* [refpolicy] In Fedora policy we have simplified the secure_mode_insmod
@ 2011-09-09 11:22 Daniel J Walsh
2011-09-09 15:56 ` Christopher J. PeBenito
0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Daniel J Walsh @ 2011-09-09 11:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: refpolicy
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Now this boolean controls sys_module, so we always transition but we
can turn off the ability to insert modules into the kernel.
This is much simpler then what we had before.
If you like this I have a similar patch for secure_mode_loadpolicy
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [refpolicy] In Fedora policy we have simplified the secure_mode_insmod
2011-09-09 11:22 [refpolicy] In Fedora policy we have simplified the secure_mode_insmod Daniel J Walsh
@ 2011-09-09 15:56 ` Christopher J. PeBenito
2011-09-10 9:55 ` Daniel J Walsh
0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Christopher J. PeBenito @ 2011-09-09 15:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: refpolicy
On 09/09/11 07:22, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
> Now this boolean controls sys_module, so we always transition but we
> can turn off the ability to insert modules into the kernel.
>
> This is much simpler then what we had before.
>
> If you like this I have a similar patch for secure_mode_loadpolicy
So with the current implementation, there are conditional module loaders and unconditional module loaders. Do we really want to make all module loading conditional? I'm fine with that, but are there reasons to keep the current conditional/unconditional behavior? If so we can still keep that functionality, but implement it similar to this patch.
--
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
www.tresys.com | oss.tresys.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [refpolicy] In Fedora policy we have simplified the secure_mode_insmod
2011-09-09 15:56 ` Christopher J. PeBenito
@ 2011-09-10 9:55 ` Daniel J Walsh
2011-09-13 17:17 ` Christopher J. PeBenito
0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Daniel J Walsh @ 2011-09-10 9:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: refpolicy
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On 09/09/2011 11:56 AM, Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> On 09/09/11 07:22, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
>> Now this boolean controls sys_module, so we always transition but
>> we can turn off the ability to insert modules into the kernel.
>>
>> This is much simpler then what we had before.
>>
>> If you like this I have a similar patch for
>> secure_mode_loadpolicy
>
> So with the current implementation, there are conditional module
> loaders and unconditional module loaders. Do we really want to
> make all module loading conditional? I'm fine with that, but are
> there reasons to keep the current conditional/unconditional
> behavior? If so we can still keep that functionality, but
> implement it similar to this patch.
>
I think this should be unconditional. If you want to shutoff loading
kernel modules, this patch will do it even with unconfined programs
running. It would be a pain to run with this system, but at least the
users know that at a certain state of the machine no kernel modules
can be loaded.
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [refpolicy] In Fedora policy we have simplified the secure_mode_insmod
2011-09-10 9:55 ` Daniel J Walsh
@ 2011-09-13 17:17 ` Christopher J. PeBenito
2011-09-13 17:33 ` Daniel J Walsh
0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Christopher J. PeBenito @ 2011-09-13 17:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: refpolicy
On 09/10/11 05:55, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
> On 09/09/2011 11:56 AM, Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
>> On 09/09/11 07:22, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
>>> Now this boolean controls sys_module, so we always transition but
>>> we can turn off the ability to insert modules into the kernel.
>>>
>>> This is much simpler then what we had before.
>>>
>>> If you like this I have a similar patch for
>>> secure_mode_loadpolicy
>
>> So with the current implementation, there are conditional module
>> loaders and unconditional module loaders. Do we really want to
>> make all module loading conditional? I'm fine with that, but are
>> there reasons to keep the current conditional/unconditional
>> behavior? If so we can still keep that functionality, but
>> implement it similar to this patch.
>
> I think this should be unconditional. If you want to shutoff loading
> kernel modules, this patch will do it even with unconfined programs
> running. It would be a pain to run with this system, but at least the
> users know that at a certain state of the machine no kernel modules
> can be loaded.
Then there is an issue with the patch. Currently unconfined domains have sys_module and its not controlled by the boolean. I'm fine with stripping this permission from unconfined domains.
--
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
www.tresys.com | oss.tresys.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [refpolicy] In Fedora policy we have simplified the secure_mode_insmod
2011-09-13 17:17 ` Christopher J. PeBenito
@ 2011-09-13 17:33 ` Daniel J Walsh
0 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Daniel J Walsh @ 2011-09-13 17:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: refpolicy
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On 09/13/2011 01:17 PM, Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> On 09/10/11 05:55, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
>> On 09/09/2011 11:56 AM, Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
>>> On 09/09/11 07:22, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
>>>> Now this boolean controls sys_module, so we always transition
>>>> but we can turn off the ability to insert modules into the
>>>> kernel.
>>>>
>>>> This is much simpler then what we had before.
>>>>
>>>> If you like this I have a similar patch for
>>>> secure_mode_loadpolicy
>>
>>> So with the current implementation, there are conditional
>>> module loaders and unconditional module loaders. Do we really
>>> want to make all module loading conditional? I'm fine with
>>> that, but are there reasons to keep the current
>>> conditional/unconditional behavior? If so we can still keep
>>> that functionality, but implement it similar to this patch.
>>
>> I think this should be unconditional. If you want to shutoff
>> loading kernel modules, this patch will do it even with
>> unconfined programs running. It would be a pain to run with this
>> system, but at least the users know that at a certain state of
>> the machine no kernel modules can be loaded.
>
> Then there is an issue with the patch. Currently unconfined
> domains have sys_module and its not controlled by the boolean. I'm
> fine with stripping this permission from unconfined domains.
>
I think it makes sense. If we have the boolean it should work for
targeted policy with or without the unconfined.pp installed.
We also have setup secure_mode_policyload like this in Fedora 16.
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2011-09-13 17:33 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
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2011-09-09 11:22 [refpolicy] In Fedora policy we have simplified the secure_mode_insmod Daniel J Walsh
2011-09-09 15:56 ` Christopher J. PeBenito
2011-09-10 9:55 ` Daniel J Walsh
2011-09-13 17:17 ` Christopher J. PeBenito
2011-09-13 17:33 ` Daniel J Walsh
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