From: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Subject: System emulator security boundary policy now enforceable
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 10:09:50 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <avwn7izLPHpSmVun@redhat.com> (raw)
With the latest pull request of mine that is merged, we now have
the mechanism for enforcement of the QEMU security boundary policy
with annotations completed across QOM classes for machine types,
devices and accelerators.
For a bug disclosure affecting a system emulator to be accepted
as a security flaw the reproducer scenario must now pass without
warnings when adding the '-compat insecure-input' flag.
For example:
$ qemu-system-x86_64 -compat insecure-input=warn
qemu-system-x86_64: warning: Insecure QOM type tcg-accel accepted by policy
$ qemu-system-x86_64 -compat insecure-input=warn -machine isapc -device ne2k_isa
qemu-system-x86_64: warning: Insecure QOM type isapc-machine accepted by policy
qemu-system-x86_64: warning: Insecure QOM type tcg-accel accepted by policy
qemu-system-x86_64: -device ne2k_isa: warning: Insecure QOM type ne2k_isa accepted by policy
Alternatively you can have QEMU crash on the first violation
$ qemu-system-x86_64 -compat insecure-input=reject -machine isapc -device ne2k_isa
qemu-system-x86_64: Insecure QOM type isapc-machine disabled by policy
This type does does not provide a security boundary to protect against untrusted data or actions
When triaging an incoming disclosure affecting system emulators
please use this mechanism as the primary guide for whether to
handle it as a security flaw with a CVE assignment request, or
merely a normal public bug.
This mechanism is intended as authoritative, while the security.rst
docs describing virtualization vs non-virtualization use cases are
merely a high level approximation.
With regards,
Daniel
--
|: https://berrange.com ~~ https://hachyderm.io/@berrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org ~~ https://entangle-photo.org :|
|: https://pixelfed.art/berrange ~~ https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
next reply other threads:[~2026-11-17 10:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-17 10:09 Daniel P. Berrangé [this message]
2026-11-17 10:24 ` System emulator security boundary policy now enforceable Peter Maydell
2026-11-17 10:35 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-17 14:55 ` Marc-André Lureau
2026-11-17 14:57 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-17 10:32 ` Mark Cave-Ayland
2026-11-17 16:00 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=avwn7izLPHpSmVun@redhat.com \
--to=berrange@redhat.com \
--cc=qemu-devel@nongnu.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.