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From: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: Mark Cave-Ayland <mark.caveayland@nutanix.com>
Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Subject: Re: System emulator security boundary policy now enforceable
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 16:00:11 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <avx6C5q6SiBTwED8@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f684a997-229a-4b62-b799-75ecb0facdae@nutanix.com>

On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 10:32:51AM +0000, Mark Cave-Ayland wrote:
> On 17/11/2026 10:09, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> 
> > With the latest pull request of mine that is merged, we now have
> > the mechanism for enforcement of the QEMU security boundary policy
> > with annotations completed across QOM classes for machine types,
> > devices and accelerators.
> > 
> > For a bug disclosure affecting a system emulator to be accepted
> > as a security flaw the reproducer scenario must now pass without
> > warnings when adding the '-compat insecure-input' flag.
> > 
> > For example:
> > 
> >   $ qemu-system-x86_64 -compat insecure-input=warn
> >   qemu-system-x86_64: warning: Insecure QOM type tcg-accel accepted by policy
> > 
> >   $ qemu-system-x86_64 -compat insecure-input=warn -machine isapc -device ne2k_isa
> >   qemu-system-x86_64: warning: Insecure QOM type isapc-machine accepted by policy
> >   qemu-system-x86_64: warning: Insecure QOM type tcg-accel accepted by policy
> >   qemu-system-x86_64: -device ne2k_isa: warning: Insecure QOM type ne2k_isa accepted by policy
> > 
> > Alternatively you can have QEMU crash on the first violation
> > 
> >   $ qemu-system-x86_64 -compat insecure-input=reject -machine isapc -device ne2k_isa
> >   qemu-system-x86_64: Insecure QOM type isapc-machine disabled by policy
> >   This type does does not provide a security boundary to protect against untrusted data or actions
> > 
> > 
> > When triaging an incoming disclosure affecting system emulators
> > please use this mechanism as the primary guide for whether to
> > handle it as a security flaw with a CVE assignment request, or
> > merely a normal public bug.
> > 
> > This mechanism is intended as authoritative, while the security.rst
> > docs describing virtualization vs non-virtualization use cases are
> > merely a high level approximation.
> Hurray! What is the best way to update AGENTS.md and friends accordingly to
> take advantage of this? Presumably we at least need to tell the agent that
> only reproducers within the security boundary should be considered
> "Confidential".
> 
> Unfortunately I'm not sure we can go as far as telling the agent not to
> raise a GitLab issue unless it lies within the security boundary, otherwise
> we risk still missing some useful bug reports. So the onslaught continues...

I guess if we at least tell the agent to use the new arg
"-compat insecure-types=reject" in their reproducers, they'll avoid
creating confidential issues for those non-virt scnearios, and their
comments will hopefully show that they included this arg.

Won't cut down the bug count, but will marginally reduce the triage work
as we won't need to manually turn off confidentiality and explain this
to users over and over and over again.

With regards,
Daniel
-- 
|: https://berrange.com       ~~        https://hachyderm.io/@berrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org          ~~          https://entangle-photo.org :|
|: https://pixelfed.art/berrange   ~~    https://fstop138.berrange.com :|



      reply	other threads:[~2026-11-17 16:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-17 10:09 System emulator security boundary policy now enforceable Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-17 10:24 ` Peter Maydell
2026-11-17 10:35   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-17 14:55     ` Marc-André Lureau
2026-11-17 14:57       ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-17 10:32 ` Mark Cave-Ayland
2026-11-17 16:00   ` Daniel P. Berrangé [this message]

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