From: Mark Cave-Ayland <mark.caveayland@nutanix.com>
To: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>, qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Subject: Re: System emulator security boundary policy now enforceable
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 10:32:51 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <f684a997-229a-4b62-b799-75ecb0facdae@nutanix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <avwn7izLPHpSmVun@redhat.com>
On 17/11/2026 10:09, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> With the latest pull request of mine that is merged, we now have
> the mechanism for enforcement of the QEMU security boundary policy
> with annotations completed across QOM classes for machine types,
> devices and accelerators.
>
> For a bug disclosure affecting a system emulator to be accepted
> as a security flaw the reproducer scenario must now pass without
> warnings when adding the '-compat insecure-input' flag.
>
> For example:
>
> $ qemu-system-x86_64 -compat insecure-input=warn
> qemu-system-x86_64: warning: Insecure QOM type tcg-accel accepted by policy
>
> $ qemu-system-x86_64 -compat insecure-input=warn -machine isapc -device ne2k_isa
> qemu-system-x86_64: warning: Insecure QOM type isapc-machine accepted by policy
> qemu-system-x86_64: warning: Insecure QOM type tcg-accel accepted by policy
> qemu-system-x86_64: -device ne2k_isa: warning: Insecure QOM type ne2k_isa accepted by policy
>
> Alternatively you can have QEMU crash on the first violation
>
> $ qemu-system-x86_64 -compat insecure-input=reject -machine isapc -device ne2k_isa
> qemu-system-x86_64: Insecure QOM type isapc-machine disabled by policy
> This type does does not provide a security boundary to protect against untrusted data or actions
>
>
> When triaging an incoming disclosure affecting system emulators
> please use this mechanism as the primary guide for whether to
> handle it as a security flaw with a CVE assignment request, or
> merely a normal public bug.
>
> This mechanism is intended as authoritative, while the security.rst
> docs describing virtualization vs non-virtualization use cases are
> merely a high level approximation.
Hurray! What is the best way to update AGENTS.md and friends accordingly
to take advantage of this? Presumably we at least need to tell the agent
that only reproducers within the security boundary should be considered
"Confidential".
Unfortunately I'm not sure we can go as far as telling the agent not to
raise a GitLab issue unless it lies within the security boundary,
otherwise we risk still missing some useful bug reports. So the
onslaught continues...
ATB,
Mark.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-17 10:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-17 10:09 System emulator security boundary policy now enforceable Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-17 10:24 ` Peter Maydell
2026-11-17 10:35 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-17 14:55 ` Marc-André Lureau
2026-11-17 14:57 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-17 10:32 ` Mark Cave-Ayland [this message]
2026-11-17 16:00 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
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