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From: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 26/26] x86, pkeys: Documentation
Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2015 11:08:27 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <560EC81B.60809@sr71.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFxf3ExQEq2zhNhj4zk5nC5in9=1acVfynOVxZdN9RLbdA@mail.gmail.com>

On 10/01/2015 06:38 PM, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 6:56 PM, Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> wrote:
>>
>> Also, a quick ftrace showed that most mmap() callers that set PROT_EXEC
>> also set PROT_READ.  I'm just assuming that folks are setting PROT_READ
>> but aren't _really_ going to read it, so we can safely deny them all
>> access other than exec.
> 
> That's a completely insane assumption. There are tons of reasons to
> have code and read-only data in the same segment, and it's very
> traditional. Just assuming that you only execute out of something that
> has PROT_EXEC | PROT_READ is insane.

Yes, it's insane, and I confirmed that ld.so actually reads some stuff
out of the first page of the r-x part of the executable.

But, it did find a bug in my code where I wouldn't allow instruction
fetches to fault in pages in a pkey-protected area, so it wasn't a
completely worthless exercise.

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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 26/26] x86, pkeys: Documentation
Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2015 11:08:27 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <560EC81B.60809@sr71.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFxf3ExQEq2zhNhj4zk5nC5in9=1acVfynOVxZdN9RLbdA@mail.gmail.com>

On 10/01/2015 06:38 PM, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 6:56 PM, Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> wrote:
>>
>> Also, a quick ftrace showed that most mmap() callers that set PROT_EXEC
>> also set PROT_READ.  I'm just assuming that folks are setting PROT_READ
>> but aren't _really_ going to read it, so we can safely deny them all
>> access other than exec.
> 
> That's a completely insane assumption. There are tons of reasons to
> have code and read-only data in the same segment, and it's very
> traditional. Just assuming that you only execute out of something that
> has PROT_EXEC | PROT_READ is insane.

Yes, it's insane, and I confirmed that ld.so actually reads some stuff
out of the first page of the r-x part of the executable.

But, it did find a bug in my code where I wouldn't allow instruction
fetches to fault in pages in a pkey-protected area, so it wasn't a
completely worthless exercise.

