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From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+git@google.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	 Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	 Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com>,
	Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com>,
	 Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Subject: [RFT PATCH v3 17/21] x86/boot: Create a confined code area for startup code
Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 21:08:52 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250512190834.332684-40-ardb+git@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250512190834.332684-23-ardb+git@google.com>

From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>

In order to be able to have tight control over which code may execute
from the early 1:1 mapping of memory, but still link vmlinux as a single
executable, prefix all symbol references in startup code with __pi_, and
invoke it from outside using the __pi_ prefix.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/boot/startup/Makefile     | 13 +++++++++++++
 arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-shared.c |  4 +---
 arch/x86/boot/startup/sme.c        |  1 -
 arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c           |  2 +-
 arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c      |  1 -
 arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h       |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h         |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c           |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S          |  8 ++++----
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S     |  6 +++---
 10 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/startup/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/startup/Makefile
index b514f7e81332..c7e690091f81 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/startup/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/startup/Makefile
@@ -28,3 +28,16 @@ lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_MIXED)		+= efi-mixed.o
 # to be linked into the decompressor or the EFI stub but not vmlinux
 #
 $(patsubst %.o,$(obj)/%.o,$(lib-y)): OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y
+
+#
+# Confine the startup code by prefixing all symbols with __pi_ (for position
+# independent). This ensures that startup code can only call other startup
+# code, or code that has explicitly been made accessible to it via a symbol
+# alias.
+#
+$(obj)/%.pi.o: OBJCOPYFLAGS := --prefix-symbols=__pi_
+$(obj)/%.pi.o: $(obj)/%.o FORCE
+	$(call if_changed,objcopy)
+
+extra-y		:= $(obj-y)
+obj-y		:= $(patsubst %.o,%.pi.o,$(obj-y))
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-shared.c b/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-shared.c
index 21d5a0e33145..49440955885a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-shared.c
@@ -11,9 +11,7 @@
 
 #include <asm/setup_data.h>
 
-#ifndef __BOOT_COMPRESSED
-#define error(v)			pr_err(v)
-#else
+#ifdef __BOOT_COMPRESSED
 #undef WARN
 #define WARN(condition, format...) (!!(condition))
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/startup/sme.c b/arch/x86/boot/startup/sme.c
index 0ae04e333f51..ffd0185aaa9d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/startup/sme.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/startup/sme.c
@@ -569,7 +569,6 @@ void __head sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 /* Local version for startup code, which never operates on user page tables */
-__weak
 pgd_t __pti_set_user_pgtbl(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
 {
 	return pgd;
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index ebf1f5ee8386..8e316b09a646 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ static int svsm_perform_call_protocol(struct svsm_call *call)
 
 	do {
 		ret = ghcb ? svsm_perform_ghcb_protocol(ghcb, call)
-			   : svsm_perform_msr_protocol(call);
+			   : __pi_svsm_perform_msr_protocol(call);
 	} while (ret == -EAGAIN);
 
 	if (sev_cfg.ghcbs_initialized)
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c
index 3cadaa46b9d7..47991807b231 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c
@@ -1060,4 +1060,3 @@ bool __init handle_vc_boot_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs)
 
 	sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SEV_ES_GEN_REQ);
 }
-
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h
index 6324f4c6c545..895d09faaf83 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ extern void i386_reserve_resources(void);
 extern unsigned long __startup_64(unsigned long p2v_offset, struct boot_params *bp);
 extern void startup_64_setup_gdt_idt(void);
 extern void startup_64_load_idt(void *vc_handler);
+extern void __pi_startup_64_load_idt(void *vc_handler);
 extern void early_setup_idt(void);
 extern void __init do_early_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 17b03a1f5694..4ebdffdc5856 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -534,6 +534,7 @@ struct cpuid_leaf {
 };
 
 int svsm_perform_msr_protocol(struct svsm_call *call);
+int __pi_svsm_perform_msr_protocol(struct svsm_call *call);
 int snp_cpuid(void (*cpuid_hv)(void *ctx, struct cpuid_leaf *),
 	      void *ctx, struct cpuid_leaf *leaf);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 8c69cea84297..1d038ba07f29 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -320,5 +320,5 @@ void early_setup_idt(void)
 		handler = vc_boot_ghcb;
 	}
 
-	startup_64_load_idt(handler);
+	__pi_startup_64_load_idt(handler);
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index 069420853304..88cbf932f7c2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
 	xorl	%edx, %edx
 	wrmsr
 
-	call	startup_64_setup_gdt_idt
+	call	__pi_startup_64_setup_gdt_idt
 
 	/* Now switch to __KERNEL_CS so IRET works reliably */
 	pushq	$__KERNEL_CS
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
 	 * subsequent code. Pass the boot_params pointer as the first argument.
 	 */
 	movq	%r15, %rdi
-	call	sme_enable
+	call	__pi_sme_enable
 #endif
 
