From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
To: bpf@vger.kernel.org, ast@kernel.org
Cc: andrii@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, martin.lau@linux.dev,
kernel-team@fb.com, yhs@fb.com,
Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/4] verify scalar ids mapping in regsafe()
Date: Tue, 30 May 2023 20:27:35 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230530172739.447290-1-eddyz87@gmail.com> (raw)
Update regsafe() to use check_ids() for scalar values.
Otherwise the following unsafe pattern is accepted by verifier:
1: r9 = ... some pointer with range X ...
2: r6 = ... unbound scalar ID=a ...
3: r7 = ... unbound scalar ID=b ...
4: if (r6 > r7) goto +1
5: r6 = r7
6: if (r6 > X) goto ...
--- checkpoint ---
7: r9 += r7
8: *(u64 *)r9 = Y
This example is unsafe because not all execution paths verify r7 range.
Because of the jump at (4) the verifier would arrive at (6) in two states:
I. r6{.id=b}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-6;
II. r6{.id=a}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-4, 6.
Currently regsafe() does not call check_ids() for scalar registers,
thus from POV of regsafe() states (I) and (II) are identical.
The change is split in two parts:
- patches #1,2:
- correctness fix for regsafe();
- test cases.
Patch #1 has a big hit on verification performance.
- patches #3,4
- modification for find_equal_scalars() to save ids of registers
that gain range via this function;
- modification for regsafe() to do check_ids() for scalar registers
only for such ids;
- test cases.
Patch #3 restores most of the verification performance.
A note on design decisions for patch #3. The change in patch #1 is
simple but very heavy handed:
@@ -15151,6 +15151,28 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
switch (base_type(rold->type)) {
case SCALAR_VALUE:
+ /* ... */
+ if (!check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap))
+ return false;
Ideally check_ids() should only be called for 'rold' that either:
(a) gained range via find_equal_scalars() in some child verification
path and was then marked as precise;
(b) was a source of range information for some other register via
find_equal_scalars() in some child verification path, and that
register was then marked as precise.
While rold->precise flag could be a proxy for criteria (a) it is,
unfortunately, cannot be a proxy for criteria (b). E.g. for the
example above precision marks look as follows:
Precise registers
5: r6 = r7 ; r7
6: if (r6 > X) goto ... ; r7
7: r9 += r7 ; r7
Jump at (6) cannot be predicted, thus there is no precision mark on r6.
If there is ever a jump to (6), cached state will not have precise
marks for r6.
This leaves two options:
- Modification of precision tracking to take find_equal_scalars() into
account.
- Find a way to track which ids were used for range information
transfer in find_equal_scalars().
The former is a bit complicated, because information about register id
assignments for instructions in the middle of a state is lost.
It is possible to extend bpf_verifier_state::jmp_history to track a
mask for registers / stack slots that gained range via
find_equal_scalars() and use this mask in backtrack_insn().
However, this is a significant complication for a very non-trivial code.
Thus, in patch #3 I opted for a latter approach, accumulate all ids
that gain range via find_equal_scalars() in a set stored in struct
bpf_verifier_env.
To represent this set I use a u32_hashset data structure derived from
tools/lib/bpf/hashmap.h. I tested it locally (see [1]), but I think
that ideally it should be tested using KUnit. However, AFAIK, this
would be the first use of KUnit in context of BPF verifier.
If people are ok with this, I will prepare the tests and necessary
CI integration.
Changelog:
- V1 -> v2:
- 'rold->precise' and 'rold->id' checks are dropped as unsafe
(thanks to discussion with Yonghong);
- patches #3,4 adding tracking of ids used for range transfer in
order to mitigate performance impact.
- RFC -> V1:
- Function verifier.c:mark_equal_scalars_as_read() is dropped,
as it was an incorrect fix for problem solved by commit [3].
- check_ids() is called only for precise scalar values.
- Test case updated to use inline assembly.
[V1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230526184126.3104040-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/
[RFC] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221128163442.280187-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/
[1] https://gist.github.com/eddyz87/a32ea7e62a27d3c201117c9a39ab4286
Eduard Zingerman (4):
bpf: verify scalar ids mapping in regsafe() using check_ids()
selftests/bpf: verify that check_ids() is used for scalars in
regsafe()
bpf: filter out scalar ids not used for range transfer in regsafe()
selftests/bpf: check env->that range_transfer_ids has effect
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 4 +
kernel/bpf/Makefile | 1 +
kernel/bpf/u32_hashset.c | 137 +++++++++++
kernel/bpf/u32_hashset.h | 30 +++
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 66 +++++-
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c | 2 +
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_scalar_ids.c | 214 ++++++++++++++++++
7 files changed, 447 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/u32_hashset.c
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/u32_hashset.h
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_scalar_ids.c
--
2.40.1
next reply other threads:[~2023-05-30 17:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-05-30 17:27 Eduard Zingerman [this message]
2023-05-30 17:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/4] bpf: verify scalar ids mapping in regsafe() using check_ids() Eduard Zingerman
2023-05-30 21:37 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-30 23:02 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-01 2:05 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-06-01 16:57 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-01 17:13 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-06-01 18:52 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-02 18:50 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-02 19:13 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-02 19:27 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-06-02 19:37 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-02 19:43 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-06-02 19:51 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-02 20:03 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-06-02 20:22 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-02 20:17 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-02 21:13 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-02 22:07 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-02 23:20 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-05 20:43 ` Eduard Zingerman
[not found] ` <f2abf39bcd4de841a89bb248de9e242a880aaa93.camel@gmail.com>
2023-05-31 18:29 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-31 19:30 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-05-31 20:12 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-31 20:31 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-05-31 21:14 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-31 22:15 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-05-31 22:54 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-31 23:42 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-01 0:23 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-30 17:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 2/4] selftests/bpf: verify that check_ids() is used for scalars in regsafe() Eduard Zingerman
2023-05-30 17:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 3/4] bpf: filter out scalar ids not used for range transfer " Eduard Zingerman
2023-05-30 17:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 4/4] selftests/bpf: check env->that range_transfer_ids has effect Eduard Zingerman
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