From: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>, xen-devel@lists.xen.org
Cc: tim@xen.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 2/9] xen: Optimize introspection access to guest state
Date: Mon, 07 Jul 2014 17:50:07 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <53BAB39F.9040007@bitdefender.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <53B425B4.3010808@citrix.com>
On 07/02/2014 06:31 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 02/07/14 14:33, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>> Speed optimization for introspection purposes: a handful of registers
>> are sent along with each mem_event. This requires enlargement of the
>> mem_event_request / mem_event_response stuctures, and additional code
>> to fill in relevant values.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
>
> The public API already has struct hvm_hw_cpu in
> xen/include/public/arch-x86/hvm/save.h
>
> It might be better to reuse that rather than defining a new structure to
> contain a subset of the information.
While reinspecting the code to accommodate the critique - the reason why
I've not used struct hvm_hw_cpu back when I initially wrote the patch is
that sizeof(struct hvm_hw_cpu) is considerably larger that the size of
our custom struct. Using hvm_hw_cpu would have filled the mem_event ring
buffer fast, with each mem_event carrying an instance of it around.
Thanks,
Razvan Cojocaru
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-07-07 14:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-07-02 13:33 [PATCH RFC 1/9] xen: Emulate with no writes; compute current instruction length Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 13:33 ` [PATCH RFC 2/9] xen: Optimize introspection access to guest state Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:31 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-07 14:50 ` Razvan Cojocaru [this message]
2014-07-10 8:05 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-10 8:17 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-10 8:23 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-10 11:57 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-10 12:16 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-10 13:01 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-02 15:37 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03 8:12 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03 8:54 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 13:33 ` [PATCH RFC 3/9] xen: Force-enable relevant MSR events; optimize the number of sent MSR events Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:35 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-02 15:43 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-09 8:02 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-23 7:56 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-23 8:03 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 13:33 ` [PATCH RFC 4/9] xenctrl: Make the headers C++ friendly Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:37 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-02 13:33 ` [PATCH RFC 5/9] xen: Support for VMCALL mem_events Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:47 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 15:54 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 16:11 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 16:23 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03 6:28 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03 7:29 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:54 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-02 15:59 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 13:33 ` [PATCH RFC 6/9] xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:51 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 16:00 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-02 16:58 ` Mihai Donțu
2014-07-02 17:07 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-03 8:23 ` Mihai Donțu
2014-07-03 9:32 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-03 9:40 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 16:06 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 16:13 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 13:33 ` [PATCH RFC 7/9] xen: Handle resumed instruction based on previous mem_event reply Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:56 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03 8:55 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03 9:02 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03 9:12 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03 9:18 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-03 9:22 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03 9:34 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03 10:14 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 13:34 ` [PATCH RFC 8/9] xen: Generic instruction re-execution mechanism for execute faults Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 16:04 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-02 13:34 ` [PATCH RFC 9/9] mm: mark pages that have their permissions controlled by a domain Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03 10:19 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03 11:27 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03 12:15 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 15:20 ` [PATCH RFC 1/9] xen: Emulate with no writes; compute current instruction length Andrew Cooper
2014-07-03 7:42 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 15:21 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 15:43 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-02 16:08 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-02 16:18 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03 6:24 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-03 7:38 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-03 8:05 ` Jan Beulich
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