From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>, "Jan Kara" <jack@suse.com>
Cc: "Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org,
dsterba@suse.cz, tytso@mit.edu, "Mark Fasheh" <mark@fasheh.com>,
"Joel Becker" <jlbec@evilplan.org>,
"Joseph Qi" <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 26/33] btrfs: don't set SB_RDONLY after filesystem errors
Date: Sat, 14 Nov 2026 12:03:48 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-214477@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261113-work-fs-sb_rdonly-v3-26-0be92bb73709@kernel.org>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential
issues to consider:
- [Medium] btrfs: btrfs_super_sync_fs() and btrfs_freeze() return 0 on
shutdown or error
- [Medium] btrfs: race between BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO and
sb_set_emergency_ro() on fs error
--
commit 3d297b218ce5c34d64ff204c632eaa6ac7a2526b
Author: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
btrfs: don't set SB_RDONLY after filesystem errors
This commit stops setting SB_RDONLY in __btrfs_handle_fs_error(), using
BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO and sb_set_emergency_ro() instead, and updates shutdown,
remount, sync_fs, and freeze handling for the new read-only state.
> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/fs.h b/fs/btrfs/fs.h
> index 024c3ec7d0583..39fd1a04d25ba 100644
> --- a/fs/btrfs/fs.h
> +++ b/fs/btrfs/fs.h
[ ... ]
> @@ -1233,15 +1232,12 @@ static inline bool btrfs_is_shutdown(const struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info)
> static inline void btrfs_force_shutdown(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info)
> {
> /*
> - * Here we do not want to use handle_fs_error(), which will mark the fs
> - * read-only.
> - * Some call sites like shutdown ioctl will mark the fs shutdown when
> - * the fs is frozen. But thaw path will handle RO and RW fs
> - * differently.
> - *
> - * So here we only mark the fs error without flipping it RO.
> + * A shutdown isn't an error, so don't use btrfs_handle_fs_error().
> + * BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO doesn't touch SB_RDONLY, so it's fine while the
> + * filesystem is frozen, e.g. for the shutdown ioctl.
> */
> WRITE_ONCE(fs_info->fs_error, -EIO);
> + set_bit(BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO, &fs_info->fs_state);
> if (!test_and_set_bit(BTRFS_FS_STATE_EMERGENCY_SHUTDOWN, &fs_info->fs_state)) {
> btrfs_crit(fs_info, "emergency shutdown");
> fserror_report_shutdown(fs_info->sb, GFP_KERNEL);
[ ... ]
> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/messages.c b/fs/btrfs/messages.c
> index cedca40508315..3a768e2ac1ccf 100644
> --- a/fs/btrfs/messages.c
> +++ b/fs/btrfs/messages.c
> @@ -173,8 +173,12 @@ void __btrfs_handle_fs_error(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, const char *function
>
> btrfs_discard_stop(fs_info);
>
> - /* Handle error by forcing the filesystem readonly. */
> - btrfs_set_sb_rdonly(sb);
> + /*
> + * Handle error by forcing the filesystem readonly. SB_RDONLY needs
> + * s_umount, see sb_set_emergency_ro().
> + */
> + set_bit(BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO, &fs_info->fs_state);
> + sb_set_emergency_ro(sb);
> btrfs_info(fs_info, "forced readonly");
[Severity: Medium]
Can setting BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO before sb_set_emergency_ro(sb) let concurrent
callers observe btrfs_fs_rdonly() == true while sb_emergency_ro(sb) is still
false?
set_bit() is a relaxed atomic operation and __btrfs_handle_fs_error() returns
early when btrfs_fs_rdonly(fs_info) is already set:
CPU0 CPU1
__btrfs_handle_fs_error()
set_bit(BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO, ...)
ksys_syncfs()
sync_filesystem(sb)
btrfs_super_sync_fs(sb, 1)
if (btrfs_fs_rdonly(...))
return 0;
if (sb_emergency_ro(sb))
/* still false, returns 0 */
sb_set_emergency_ro(sb)
During this window, syncfs(2) and freeze_super() can see btrfs_fs_rdonly() ==
true in btrfs_super_sync_fs() and sb_emergency_ro(sb) == false in the VFS, so
they return 0 without syncing instead of failing with -EROFS. Similarly, a
second thread entering __btrfs_handle_fs_error() sees btrfs_fs_rdonly(fs_info)
and returns early to its caller before CPU0 sets SB_STATE_EMERGENCY_RO, so a
subsequent btrfs_ioctl_shutdown() or VFS call on CPU1 can still observe
sb_emergency_ro(sb) == false.
> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/super.c b/fs/btrfs/super.c
> index b424cc836bd4a..ff61ec9ebfa79 100644
> --- a/fs/btrfs/super.c
> +++ b/fs/btrfs/super.c
> @@ -1041,6 +1041,18 @@ int btrfs_sync_fs(struct super_block *sb, int wait)
> return btrfs_commit_transaction(trans);
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Nothing can be committed after an error, don't fail syncfs(2) and freezing.
> + * BTRFS_IOC_SYNC calls btrfs_sync_fs() directly and still gets the error.
> + */
> +static int btrfs_super_sync_fs(struct super_block *sb, int wait)
> +{
> + if (btrfs_fs_rdonly(btrfs_sb(sb)))
> + return 0;
> +
> + return btrfs_sync_fs(sb, wait);
> +}
[ ... ]
> @@ -2308,6 +2326,9 @@ static int btrfs_freeze(struct super_block *sb)
> struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = btrfs_sb(sb);
>
> set_bit(BTRFS_FS_FROZEN, &fs_info->flags);
> + /* Nothing can be committed after an error. */
> + if (btrfs_fs_rdonly(fs_info))
> + return 0;
> /*
> * We don't need a barrier here, we'll wait for any transaction that
> * could be in progress on other threads (and do delayed iputs that
[Severity: Medium]
Does returning 0 when btrfs_fs_rdonly() is true cause syncfs(2) and
freeze_super() to succeed without flushing after a forced shutdown?
btrfs_force_shutdown() now sets BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO without calling
sb_set_emergency_ro(sb). After BTRFS_IOC_SHUTDOWN with
BTRFS_SHUTDOWN_FLAGS_NOLOGFLUSH (or btrfs_shutdown()), dirty data and
transactions were not flushed, yet sb_emergency_ro(sb) and sb_rdonly(sb) are
both false. Calling syncfs(2) or FIFREEZE then reaches btrfs_super_sync_fs()
and btrfs_freeze(), which see btrfs_fs_rdonly() == true and return 0 instead
of failing as btrfs_sync_fs() and btrfs_commit_current_transaction() did via
BTRFS_FS_ERROR(fs_info).
In addition, if an in-flight transaction aborts while freeze_super() is
waiting in sb_wait_write(sb, SB_FREEZE_FS) (after freeze_super() already
checked sb_emergency_ro(sb)), btrfs_freeze() now returns 0 and lets the freeze
succeed on an errored filesystem. The comment above btrfs_super_sync_fs()
also says not to fail syncfs(2) and freezing after an error, whereas the VFS
fails both with -EROFS when sb_emergency_ro(sb) is set.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261113-work-fs-sb_rdonly-v3-0-0be92bb73709@kernel.org?part=26
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>, "Jan Kara" <jack@suse.com>
Cc: "Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org,
dsterba@suse.cz, tytso@mit.edu, "Mark Fasheh" <mark@fasheh.com>,
"Joel Becker" <jlbec@evilplan.org>,
"Joseph Qi" <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 26/33] btrfs: don't set SB_RDONLY after filesystem errors
Date: Sat, 14 Nov 2026 12:03:48 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-214477@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261113-work-fs-sb_rdonly-v3-26-0be92bb73709@kernel.org>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential
issues to consider:
- [Medium] btrfs: btrfs_super_sync_fs() and btrfs_freeze() return 0 on
shutdown or error
- [Medium] btrfs: race between BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO and
sb_set_emergency_ro() on fs error
--
commit 3d297b218ce5c34d64ff204c632eaa6ac7a2526b
Author: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
btrfs: don't set SB_RDONLY after filesystem errors
This commit stops setting SB_RDONLY in __btrfs_handle_fs_error(), using
BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO and sb_set_emergency_ro() instead, and updates shutdown,
remount, sync_fs, and freeze handling for the new read-only state.
> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/fs.h b/fs/btrfs/fs.h
> index 024c3ec7d0583..39fd1a04d25ba 100644
> --- a/fs/btrfs/fs.h
> +++ b/fs/btrfs/fs.h
[ ... ]
> @@ -1233,15 +1232,12 @@ static inline bool btrfs_is_shutdown(const struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info)
> static inline void btrfs_force_shutdown(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info)
> {
> /*
> - * Here we do not want to use handle_fs_error(), which will mark the fs
> - * read-only.
