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From: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
To: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Mihai Dontu <mdontu@bitdefender.com>,
	tim@xen.org, xen-devel@lists.xen.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 9/9] mm: mark pages that have their permissions controlled by a domain
Date: Thu, 03 Jul 2014 14:27:08 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <53B53E0C.20505@bitdefender.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <53B54A56020000780002019D@mail.emea.novell.com>

On 07/03/2014 01:19 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 02.07.14 at 15:34, <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com> wrote:
>> This goes together with the mem-event API changes and marks certain
>> pages as being controlled from outside the HV (a user domain in our
>> case). This prevents Xen from resetting the permissions in certain
>> cases, enforcing the previously expressed intention of receiving a
>> memory event everytime the owning domain triggers a fault.
> 
> These "certain cases" would clearly benefit from being named in a
> more precise fashion - it's not been that long ago that for some of
> the cases where the access permissions got reset as a side effect
> we decided to remove that side effect, and it was discussed to also
> be done for at least one more case. I.e. perhaps you would not
> need extensive changes like the ones here if that was done?

Could you please point us to these discussions? It would definitely be
very nice if the problem has been fixed in the meantime.

We're not entirely sure what the trigger for the resets was in our case.
We've so far ruled out live migration and ballooning, by disabling them
in the .conf files for the guests.

We hook into the guest fairly early, almost immediately after it starts
running, and occasionally (quite rarely, actually), we lost the
permissions set on some pages, apparently during the boot process (or
very shortly after).


Thanks,
Razvan Cojocaru

  reply	other threads:[~2014-07-03 11:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-07-02 13:33 [PATCH RFC 1/9] xen: Emulate with no writes; compute current instruction length Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 13:33 ` [PATCH RFC 2/9] xen: Optimize introspection access to guest state Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:31   ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-07 14:50     ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-10  8:05     ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-10  8:17       ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-10  8:23         ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-10 11:57         ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-10 12:16           ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-10 13:01           ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-02 15:37   ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03  8:12     ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03  8:54       ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 13:33 ` [PATCH RFC 3/9] xen: Force-enable relevant MSR events; optimize the number of sent MSR events Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:35   ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-02 15:43     ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-09  8:02       ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-23  7:56         ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-23  8:03           ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 13:33 ` [PATCH RFC 4/9] xenctrl: Make the headers C++ friendly Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:37   ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-02 13:33 ` [PATCH RFC 5/9] xen: Support for VMCALL mem_events Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:47   ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 15:54     ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 16:11       ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 16:23         ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03  6:28           ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03  7:29             ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:54   ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-02 15:59     ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 13:33 ` [PATCH RFC 6/9] xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:51   ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 16:00     ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-02 16:58       ` Mihai Donțu
2014-07-02 17:07         ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-03  8:23           ` Mihai Donțu
2014-07-03  9:32             ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-03  9:40               ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 16:06     ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 16:13       ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 13:33 ` [PATCH RFC 7/9] xen: Handle resumed instruction based on previous mem_event reply Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:56   ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03  8:55     ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03  9:02       ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03  9:12         ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03  9:18           ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-03  9:22           ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03  9:34             ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03 10:14               ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 13:34 ` [PATCH RFC 8/9] xen: Generic instruction re-execution mechanism for execute faults Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 16:04   ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-02 13:34 ` [PATCH RFC 9/9] mm: mark pages that have their permissions controlled by a domain Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03 10:19   ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03 11:27     ` Razvan Cojocaru [this message]
2014-07-03 12:15       ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 15:20 ` [PATCH RFC 1/9] xen: Emulate with no writes; compute current instruction length Andrew Cooper
2014-07-03  7:42   ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:21 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 15:43   ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 16:08     ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 16:18       ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03  6:24         ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03  7:38   ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03  8:05     ` Jan Beulich

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