 	/* Sanitize CPU configuration */
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
 	 * programmed into CR3.
 	 */
 	movq	%r15, %rsi
-	call	__startup_64
+	call	__pi___startup_64
 
 	/* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */
 	leaq	early_top_pgt(%rip), %rcx
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(vc_no_ghcb)
 	/* Call C handler */
 	movq    %rsp, %rdi
 	movq	ORIG_RAX(%rsp), %rsi
-	call    do_vc_no_ghcb
+	call    __pi_do_vc_no_ghcb
 
 	/* Unwind pt_regs */
 	POP_REGS
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S
index f8a33b25ae86..edbf9c998848 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 
 	.text
 	.code64
-SYM_FUNC_START(sme_encrypt_execute)
+SYM_FUNC_START(__pi_sme_encrypt_execute)
 
 	/*
 	 * Entry parameters:
@@ -69,9 +69,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(sme_encrypt_execute)
 	ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
 	ret
 	int3
-SYM_FUNC_END(sme_encrypt_execute)
+SYM_FUNC_END(__pi_sme_encrypt_execute)
 
-SYM_FUNC_START(__enc_copy)
+SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__enc_copy)
 	ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
 /*
  * Routine used to encrypt memory in place.
-- 
2.49.0.1045.g170613ef41-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-05-12 19:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-05-12 19:08 [RFT PATCH v3 00/21] x86: strict separation of startup code Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-12 19:08 ` [RFT PATCH v3 01/21] x86/sev: Separate MSR and GHCB based snp_cpuid() via a callback Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-15  7:22   ` Ingo Molnar
2025-05-15 10:24     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-15 15:18       ` Ingo Molnar
2025-05-15 11:10   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-15 14:22     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-12 19:08 ` [RFT PATCH v3 02/21] x86/sev: Use MSR protocol for remapping SVSM calling area Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-15 16:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-12 19:08 ` [RFT PATCH v3 03/21] x86/sev: Use MSR protocol only for early SVSM PVALIDATE call Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-12 19:08 ` [RFT PATCH v3 04/21] x86/sev: Run RMPADJUST on SVSM calling area page to test VMPL Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-20  9:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-12 19:08 ` [RFT PATCH v3 05/21] x86/sev: Move GHCB page based HV communication out of startup code Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-20 11:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-20 11:49     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-20 13:58       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-12 19:08 ` [RFT PATCH v3 06/21] x86/sev: Avoid global variable to store virtual address of SVSM area Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-12 19:08 ` [RFT PATCH v3 07/21] x86/sev: Move MSR save/restore out of early page state change helper Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-12 19:08 ` [RFT PATCH v3 08/21] x86/sev: Share implementation of MSR-based page state change Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-12 19:08 ` [RFT PATCH v3 09/21] x86/sev: Pass SVSM calling area down to early page state change API Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-13 13:55   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-13 13:58     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-12 19:08 ` [RFT PATCH v3 10/21] x86/sev: Use boot SVSM CA for all startup and init code Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-12 19:08 ` [RFT PATCH v3 11/21] x86/boot: Drop redundant RMPADJUST in SEV SVSM presence check Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-12 19:08 ` [RFT PATCH v3 12/21] x86/sev: Unify SEV-SNP hypervisor feature check Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-30 11:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-30 14:28     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-30 16:08       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-30 16:12         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-30 16:55           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-12 19:08 ` [RFT PATCH v3 13/21] x86/sev: Provide PIC aliases for SEV related data objects Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-12 19:08 ` [RFT PATCH v3 14/21] x86/boot: Provide PIC aliases for 5-level paging related constants Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-12 19:08 ` [RFT PATCH v3 15/21] x86/sev: Move __sev_[get|put]_ghcb() into separate noinstr object Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-12 19:08 ` [RFT PATCH v3 16/21] x86/sev: Export startup routines for later use Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-12 19:08 ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2025-05-12 19:08 ` [RFT PATCH v3 18/21] x86/boot: Move startup code out of __head section Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-12 19:08 ` [RFT PATCH v3 19/21] x86/boot: Disallow absolute symbol references in startup code Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-12 19:08 ` [RFT PATCH v3 20/21] x86/boot: Revert "Reject absolute references in .head.text" Ard Biesheuvel
2025-06-01  9:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-12 19:08 ` [RFT PATCH v3 21/21] x86/boot: Get rid of the .head.text section Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-12 19:17 ` [RFT PATCH v3 00/21] x86: strict separation of startup code Borislav Petkov
2025-05-13 10:02   ` Ingo Molnar
2025-05-13 10:12     ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-13 11:22       ` Ingo Molnar
2025-05-13 14:16         ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-13 15:01           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-13 16:44             ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-13 21:31               ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-14  6:32             ` Ingo Molnar
2025-05-14  7:41               ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-15  7:17                 ` Ingo Molnar
2025-05-14  6:20           ` Ingo Molnar
2025-05-14  8:17             ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-14  8:21             ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-14  9:54             ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-05-14 17:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-14 17:37   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-14 18:53     ` Borislav Petkov

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