++++++++++-------
mm/kfence/kfence.h | 14 ++++++++------
mm/kfence/report.c | 4 ++--
4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/kfence/Makefile b/mm/kfence/Makefile
index 2de2a58d11a1..b3640bdc3c69 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/Makefile
+++ b/mm/kfence/Makefile
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+CAPABILITY_ANALYSIS := y
+
obj-y := core.o report.o
CFLAGS_kfence_test.o := -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-optimize-sibling-calls
diff --git a/mm/kfence/core.c b/mm/kfence/core.c
index 102048821c22..f75c3c11c0be 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/core.c
+++ b/mm/kfence/core.c
@@ -132,8 +132,8 @@ struct kfence_metadata *kfence_metadata __read_mostly;
static struct kfence_metadata *kfence_metadata_init __read_mostly;
/* Freelist with available objects. */
-static struct list_head kfence_freelist = LIST_HEAD_INIT(kfence_freelist);
-static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(kfence_freelist_lock); /* Lock protecting freelist. */
+DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(kfence_freelist_lock); /* Lock protecting freelist. */
+static struct list_head kfence_freelist __guarded_by(&kfence_freelist_lock) = LIST_HEAD_INIT(kfence_freelist);
/*
* The static key to set up a KFENCE allocation; or if static keys are not used
@@ -253,6 +253,7 @@ static bool kfence_unprotect(unsigned long addr)
}
static inline unsigned long metadata_to_pageaddr(const struct kfence_metadata *meta)
+ __must_hold(&meta->lock)
{
unsigned long offset = (meta - kfence_metadata + 1) * PAGE_SIZE * 2;
unsigned long pageaddr = (unsigned long)&__kfence_pool[offset];
@@ -288,6 +289,7 @@ static inline bool kfence_obj_allocated(const struct kfence_metadata *meta)
static noinline void
metadata_update_state(struct kfence_metadata *meta, enum kfence_object_state next,
unsigned long *stack_entries, size_t num_stack_entries)
+ __must_hold(&meta->lock)
{
struct kfence_track *track =
next == KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED ? &meta->alloc_track : &meta->free_track;
@@ -485,7 +487,7 @@ static void *kfence_guarded_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, size_t size, gfp_t g
alloc_covered_add(alloc_stack_hash, 1);
/* Set required slab fields. */
- slab = virt_to_slab((void *)meta->addr);
+ slab = virt_to_slab(addr);
slab->slab_cache = cache;
slab->objects = 1;
@@ -514,6 +516,7 @@ static void *kfence_guarded_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, size_t size, gfp_t g
static void kfence_guarded_free(void *addr, struct kfence_metadata *meta, bool zombie)
{
struct kcsan_scoped_access assert_page_exclusive;
+ u32 alloc_stack_hash;
unsigned long flags;
bool init;
@@ -546,9 +549,10 @@ static void kfence_guarded_free(void *addr, struct kfence_metadata *meta, bool z
/* Mark the object as freed. */
metadata_update_state(meta, KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED, NULL, 0);
init = slab_want_init_on_free(meta->cache);
+ alloc_stack_hash = meta->alloc_stack_hash;
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags);
- alloc_covered_add(meta->alloc_stack_hash, -1);
+ alloc_covered_add(alloc_stack_hash, -1);
/* Check canary bytes for memory corruption. */
check_canary(meta);
@@ -593,6 +597,7 @@ static void rcu_guarded_free(struct rcu_head *h)
* which partial initialization succeeded.
