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From: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>, xen-devel@lists.xen.org
Cc: tim@xen.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 2/9] xen: Optimize introspection access to guest state
Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2014 11:23:23 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <53BE4D7B.2020006@bitdefender.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <53BE4C36.4000805@citrix.com>

On 07/10/2014 11:17 AM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> Your proposed change would make the results of vmx_guest_x86_mode() part
> of the Xen ABI, and therefore hard to refactor in the future if the need
> were to arise.
> 
> Also, it ties any SVM extension of your work to VT-x internals.

I see. Yes, that makes sense. I'll take guest_x86_mode out.


Thanks,
Razvan Cojocaru

  reply	other threads:[~2014-07-10  8:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-07-02 13:33 [PATCH RFC 1/9] xen: Emulate with no writes; compute current instruction length Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 13:33 ` [PATCH RFC 2/9] xen: Optimize introspection access to guest state Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:31   ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-07 14:50     ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-10  8:05     ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-10  8:17       ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-10  8:23         ` Razvan Cojocaru [this message]
2014-07-10 11:57         ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-10 12:16           ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-10 13:01           ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-02 15:37   ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03  8:12     ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03  8:54       ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 13:33 ` [PATCH RFC 3/9] xen: Force-enable relevant MSR events; optimize the number of sent MSR events Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:35   ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-02 15:43     ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-09  8:02       ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-23  7:56         ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-23  8:03           ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 13:33 ` [PATCH RFC 4/9] xenctrl: Make the headers C++ friendly Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:37   ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-02 13:33 ` [PATCH RFC 5/9] xen: Support for VMCALL mem_events Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:47   ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 15:54     ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 16:11       ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 16:23         ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03  6:28           ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03  7:29             ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:54   ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-02 15:59     ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 13:33 ` [PATCH RFC 6/9] xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:51   ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 16:00     ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-02 16:58       ` Mihai Donțu
2014-07-02 17:07         ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-03  8:23           ` Mihai Donțu
2014-07-03  9:32             ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-03  9:40               ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 16:06     ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 16:13       ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 13:33 ` [PATCH RFC 7/9] xen: Handle resumed instruction based on previous mem_event reply Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:56   ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03  8:55     ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03  9:02       ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03  9:12         ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03  9:18           ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-03  9:22           ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03  9:34             ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03 10:14               ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 13:34 ` [PATCH RFC 8/9] xen: Generic instruction re-execution mechanism for execute faults Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 16:04   ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-02 13:34 ` [PATCH RFC 9/9] mm: mark pages that have their permissions controlled by a domain Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03 10:19   ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03 11:27     ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03 12:15       ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 15:20 ` [PATCH RFC 1/9] xen: Emulate with no writes; compute current instruction length Andrew Cooper
2014-07-03  7:42   ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:21 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 15:43   ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 16:08     ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 16:18       ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03  6:24         ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03  7:38   ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03  8:05     ` Jan Beulich

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