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From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
To: bpf@vger.kernel.org, ast@kernel.org
Cc: andrii@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, martin.lau@linux.dev,
	kernel-team@fb.com, yhs@fb.com,
	Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/4] bpf: verify scalar ids mapping in regsafe() using check_ids()
Date: Tue, 30 May 2023 20:27:36 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230530172739.447290-2-eddyz87@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230530172739.447290-1-eddyz87@gmail.com>

Make sure that the following unsafe example is rejected by verifier:

1: r9 = ... some pointer with range X ...
2: r6 = ... unbound scalar ID=a ...
3: r7 = ... unbound scalar ID=b ...
4: if (r6 > r7) goto +1
5: r6 = r7
6: if (r6 > X) goto ...
--- checkpoint ---
7: r9 += r7
8: *(u64 *)r9 = Y

This example is unsafe because not all execution paths verify r7 range.
Because of the jump at (4) the verifier would arrive at (6) in two states:
I.  r6{.id=b}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-6;
II. r6{.id=a}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-4, 6.

Currently regsafe() does not call check_ids() for scalar registers,
thus from POV of regsafe() states (I) and (II) are identical. If the
path 1-6 is taken by verifier first, and checkpoint is created at (6)
the path [1-4, 6] would be considered safe.

This commit updates regsafe() to call check_ids() for scalar registers.

This change is costly in terms of verification performance.
Using veristat to compare number of processed states for selftests
object files listed in tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.cfg and
Cilium object files from [1] gives the following statistics:

  Filter        | Number of programs
  ----------------------------------
  states_pct>10 | 40
  states_pct>20 | 20
  states_pct>30 | 15
  states_pct>40 | 11

(Out of total 177 programs)

In fact, impact is so bad that in no-alu32 mode the following
test_progs tests no longer pass verifiction:
- verif_scale2: maximal number of instructions exceeded
- verif_scale3: maximal number of instructions exceeded
- verif_scale_pyperf600: maximal number of instructions exceeded

Additionally:
- verifier_search_pruning/allocated_stack: expected prunning does not
  happen because of differences in register id allocation.

Followup patch would address these issues.

[1] git@github.com:anakryiko/cilium.git

Fixes: 75748837b7e5 ("bpf: Propagate scalar ranges through register assignments.")
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index af70dad655ab..9c10f2619c4f 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -15151,6 +15151,28 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
 
 	switch (base_type(rold->type)) {
 	case SCALAR_VALUE:
+		/* Why check_ids() for scalar registers?
+		 *
+		 * Consider the following BPF code:
+		 *   1: r6 = ... unbound scalar, ID=a ...
+		 *   2: r7 = ... unbound scalar, ID=b ...
+		 *   3: if (r6 > r7) goto +1
+		 *   4: r6 = r7
+		 *   5: if (r6 > X) goto ...
+		 *   6: ... memory operation using r7 ...
+		 *
+		 * First verification path is [1-6]:
+		 * - at (4) same bpf_reg_state::id (b) would be assigned to r6 and r7;
+		 * - at (5) r6 would be marked <= X, find_equal_scalars() would also mark
+		 *   r7 <= X, because r6 and r7 share same id.
+		 *
+		 * Next verification path would start from (5), because of the jump at (3).
+		 * The only state difference between first and second visits of (5) is
+		 * bpf_reg_state::id assignments for r6 and r7: (b, b) vs (a, b).
+		 * Thus, use check_ids() to distinguish these states.
+		 */
+		if (!check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap))
+			return false;
 		if (regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap))
 			return true;
 		if (env->explore_alu_limits)
-- 
2.40.1


  reply	other threads:[~2023-05-30 17:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-05-30 17:27 [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/4] verify scalar ids mapping in regsafe() Eduard Zingerman
2023-05-30 17:27 ` Eduard Zingerman [this message]
2023-05-30 21:37   ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/4] bpf: verify scalar ids mapping in regsafe() using check_ids() Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-30 23:02     ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-01  2:05       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-06-01 16:57         ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-01 17:13           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-06-01 18:52             ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-02 18:50               ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-02 19:13                 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-02 19:27                   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-06-02 19:37                     ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-02 19:43                       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-06-02 19:51                         ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-02 20:03                           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-06-02 20:22                             ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-02 20:17                   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-02 21:13                     ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-02 22:07                       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-02 23:20                         ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-05 20:43                           ` Eduard Zingerman
     [not found]     ` <f2abf39bcd4de841a89bb248de9e242a880aaa93.camel@gmail.com>
2023-05-31 18:29       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-31 19:30         ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-05-31 20:12           ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-31 20:31             ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-05-31 21:14               ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-31 22:15                 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-05-31 22:54                   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-31 23:42                     ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-01  0:23                       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-30 17:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 2/4] selftests/bpf: verify that check_ids() is used for scalars in regsafe() Eduard Zingerman
2023-05-30 17:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 3/4] bpf: filter out scalar ids not used for range transfer " Eduard Zingerman
2023-05-30 17:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 4/4] selftests/bpf: check env->that range_transfer_ids has effect Eduard Zingerman

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