*/
static unsigned long kfence_init_pool(void)
+ __capability_unsafe(/* constructor */)
{
unsigned long addr;
struct page *pages;
@@ -1192,6 +1197,7 @@ bool kfence_handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr, bool is_write, struct pt_regs
{
const int page_index = (addr - (unsigned long)__kfence_pool) / PAGE_SIZE;
struct kfence_metadata *to_report = NULL;
+ unsigned long unprotected_page = 0;
enum kfence_error_type error_type;
unsigned long flags;
@@ -1225,9 +1231,8 @@ bool kfence_handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr, bool is_write, struct pt_regs
if (!to_report)
goto out;
- raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&to_report->lock, flags);
- to_report->unprotected_page = addr;
error_type = KFENCE_ERROR_OOB;
+ unprotected_page = addr;
/*
* If the object was freed before we took the look we can still
@@ -1239,7 +1244,6 @@ bool kfence_handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr, bool is_write, struct pt_regs
if (!to_report)
goto out;
- raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&to_report->lock, flags);
error_type = KFENCE_ERROR_UAF;
/*
* We may race with __kfence_alloc(), and it is possible that a
@@ -1251,6 +1255,8 @@ bool kfence_handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr, bool is_write, struct pt_regs
out:
if (to_report) {
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&to_report->lock, flags);
+ to_report->unprotected_page = unprotected_page;
kfence_report_error(addr, is_write, regs, to_report, error_type);
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&to_report->lock, flags);
} else {
diff --git a/mm/kfence/kfence.h b/mm/kfence/kfence.h
index dfba5ea06b01..f9caea007246 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/kfence.h
+++ b/mm/kfence/kfence.h
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
/* Maximum stack depth for reports. */
#define KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH 64
+extern raw_spinlock_t kfence_freelist_lock;
+
/* KFENCE object states. */
enum kfence_object_state {
KFENCE_OBJECT_UNUSED, /* Object is unused. */
@@ -53,7 +55,7 @@ struct kfence_track {
/* KFENCE metadata per guarded allocation. */
struct kfence_metadata {
- struct list_head list; /* Freelist node; access under kfence_freelist_lock. */
+ struct list_head list __guarded_by(&kfence_freelist_lock); /* Freelist node. */
struct rcu_head rcu_head; /* For delayed freeing. */
/*
@@ -91,13 +93,13 @@ struct kfence_metadata {
* In case of an invalid access, the page that was unprotected; we
* optimistically only store one address.
*/
- unsigned long unprotected_page;
+ unsigned long unprotected_page __guarded_by(&lock);
/* Allocation and free stack information. */
- struct kfence_track alloc_track;
- struct kfence_track free_track;
+ struct kfence_track alloc_track __guarded_by(&lock);
+ struct kfence_track free_track __guarded_by(&lock);
/* For updating alloc_covered on frees. */
- u32 alloc_stack_hash;
+ u32 alloc_stack_hash __guarded_by(&lock);
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
struct slabobj_ext obj_exts;
#endif
@@ -141,6 +143,6 @@ enum kfence_error_type {
void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, bool is_write, struct pt_regs *regs,
const struct kfence_metadata *meta, enum kfence_error_type type);
-void kfence_print_object(struct seq_file *seq, const struct kfence_metadata *meta);
+void kfence_print_object(struct seq_file *seq, const struct kfence_metadata *meta) __must_hold(&meta->lock);
#endif /* MM_KFENCE_KFENCE_H */
diff --git a/mm/kfence/report.c b/mm/kfence/report.c
index 10e6802a2edf..787e87c26926 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/report.c
+++ b/mm/kfence/report.c
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ static int get_stack_skipnr(const unsigned long stack_entries[], int num_entries
static void kfence_print_stack(struct seq_file *seq, const struct kfence_metadata *meta,
bool show_alloc)
+ __must_hold(&meta->lock)
{
const struct kfence_track *track = show_alloc ? &meta->alloc_track : &meta->free_track;
u64 ts_sec = track->ts_nsec;
@@ -207,8 +208,6 @@ void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, bool is_write, struct pt_regs *r
if (WARN_ON(type != KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID && !meta))
return;
- if (meta)
- lockdep_assert_held(&meta->lock);
/*
* Because we may generate reports in printk-unfriendly parts of the
* kernel, such as scheduler code, the use of printk() could deadlock.
