Re: [lxc-devel] Detecting if you are running in a container

[Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>]

[Replying to an oldish email...]

On 12.10.2011 20:59, Kay Sievers wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 10, 2011 at 23:41, Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de> wrote:
>> On Mon, 10.10.11 13:59, Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com) wrote:
> 
>>> - udev.  All of the kernel interfaces for udev should be supported in
>>>   current kernels.  However I believe udev is useless because container
>>>   start drops CAP_MKNOD so we can't do evil things.  So I would
>>>   recommend basing the startup of udev on presence of CAP_MKNOD.
>>
>> Using CAP_MKNOD as test here is indeed a good idea. I'll make sure udev
>> in a systemd world makes use of that.
> 
> Done.
> 
> http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/hotplug/udev.git;a=commitdiff;h=9371e6f3e04b03692c23e392fdf005a08ccf1edb

Maybe CAP_MKNOD isn't actually a good idea, having in mind devtmpfs?

Without CAP_MKNOD, is devtmpfs still being populated internally by
the kernel, so that udev only needs to change ownership/permissions
and maintain symlinks in response to device changes, and perform
other duties (reacting to other types of events) normally?

In other words, provided devtmpfs works even without CAP_MKNOD,
I can easily imagine a whole system running without this capability
from the very early boot, with all functionality in place, including
udev and what not...

And having CAP_MKNOD in container may not be that bad either, while
cgroup device.permission is set correctly - some nodes may need to
be created still, even in an unprivileged containers.  Who filters
out CAP_MKNOD during container startup (I don't see it in the code,
which only removes CAP_SYS_BOOT, and even that due to current
limitation), and which evil things can be done if it is not filtered?

Thanks,

/mjt