From: "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@linux-mips.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
x86@kernel.org, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>,
Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
Alex Shi <alex.shi@intel.com>,
Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com>,
Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>,
Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
xen-devel@lists.xensource.com,
virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>,
Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] x86: make IDT read-only
Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2013 23:56:29 +0100 (BST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LFD.2.03.1304082350540.25182@linux-mips.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130408224328.GA17641@www.outflux.net>
On Mon, 8 Apr 2013, Kees Cook wrote:
> This makes the IDT unconditionally read-only. This primarily removes
> the IDT from being a target for arbitrary memory write attacks. It has
> an added benefit of also not leaking (via the "sidt" instruction) the
> kernel base offset, if it has been relocated.
[...]
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
> @@ -215,7 +201,6 @@ static void __cpuinit intel_workarounds(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>
> c->f00f_bug = 1;
> if (!f00f_workaround_enabled) {
> - trap_init_f00f_bug();
> printk(KERN_NOTICE "Intel Pentium with F0 0F bug - workaround enabled.\n");
> f00f_workaround_enabled = 1;
> }
FWIW the change looks reasonable to me, however given that that it makes
the arrangement unconditional and there is no longer a workaround to
enable I think it would make sense to remove the conditional block quoted
above altogether, along with the f00f_workaround_enabled variable itself
(alternatively "Intel Pentium with F0 0F bug" alone could be printed
instead and the name of the variable adjusted to make sense with the new
meaning -- up to you to decide).
Maciej
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@linux-mips.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
x86@kernel.org, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>,
Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
Alex Shi <alex.shi@intel.com>,
Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com>,
Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>,
Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
xen-devel@lists.xensource.com,
virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>,
Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: make IDT read-only
Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2013 23:56:29 +0100 (BST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LFD.2.03.1304082350540.25182@linux-mips.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130408224328.GA17641@www.outflux.net>
On Mon, 8 Apr 2013, Kees Cook wrote:
> This makes the IDT unconditionally read-only. This primarily removes
> the IDT from being a target for arbitrary memory write attacks. It has
> an added benefit of also not leaking (via the "sidt" instruction) the
> kernel base offset, if it has been relocated.
[...]
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
> @@ -215,7 +201,6 @@ static void __cpuinit intel_workarounds(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>
> c->f00f_bug = 1;
> if (!f00f_workaround_enabled) {
> - trap_init_f00f_bug();
> printk(KERN_NOTICE "Intel Pentium with F0 0F bug - workaround enabled.\n");
> f00f_workaround_enabled = 1;
> }
FWIW the change looks reasonable to me, however given that that it makes
the arrangement unconditional and there is no longer a workaround to
enable I think it would make sense to remove the conditional block quoted
above altogether, along with the f00f_workaround_enabled variable itself
(alternatively "Intel Pentium with F0 0F bug" alone could be printed
instead and the name of the variable adjusted to make sense with the new
meaning -- up to you to decide).
Maciej
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-04-08 22:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 83+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-04-08 22:43 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] x86: make IDT read-only Kees Cook
2013-04-08 22:43 ` Kees Cook
2013-04-08 22:43 ` Kees Cook
2013-04-08 22:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-08 22:47 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-08 22:47 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-08 22:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-04-08 22:55 ` Kees Cook
2013-04-08 22:55 ` Kees Cook
2013-04-08 22:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-08 22:48 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-08 22:48 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-09 9:23 ` Thomas Gleixner
2013-04-09 9:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Gleixner
2013-04-09 9:23 ` Thomas Gleixner
2013-04-09 18:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-04-09 18:22 ` Kees Cook
2013-04-09 18:26 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-09 18:26 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-09 18:31 ` Kees Cook
2013-04-09 18:31 ` Kees Cook
2013-04-09 18:39 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-09 18:39 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-09 18:46 ` Kees Cook
2013-04-09 18:46 ` Kees Cook
2013-04-09 18:50 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-09 18:50 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-09 18:53 ` Kees Cook
2013-04-09 18:53 ` Kees Cook
2013-04-09 18:54 ` Eric Northup
2013-04-09 18:54 ` Eric Northup
2013-04-09 18:59 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-09 18:59 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-10 0:43 ` [kernel-hardening] Readonly GDT H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-10 0:43 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-10 0:43 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-10 0:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Steven Rostedt
2013-04-10 0:53 ` Steven Rostedt
2013-04-10 0:53 ` Steven Rostedt
2013-04-10 0:58 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-10 0:58 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-10 0:58 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-10 9:42 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [Xen-devel] " Jan Beulich
2013-04-10 9:42 ` Jan Beulich
2013-04-10 9:42 ` Jan Beulich
2013-04-10 14:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-10 14:16 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-10 14:16 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-10 18:28 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-10 18:28 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-10 9:41 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] x86: make IDT read-only Ingo Molnar
2013-04-10 9:41 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-04-10 0:03 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-10 0:03 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-10 9:52 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-04-10 9:52 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-04-09 9:45 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-04-09 9:45 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-04-09 9:45 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-04-10 9:57 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2013-04-10 9:57 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-04-10 9:57 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-04-10 10:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2013-04-10 10:40 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-04-10 10:40 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-04-10 16:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Northup
2013-04-10 16:31 ` Eric Northup
2013-04-10 16:31 ` Eric Northup
2013-04-10 16:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-10 16:48 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-10 16:48 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-08 22:56 ` Maciej W. Rozycki
2013-04-08 22:56 ` Maciej W. Rozycki [this message]
2013-04-08 22:56 ` Maciej W. Rozycki
2013-04-08 23:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-04-08 23:00 ` Kees Cook
2013-04-08 23:00 ` Kees Cook
2013-04-08 23:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-04-08 23:05 ` Kees Cook
2013-04-08 23:05 ` Kees Cook
2013-04-08 23:42 ` [kernel-hardening] " Maciej W. Rozycki
2013-04-08 23:42 ` Maciej W. Rozycki
2013-04-08 23:42 ` Maciej W. Rozycki
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