> - * Some call sites like shutdown ioctl will mark the fs shutdown when
> - * the fs is frozen. But thaw path will handle RO and RW fs
> - * differently.
> - *
> - * So here we only mark the fs error without flipping it RO.
> + * A shutdown isn't an error, so don't use btrfs_handle_fs_error().
> + * BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO doesn't touch SB_RDONLY, so it's fine while the
> + * filesystem is frozen, e.g. for the shutdown ioctl.
> */
> WRITE_ONCE(fs_info->fs_error, -EIO);
> + set_bit(BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO, &fs_info->fs_state);
> if (!test_and_set_bit(BTRFS_FS_STATE_EMERGENCY_SHUTDOWN, &fs_info->fs_state)) {
> btrfs_crit(fs_info, "emergency shutdown");
> fserror_report_shutdown(fs_info->sb, GFP_KERNEL);
[ ... ]
> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/messages.c b/fs/btrfs/messages.c
> index cedca40508315..3a768e2ac1ccf 100644
> --- a/fs/btrfs/messages.c
> +++ b/fs/btrfs/messages.c
> @@ -173,8 +173,12 @@ void __btrfs_handle_fs_error(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, const char *function
>
> btrfs_discard_stop(fs_info);
>
> - /* Handle error by forcing the filesystem readonly. */
> - btrfs_set_sb_rdonly(sb);
> + /*
> + * Handle error by forcing the filesystem readonly. SB_RDONLY needs
> + * s_umount, see sb_set_emergency_ro().
> + */
> + set_bit(BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO, &fs_info->fs_state);
> + sb_set_emergency_ro(sb);
> btrfs_info(fs_info, "forced readonly");
[Severity: Medium]
Can setting BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO before sb_set_emergency_ro(sb) let concurrent
callers observe btrfs_fs_rdonly() == true while sb_emergency_ro(sb) is still
false?
set_bit() is a relaxed atomic operation and __btrfs_handle_fs_error() returns
early when btrfs_fs_rdonly(fs_info) is already set:
CPU0 CPU1
__btrfs_handle_fs_error()
set_bit(BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO, ...)
ksys_syncfs()
sync_filesystem(sb)
btrfs_super_sync_fs(sb, 1)
if (btrfs_fs_rdonly(...))
return 0;
if (sb_emergency_ro(sb))
/* still false, returns 0 */
sb_set_emergency_ro(sb)
During this window, syncfs(2) and freeze_super() can see btrfs_fs_rdonly() ==
true in btrfs_super_sync_fs() and sb_emergency_ro(sb) == false in the VFS, so
they return 0 without syncing instead of failing with -EROFS. Similarly, a
second thread entering __btrfs_handle_fs_error() sees btrfs_fs_rdonly(fs_info)
and returns early to its caller before CPU0 sets SB_STATE_EMERGENCY_RO, so a
subsequent btrfs_ioctl_shutdown() or VFS call on CPU1 can still observe
sb_emergency_ro(sb) == false.
> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/super.c b/fs/btrfs/super.c
> index b424cc836bd4a..ff61ec9ebfa79 100644
> --- a/fs/btrfs/super.c
> +++ b/fs/btrfs/super.c
> @@ -1041,6 +1041,18 @@ int btrfs_sync_fs(struct super_block *sb, int wait)
> return btrfs_commit_transaction(trans);
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Nothing can be committed after an error, don't fail syncfs(2) and freezing.
> + * BTRFS_IOC_SYNC calls btrfs_sync_fs() directly and still gets the error.
> + */
> +static int btrfs_super_sync_fs(struct super_block *sb, int wait)
> +{
> + if (btrfs_fs_rdonly(btrfs_sb(sb)))
> + return 0;
> +
> + return btrfs_sync_fs(sb, wait);
> +}
[ ... ]
> @@ -2308,6 +2326,9 @@ static int btrfs_freeze(struct super_block *sb)
> struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = btrfs_sb(sb);
>
> set_bit(BTRFS_FS_FROZEN, &fs_info->flags);
> + /* Nothing can be committed after an error. */
> + if (btrfs_fs_rdonly(fs_info))
> + return 0;
> /*
> * We don't need a barrier here, we'll wait for any transaction that
> * could be in progress on other threads (and do delayed iputs that
[Severity: Medium]
Does returning 0 when btrfs_fs_rdonly() is true cause syncfs(2) and
freeze_super() to succeed without flushing after a forced shutdown?
