From: ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Linux Containers
<containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
Subject: [REVIEW][PATCH 4/5] capabilities: allow nice if we are privileged
Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2013 16:55:35 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8761uoyruw.fsf@xmission.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87ob8gys0d.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org> (Eric W. Biederman's message of "Thu, 29 Aug 2013 16:52:18 -0700")
We allow task A to change B's nice level if it has a supserset of
B's privileges, or of it has CAP_SYS_NICE. Also allow it if A has
CAP_SYS_NICE with respect to B - meaning it is root in the same
namespace, or it created B's namespace.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
---
security/commoncap.c | 8 ++++----
1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 9fccf71..b9d613e 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -768,16 +768,16 @@ int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)
*/
static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
{
- int is_subset;
+ int is_subset, ret = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
is_subset = cap_issubset(__task_cred(p)->cap_permitted,
current_cred()->cap_permitted);
+ if (!is_subset && !ns_capable(__task_cred(p)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE))
+ ret = -EPERM;
rcu_read_unlock();
- if (!is_subset && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
- return -EPERM;
- return 0;
+ return ret;
}
/**
--
1.7.5.4
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [REVIEW][PATCH 4/5] capabilities: allow nice if we are privileged
Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2013 16:55:35 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8761uoyruw.fsf@xmission.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87ob8gys0d.fsf@xmission.com> (Eric W. Biederman's message of "Thu, 29 Aug 2013 16:52:18 -0700")
We allow task A to change B's nice level if it has a supserset of
B's privileges, or of it has CAP_SYS_NICE. Also allow it if A has
CAP_SYS_NICE with respect to B - meaning it is root in the same
namespace, or it created B's namespace.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
security/commoncap.c | 8 ++++----
1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 9fccf71..b9d613e 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -768,16 +768,16 @@ int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)
*/
static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
{
- int is_subset;
+ int is_subset, ret = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
is_subset = cap_issubset(__task_cred(p)->cap_permitted,
current_cred()->cap_permitted);
+ if (!is_subset && !ns_capable(__task_cred(p)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE))
+ ret = -EPERM;
rcu_read_unlock();
- if (!is_subset && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
- return -EPERM;
- return 0;
+ return ret;
}
/**
--
1.7.5.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-08-29 23:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-08-29 23:52 [REVIEW][PATCH 0/5] A couple of lingering namespace patches Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-29 23:52 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87ob8gys0d.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2013-08-29 23:53 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 1/5] namespaces: Simplify copy_namespaces so it is clear what is going on Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-29 23:53 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87ioyoyryr.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2013-08-30 16:10 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-08-30 16:10 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-08-29 23:54 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 2/5] userns: Allow PR_CAPBSET_DROP in a user namespace Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-29 23:54 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87eh9cyrxj.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2013-08-30 1:15 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-08-30 1:15 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-08-29 23:55 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 3/5] pidns: Don't have unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) imply CLONE_THREAD Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-29 23:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87a9k0yrvu.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2013-08-30 16:38 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-08-30 16:38 ` Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <20130830163805.GB18857-7LNsyQBKDXoIagZqoN9o3w@public.gmane.org>
2013-08-30 23:49 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-30 23:49 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87ppsuviwb.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2013-08-31 5:31 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-08-31 5:31 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-09-08 17:00 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-09-08 17:00 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-29 23:55 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2013-08-29 23:55 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 4/5] capabilities: allow nice if we are privileged Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-29 23:56 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 5/5] userns: Kill nsown_capable it makes the wrong thing easy Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-29 23:56 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <871u5cyrst.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2013-08-30 1:14 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-08-30 1:14 ` Serge E. Hallyn
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