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From: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>,
	Tristan Schmelcher <tschmelcher@google.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	user-mode-linux-user@lists.sourceforge.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] um: Set secure access mode for temporary file
Date: Sun, 29 Nov 2015 00:11:39 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <565A34AB.5010303@nod.at> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <565A3228.5080908@digikod.net>

Am 29.11.2015 um 00:00 schrieb Mickaël Salaün:
> 
> 
> On 28/11/2015 23:55, Richard Weinberger wrote:
>> Am 28.11.2015 um 23:52 schrieb Mickaël Salaün:
>>>
>>> On 28/11/2015 22:40, Richard Weinberger wrote:
>>>> Am 28.11.2015 um 22:32 schrieb Mickaël Salaün:
>>>>> Replace the default insecure mode 0777 with 0700 for temporary file.
>>>>>
>>>>> Prohibit other users to change the executable mapped code.
>>>>
>>>> Hmm, isn't the tmp file already unlinked at this stage?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, but if someone could open it before the unlink e.g. because of the umask (which does not seems to be the case thanks to mkstemp, but remains unspecified [1]), this user should then be able to have write access to the file descriptor/description.
>>
>> Yes, someone can open it before the unlink. But you change the file mode after that.
>> How does it improve the situation? The attacker has already the file handle.
> 
> The attacker could have the file handle only in a read-only mode, which is a bit different than being able to write and execute arbitrary code thanks to a file descriptor mapped RWX :)

Fair point. Please describe this in detail in the patch changelog. :-)

Thanks,
//richard
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>,
	Tristan Schmelcher <tschmelcher@google.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	user-mode-linux-user@lists.sourceforge.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] um: Set secure access mode for temporary file
Date: Sun, 29 Nov 2015 00:11:39 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <565A34AB.5010303@nod.at> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <565A3228.5080908@digikod.net>

Am 29.11.2015 um 00:00 schrieb Mickaël Salaün:
> 
> 
> On 28/11/2015 23:55, Richard Weinberger wrote:
>> Am 28.11.2015 um 23:52 schrieb Mickaël Salaün:
>>>
>>> On 28/11/2015 22:40, Richard Weinberger wrote:
>>>> Am 28.11.2015 um 22:32 schrieb Mickaël Salaün:
>>>>> Replace the default insecure mode 0777 with 0700 for temporary file.
>>>>>
>>>>> Prohibit other users to change the executable mapped code.
>>>>
>>>> Hmm, isn't the tmp file already unlinked at this stage?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, but if someone could open it before the unlink e.g. because of the umask (which does not seems to be the case thanks to mkstemp, but remains unspecified [1]), this user should then be able to have write access to the file descriptor/description.
>>
>> Yes, someone can open it before the unlink. But you change the file mode after that.
>> How does it improve the situation? The attacker has already the file handle.
> 
> The attacker could have the file handle only in a read-only mode, which is a bit different than being able to write and execute arbitrary code thanks to a file descriptor mapped RWX :)

Fair point. Please describe this in detail in the patch changelog. :-)

Thanks,
//richard

  reply	other threads:[~2015-11-28 23:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-11-28 21:32 [PATCH 0/2] um: Protect memory mapped file Mickaël Salaün
2015-11-28 21:32 ` Mickaël Salaün
2015-11-28 21:32 ` [PATCH 1/2] um: Set secure access mode for temporary file Mickaël Salaün
2015-11-28 21:32   ` Mickaël Salaün
2015-11-28 21:40   ` [uml-devel] " Richard Weinberger
2015-11-28 21:40     ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-28 22:52     ` Mickaël Salaün
2015-11-28 22:55       ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-28 22:55         ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-28 23:00         ` Mickaël Salaün
2015-11-28 23:11           ` Richard Weinberger [this message]
2015-11-28 23:11             ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-28 21:32 ` [PATCH 2/2] um: Use race-free temporary file creation Mickaël Salaün
2015-11-28 21:32   ` Mickaël Salaün
2015-11-28 22:07   ` [uml-devel] " Richard Weinberger
2015-11-28 22:07     ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-28 22:56     ` Mickaël Salaün
2015-11-28 22:59       ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-28 22:59         ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-28 23:02         ` Mickaël Salaün

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