btrfs_force_shutdown() now sets BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO without calling
sb_set_emergency_ro(sb). After BTRFS_IOC_SHUTDOWN with
BTRFS_SHUTDOWN_FLAGS_NOLOGFLUSH (or btrfs_shutdown()), dirty data and
transactions were not flushed, yet sb_emergency_ro(sb) and sb_rdonly(sb) are
both false. Calling syncfs(2) or FIFREEZE then reaches btrfs_super_sync_fs()
and btrfs_freeze(), which see btrfs_fs_rdonly() == true and return 0 instead
of failing as btrfs_sync_fs() and btrfs_commit_current_transaction() did via
BTRFS_FS_ERROR(fs_info).
In addition, if an in-flight transaction aborts while freeze_super() is
waiting in sb_wait_write(sb, SB_FREEZE_FS) (after freeze_super() already
checked sb_emergency_ro(sb)), btrfs_freeze() now returns 0 and lets the freeze
succeed on an errored filesystem. The comment above btrfs_super_sync_fs()
also says not to fail syncfs(2) and freezing after an error, whereas the VFS
fails both with -EROFS when sb_emergency_ro(sb) is set.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261113-work-fs-sb_rdonly-v3-0-0be92bb73709@kernel.org?part=26
______________________________________________________
Linux MTD discussion mailing list
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-14 12:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 118+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-13 11:58 [PATCH v3 00/33] fs: don't set SB_RDONLY after filesystem errors Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:58 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:58 ` [PATCH v3 01/33] jfs: free uncommitted anonymous tlocks when evicting an inode Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:58 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:58 ` [PATCH v3 02/33] jfs: use jfs_symlink_inode_operations in jfs_iget() Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:58 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:58 ` [PATCH v3 03/33] ecryptfs: don't leak the inode when a lookup can't open the lower file Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:58 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 04/33] ecryptfs: fall back to a read-only " Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 05/33] fs: add a generic emergency read-only state Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 14:53 ` Jan Kara
2026-11-13 14:53 ` Jan Kara
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 06/33] ext2: don't set SB_RDONLY after filesystem errors Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 14:54 ` Jan Kara
2026-11-13 14:54 ` Jan Kara
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 07/33] jfs: " Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 08/33] nilfs2: " Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 09/33] fat: " Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 10/33] exfat: keep the current mount options on remount Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 11/33] exfat: don't set SB_RDONLY after filesystem errors Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 12/33] exfat: use the generic emergency read-only state Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 13/33] hfs: don't set SB_RDONLY after MDB write errors Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 14/33] hfs: use the generic emergency read-only state Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 15/33] hfsplus: don't set SB_RDONLY when creating the attributes tree Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 16/33] affs: don't set SB_RDONLY after filesystem errors Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 17/33] ufs: " Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 18/33] hpfs: " Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 19/33] ntfs: " Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 20/33] ntfs: use the generic emergency read-only state Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 21/33] ocfs2: keep the current mount options on remount Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 22/33] ocfs2: don't set SB_RDONLY after filesystem errors Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 23/33] zonefs: don't set SB_RDONLY after I/O errors Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 24/33] zonefs: use the generic emergency read-only state Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 25/33] btrfs: check BTRFS_FS_STATE_RO instead of SB_RDONLY at runtime Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 26/33] btrfs: don't set SB_RDONLY after filesystem errors Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 27/33] gfs2: wait for a pending withdraw before remounting read-only Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 28/33] gfs2: don't set SB_RDONLY on withdraw Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 29/33] efivarfs: stop using SB_RDONLY for read-only efivar ops Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 30/33] ubifs: don't set SB_RDONLY after errors Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 2:17 ` Zhihao Cheng
2026-11-14 2:17 ` Zhihao Cheng
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 31/33] ext4: allow remounting read-only in the emergency state Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 32/33] ext4: use the generic emergency read-only state Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 11:59 ` [PATCH v3 33/33] xfs: allow remounting read-only after a shutdown Christian Brauner
2026-11-13 11:59 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-14 12:03 ` sashiko-bot
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=sashiko-outbox-214477@kernel.org \
--to=sashiko-bot@kernel.org \
--cc=brauner@kernel.org \
--cc=dsterba@suse.cz \
--cc=jack@suse.com \
--cc=jlbec@evilplan.org \
--cc=joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com \
--cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=mark@fasheh.com \
--cc=sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=tytso@mit.edu \
--cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.