From: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
To: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: tim@xen.org, xen-devel@lists.xen.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 6/9] xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc
Date: Wed, 02 Jul 2014 19:06:05 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <53B42DED.1000406@bitdefender.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <53B4468D020000780001FB40@mail.emea.novell.com>
On 07/02/2014 06:51 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 02.07.14 at 15:33, <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com> wrote:
>> Added new XEN_DOMCTL_set_pagefault_info hypercall, used by libxc's
>> new xc_domain_set_pagefault_info() function to set per-domain page
>> fault injection information. This information is then used to call
>> hvm_inject_page_fault() at the first VMENTRY where the guest status
>> matches and there are no other pending traps.
>
> So the first question that strikes me here: What good can it do to be
> able to inject arbitrary page faults, possibly at times where the guest
> OS is absolutely not expecting them?
The guest, as Andrew Cooper said, is waiting for a mem_event reply.
>> @@ -430,6 +431,9 @@ static void vmx_vmcs_save(struct vcpu *v, struct hvm_hw_cpu *c)
>> __vmread(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, &c->sysenter_cs);
>> __vmread(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, &c->sysenter_esp);
>> __vmread(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, &c->sysenter_eip);
>> + __vmread(GUEST_CS_AR_BYTES, &cs_arbytes);
>> +
>> + c->cs_arbytes = (uint32_t)cs_arbytes;
>
> This again looks like an unrelated change without any explanation.
It's used here, to check if we're in user mode before injecting the page
fault:
92 +static void check_pf_injection(void)
93 +{
94 + struct vcpu *curr = current;
95 + struct domain *d = curr->domain;
96 + struct hvm_hw_cpu ctxt;
97 + uint32_t cs_dpl;
98 +
99 + if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) || d->fault_info.virtual_address == 0 )
100 + return;
101 +
102 + memset(&ctxt, 0, sizeof(struct hvm_hw_cpu));
103 + hvm_funcs.save_cpu_ctxt(curr, &ctxt);
104 +
105 + cs_dpl = (ctxt.cs_arbytes >> 5) & 3;
106 +
107 + if ( cs_dpl == 3 /* Guest is in user mode */
108 + && !ctxt.pending_event
109 + && ctxt.cr3 == d->fault_info.address_space )
110 + {
111 + /* Cache */
112 + uint64_t virtual_address = d->fault_info.virtual_address;
113 + uint32_t write_access = d->fault_info.write_access;
114 +
115 + /* Reset */
116 + d->fault_info.address_space = 0;
117 + d->fault_info.virtual_address = 0;
118 + d->fault_info.write_access = 0;
119 +
120 + hvm_inject_page_fault((write_access << 1) | PFEC_user_mode,
121 + virtual_address);
122 + }
123 +}
Thanks,
Razvan Cojocaru
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-07-02 16:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-07-02 13:33 [PATCH RFC 1/9] xen: Emulate with no writes; compute current instruction length Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 13:33 ` [PATCH RFC 2/9] xen: Optimize introspection access to guest state Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:31 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-07 14:50 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-10 8:05 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-10 8:17 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-10 8:23 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-10 11:57 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-10 12:16 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-10 13:01 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-02 15:37 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03 8:12 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03 8:54 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 13:33 ` [PATCH RFC 3/9] xen: Force-enable relevant MSR events; optimize the number of sent MSR events Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:35 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-02 15:43 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-09 8:02 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-23 7:56 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-23 8:03 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 13:33 ` [PATCH RFC 4/9] xenctrl: Make the headers C++ friendly Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:37 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-02 13:33 ` [PATCH RFC 5/9] xen: Support for VMCALL mem_events Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:47 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 15:54 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 16:11 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 16:23 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03 6:28 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03 7:29 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:54 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-02 15:59 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 13:33 ` [PATCH RFC 6/9] xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:51 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 16:00 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-02 16:58 ` Mihai Donțu
2014-07-02 17:07 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-03 8:23 ` Mihai Donțu
2014-07-03 9:32 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-03 9:40 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 16:06 ` Razvan Cojocaru [this message]
2014-07-02 16:13 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 13:33 ` [PATCH RFC 7/9] xen: Handle resumed instruction based on previous mem_event reply Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:56 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03 8:55 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03 9:02 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03 9:12 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03 9:18 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-03 9:22 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03 9:34 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03 10:14 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 13:34 ` [PATCH RFC 8/9] xen: Generic instruction re-execution mechanism for execute faults Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 16:04 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-02 13:34 ` [PATCH RFC 9/9] mm: mark pages that have their permissions controlled by a domain Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03 10:19 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03 11:27 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03 12:15 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 15:20 ` [PATCH RFC 1/9] xen: Emulate with no writes; compute current instruction length Andrew Cooper
2014-07-03 7:42 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:21 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 15:43 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 16:08 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 16:18 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03 6:24 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03 7:38 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03 8:05 ` Jan Beulich
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