@@ -263,6 +262,7 @@ void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, bool is_write, struct pt_regs *r
stack_trace_print(stack_entries + skipnr, num_stack_entries - skipnr, 0);
if (meta) {
+ lockdep_assert_held(&meta->lock);
pr_err("\n");
kfence_print_object(NULL, meta);
}
--
2.48.1.711.g2feabab25a-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-03-04 9:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-03-04 9:20 [PATCH v2 00/34] Compiler-Based Capability- and Locking-Analysis Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 01/34] compiler_types: Move lock checking attributes to compiler-capability-analysis.h Marco Elver
2025-03-04 23:26 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-03-05 8:36 ` Dan Carpenter
2025-03-05 9:13 ` Marco Elver
2025-03-05 9:27 ` Dan Carpenter
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 02/34] compiler-capability-analysis: Add infrastructure for Clang's capability analysis Marco Elver
2025-03-04 15:29 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-03-04 16:05 ` Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 03/34] compiler-capability-analysis: Add test stub Marco Elver
2025-03-04 23:52 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-03-05 0:03 ` Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 04/34] Documentation: Add documentation for Compiler-Based Capability Analysis Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 05/34] checkpatch: Warn about capability_unsafe() without comment Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 06/34] cleanup: Basic compatibility with capability analysis Marco Elver
2025-03-04 12:55 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-03-04 13:09 ` Marco Elver
2025-03-04 23:57 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 07/34] lockdep: Annotate lockdep assertions for " Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 08/34] locking/rwlock, spinlock: Support Clang's " Marco Elver
2025-03-04 14:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 09/34] compiler-capability-analysis: Change __cond_acquires to take return value Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 10/34] locking/mutex: Support Clang's capability analysis Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 11/34] locking/seqlock: " Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 12/34] bit_spinlock: Include missing <asm/processor.h> Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 13/34] bit_spinlock: Support Clang's capability analysis Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 14/34] rcu: " Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 15/34] srcu: " Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 16/34] kref: Add capability-analysis annotations Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 17/34] locking/rwsem: Support Clang's capability analysis Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 18/34] locking/local_lock: Include missing headers Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 19/34] locking/local_lock: Support Clang's capability analysis Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 20/34] locking/ww_mutex: " Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 21/34] debugfs: Make debugfs_cancellation a capability struct Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 22/34] compiler-capability-analysis: Remove Sparse support Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 23/34] compiler-capability-analysis: Remove __cond_lock() function-like helper Marco Elver
2025-03-04 23:25 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 24/34] compiler-capability-analysis: Introduce header suppressions Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 25/34] compiler: Let data_race() imply disabled capability analysis Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` Marco Elver [this message]
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 27/34] kcov: Enable " Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 28/34] stackdepot: " Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 29/34] rhashtable: " Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 30/34] printk: Move locking annotation to printk.c Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 31/34] drivers/tty: Enable capability analysis for core files Marco Elver
2025-03-05 9:15 ` Jiri Slaby
2025-03-05 9:26 ` Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 32/34] security/tomoyo: Enable capability analysis Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 33/34] crypto: " Marco Elver
2025-03-04 9:21 ` [PATCH v2 34/34] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for Capability Analysis Marco Elver
2025-03-04 23:18 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-03-04 11:21 ` [PATCH v2 00/34] Compiler-Based Capability- and Locking-Analysis Peter Zijlstra
2025-03-04 11:43 ` Marco Elver
2025-03-05 11:20 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-03-05 15:27 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-03-05 16:16 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-08-06 13:36 ` Marco Elver
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20250304092417.2873893-27-elver@google.com \
--to=elver@google.com \
--cc=arnd@arndb.de \
--cc=boqun.feng@gmail.com \
--cc=bvanassche@acm.org \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=dvyukov@google.com \
--cc=edumazet@google.com \
--cc=frederic@kernel.org \
--cc=glider@google.com \
--cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=herbert@gondor.apana.org.au \
--cc=jannh@google.com \
--cc=jirislaby@kernel.org \
--cc=joel@joelfernandes.org \
--cc=josh@joshtriplett.org \
--cc=justinstitt@google.com \
--cc=kasan-dev@googlegroups.com \
--cc=kees@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-serial@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=llvm@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=longman@redhat.com \
--cc=luc.vanoostenryck@gmail.com \
--cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
--cc=mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com \
--cc=mingo@kernel.org \
--cc=morbo@google.com \
--cc=nathan@kernel.org \
--cc=neeraj.upadhyay@kernel.org \
--cc=ojeda@kernel.org \
--cc=paulmck@kernel.org \
--cc=penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=rcu@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=rostedt@goodmis.org \
--cc=takedakn@nttdata.co.jp \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=urezki@gmail.com \
--cc=will@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.