  reply	other threads:[~2015-10-02 18:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 172+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-09-16 17:49 [PATCH 00/26] [RFCv2] x86: Memory Protection Keys Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 02/26] x86, pkeys: Add Kconfig option Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 04/26] x86, pku: define new CR4 bit Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 01/26] x86, fpu: add placeholder for Processor Trace XSAVE state Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 03/26] x86, pkeys: cpuid bit definition Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 06/26] x86, pkeys: PTE bits for storing protection key Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 05/26] x86, pkey: add PKRU xsave fields and data structure(s) Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-22 19:53   ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-09-22 19:53     ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-09-22 19:58     ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-22 19:58       ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 07/26] x86, pkeys: new page fault error code bit: PF_PK Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 10/26] x86, pkeys: notify userspace about protection key faults Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-22 20:03   ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-09-22 20:03     ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-09-22 20:21     ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-22 20:21       ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-22 20:27       ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-09-22 20:27         ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-09-22 20:29         ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-22 20:29           ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-23  8:05           ` Ingo Molnar
2015-09-23  8:05             ` Ingo Molnar
2015-09-24  9:23   ` Ingo Molnar
2015-09-24  9:23     ` Ingo Molnar
2015-09-24  9:30     ` Ingo Molnar
2015-09-24  9:30       ` Ingo Molnar
2015-09-24 17:41       ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-24 17:41         ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-25  7:11         ` Ingo Molnar
2015-09-25  7:11           ` Ingo Molnar
2015-09-25 23:18           ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-25 23:18             ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-26  6:20             ` Ingo Molnar
2015-09-26  6:20               ` Ingo Molnar
2015-09-27 22:39               ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-27 22:39                 ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-28  5:59                 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-09-28  5:59                   ` Ingo Molnar
2015-09-24 17:15     ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-24 17:15       ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:25       ` Christian Borntraeger
2015-09-28 19:25         ` Christian Borntraeger
2015-09-28 19:32         ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:32           ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 08/26] x86, pkeys: store protection in high VMA flags Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 09/26] x86, pkeys: arch-specific protection bits Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 11/26] x86, pkeys: add functions for set/fetch PKRU Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-22 20:05   ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-09-22 20:05     ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-09-22 20:22     ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-22 20:22       ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 12/26] mm: factor out VMA fault permission checking Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 13/26] mm: simplify get_user_pages() PTE bit handling Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 14/26] x86, pkeys: check VMAs and PTEs for protection keys Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 15/26] x86, pkeys: optimize fault handling in access_error() Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 17/26] x86, pkeys: dump PTE pkey in /proc/pid/smaps Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 16/26] x86, pkeys: dump PKRU with other kernel registers Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 19/26] [NEWSYSCALL] mm, multi-arch: pass a protection key in to calc_vm_flag_bits() Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 18/26] x86, pkeys: add Kconfig prompt to existing config option Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 20/26] [NEWSYSCALL] mm: implement new mprotect_pkey() system call Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 21/26] [NEWSYSCALL] x86: wire up mprotect_key() " Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 22/26] [HIJACKPROT] mm: Pass the 4-bit protection key in via PROT_ bits to syscalls Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 24/26] [HIJACKPROT] x86, pkeys: mask off pkeys bits in mprotect() Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 25/26] x86, pkeys: actually enable Memory Protection Keys in CPU Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 23/26] [HIJACKPROT] x86, pkeys: add x86 version of arch_validate_prot() Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49 ` [PATCH 26/26] x86, pkeys: Documentation Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:49   ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-20  8:55   ` Ingo Molnar
2015-09-20  8:55     ` Ingo Molnar
2015-09-21  4:34     ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-21  4:34       ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-24  9:49       ` Ingo Molnar
2015-09-24  9:49         ` Ingo Molnar
2015-09-24 19:10         ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-24 19:10           ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-24 19:17           ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-24 19:17             ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-25  7:16             ` Ingo Molnar
2015-09-25  7:16               ` Ingo Molnar
2015-09-25  6:15           ` Ingo Molnar
2015-09-25  6:15             ` Ingo Molnar
2015-10-01 11:17           ` Ingo Molnar
2015-10-01 11:17             ` Ingo Molnar
2015-10-01 20:39             ` Kees Cook
2015-10-01 20:39               ` Kees Cook
2015-10-01 20:45               ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-10-01 20:45                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-10-02  6:23                 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-10-02  6:23                   ` Ingo Molnar
2015-10-02 17:50                   ` Dave Hansen
2015-10-02 17:50                     ` Dave Hansen
2015-10-03  7:27                     ` Ingo Molnar
2015-10-03  7:27                       ` Ingo Molnar
2015-10-06 23:28                       ` Dave Hansen
2015-10-06 23:28                         ` Dave Hansen
2015-10-07  7:11                         ` Ingo Molnar
2015-10-07  7:11                           ` Ingo Molnar
2015-10-16 15:12                       ` Dave Hansen
2015-10-16 15:12                         ` Dave Hansen
2015-10-21 18:55                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-10-21 18:55                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-10-21 19:11                           ` Dave Hansen
2015-10-21 19:11                             ` Dave Hansen
2015-10-21 23:22                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-10-21 23:22                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-10-01 20:58               ` Dave Hansen
2015-10-01 20:58                 ` Dave Hansen
2015-10-01 22:33               ` Dave Hansen
2015-10-01 22:35                 ` Kees Cook
2015-10-01 22:35                   ` Kees Cook
2015-10-01 22:39                   ` Dave Hansen
2015-10-01 22:39                     ` Dave Hansen
2015-10-01 22:48                 ` Linus Torvalds
2015-10-01 22:48                   ` Linus Torvalds
2015-10-01 22:56                   ` Dave Hansen
2015-10-01 22:56                     ` Dave Hansen
2015-10-02  1:38                     ` Linus Torvalds
2015-10-02  1:38                       ` Linus Torvalds
2015-10-02 18:08                       ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2015-10-02 18:08                         ` Dave Hansen
2015-10-02  7:09                   ` Ingo Molnar
2015-10-02  7:09                     ` Ingo Molnar
2015-10-03  6:59                     ` Ingo Molnar
2015-10-03  6:59                       ` Ingo Molnar
2015-10-02 11:49                   ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-10-02 11:49                     ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-10-02 11:58                     ` Linus Torvalds
2015-10-02 11:58                       ` Linus Torvalds
2015-10-02 12:14                       ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-10-02 12:14                         ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-10-03  6:46                         ` Ingo Molnar
2015-10-03  6:46                           ` Ingo Molnar
2015-10-01 22:57                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-10-01 22:57                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-10-02  6:09                 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-10-02  6:09                   ` Ingo Molnar
2015-10-03  8:17         ` Ingo Molnar
2015-10-03  8:17           ` Ingo Molnar
2015-10-07 20:24           ` Dave Hansen
2015-10-07 20:24             ` Dave Hansen
2015-10-07 20:39             ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-10-07 20:39               ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-10-07 20:47               ` Dave Hansen
2015-10-07 20:47                 ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-16 17:51 ` Fwd: [PATCH 00/26] [RFCv2] x86: Memory Protection Keys Dave Hansen

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