From: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Subject: Re: System emulator security boundary policy now enforceable
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 10:35:25 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <avwt7XWPt9WNo90r@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFEAcA9otxN=xhb7C8JRQ7HGNZqvzdpDjBaFQ7rCxDviip-rZA@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 10:24:26AM +0000, Peter Maydell wrote:
> On Tue, 17 Nov 2026 at 10:10, Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > With the latest pull request of mine that is merged, we now have
> > the mechanism for enforcement of the QEMU security boundary policy
> > with annotations completed across QOM classes for machine types,
> > devices and accelerators.
> >
> > For a bug disclosure affecting a system emulator to be accepted
> > as a security flaw the reproducer scenario must now pass without
> > warnings when adding the '-compat insecure-input' flag.
>
> How does the marking work? I'm confused about what's going
> on with the pl011 UART (which is on the security boundary
> because the arm virt board uses it). Unlike hw/char/serial.c
> and some others, there's no ".secure = true" in hw/char/pl011.c.
> But it isn't being rejected by
> ./build/kvmonly/qemu-system-aarch64 -accel kvm -M virt -display none
> -compat insecure-input=reject -serial stdio
>
> so presumably we have figured out it's secure somehow. What's
> the mechanism here?
Currently we've only marked things which are explicitly user
creatable. ie they appear in '-machine help', '-accel help'
or '-device help' lists.
If a machine type is marked as secure, then implicitly devices
which are built-in for that machine are also considered secure.
Similarly if a device is marked as secure, then implicitly
any QOM parents of that device are also secure.
In the next release cycle, I want to explicitly mark the
built-in devices to make this clear to developers, and also
explicitly mark parent types.
Then code can explicitly validate the built-in devices & parents,
so that we can detect if someone adds something inappropriate
in our security boundary without realizing implications.
> Speaking of pl011, there's also a rust implementation (which
> I am not using in this test). Do we mark both the C and Rust
> implementations as 'secure' ?
We still have Rust disabled by default. Did we ever declare it to
be production ready yet ? If we still consider it experimental then
the rust pl011 would be out of scope.
With regards,
Daniel
--
|: https://berrange.com ~~ https://hachyderm.io/@berrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org ~~ https://entangle-photo.org :|
|: https://pixelfed.art/berrange ~~ https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-17 10:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-17 10:09 System emulator security boundary policy now enforceable Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-17 10:24 ` Peter Maydell
2026-11-17 10:35 ` Daniel P. Berrangé [this message]
2026-11-17 14:55 ` Marc-André Lureau
2026-11-17 14:57 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-17 10:32 ` Mark Cave-Ayland
2026-11-17 16:00 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=avwt7XWPt9WNo90r@redhat.com \
--to=berrange@redhat.com \
--cc=peter.maydell@linaro.org \
--cc=qemu-devel@nongnu.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.