From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
To: bpf@vger.kernel.org, ast@kernel.org
Cc: andrii@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, martin.lau@linux.dev,
kernel-team@fb.com, yhs@fb.com,
Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v2 2/4] selftests/bpf: verify that check_ids() is used for scalars in regsafe()
Date: Tue, 30 May 2023 20:27:37 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230530172739.447290-3-eddyz87@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230530172739.447290-1-eddyz87@gmail.com>
Verify that the following example is rejected by verifier:
r9 = ... some pointer with range X ...
r6 = ... unbound scalar ID=a ...
r7 = ... unbound scalar ID=b ...
if (r6 > r7) goto +1
r6 = r7
if (r6 > X) goto exit
r9 += r7
*(u64 *)r9 = Y
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
---
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c | 2 +
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_scalar_ids.c | 108 ++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 110 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_scalar_ids.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c
index 531621adef42..070a13833c3f 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
#include "verifier_regalloc.skel.h"
#include "verifier_ringbuf.skel.h"
#include "verifier_runtime_jit.skel.h"
+#include "verifier_scalar_ids.skel.h"
#include "verifier_search_pruning.skel.h"
#include "verifier_sock.skel.h"
#include "verifier_spill_fill.skel.h"
@@ -150,6 +151,7 @@ void test_verifier_ref_tracking(void) { RUN(verifier_ref_tracking); }
void test_verifier_regalloc(void) { RUN(verifier_regalloc); }
void test_verifier_ringbuf(void) { RUN(verifier_ringbuf); }
void test_verifier_runtime_jit(void) { RUN(verifier_runtime_jit); }
+void test_verifier_scalar_ids(void) { RUN(verifier_scalar_ids); }
void test_verifier_search_pruning(void) { RUN(verifier_search_pruning); }
void test_verifier_sock(void) { RUN(verifier_sock); }
void test_verifier_spill_fill(void) { RUN(verifier_spill_fill); }
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_scalar_ids.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_scalar_ids.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0ea9a1f6e1ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_scalar_ids.c
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include "bpf_misc.h"
+
+/* Verify that check_ids() is used by regsafe() for scalars.
+ *
+ * r9 = ... some pointer with range X ...
+ * r6 = ... unbound scalar ID=a ...
+ * r7 = ... unbound scalar ID=b ...
+ * if (r6 > r7) goto +1
+ * r6 = r7
+ * if (r6 > X) goto exit
+ * r9 += r7
+ * *(u8 *)r9 = Y
+ *
+ * The memory access is safe only if r7 is bounded,
+ * which is true for one branch and not true for another.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__failure __msg("register with unbounded min value")
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__naked void ids_id_mapping_in_regsafe(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ /* Bump allocated stack */
+ "r1 = 0;"
+ "*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1;"
+ /* r9 = pointer to stack */
+ "r9 = r10;"
+ "r9 += -8;"
+ /* r7 = ktime_get_ns() */
+ "call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
+ "r7 = r0;"
+ /* r6 = ktime_get_ns() */
+ "call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
+ "r6 = r0;"
+ /* if r6 > r7 is an unpredictable jump */
+ "if r6 > r7 goto l1_%=;"
+ "r6 = r7;"
+"l1_%=:"
+ /* a noop to get to add new parent state */
+ "r0 = r0;"
+ /* if r6 > 4 exit(0) */
+ "if r6 > 4 goto l2_%=;"
+ /* Access memory at r9[r7] */
+ "r9 += r7;"
+ "r0 = *(u8*)(r9 + 0);"
+"l2_%=:"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Similar to a previous one, but shows that bpf_reg_state::precise
+ * could not be used to filter out registers subject to check_ids() in
+ * verifier.c:regsafe(). At 'l0' register 'r6' does not have 'precise'
+ * flag set but it is important to have this register in the idmap.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__failure __msg("register with unbounded min value")
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__naked void ids_id_mapping_in_regsafe_2(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ /* Bump allocated stack */
+ "r1 = 0;"
+ "*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1;"
+ /* r9 = pointer to stack */
+ "r9 = r10;"
+ "r9 += -8;"
+ /* r8 = ktime_get_ns() */
+ "call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
+ "r8 = r0;"
+ /* r7 = ktime_get_ns() */
+ "call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
+ "r7 = r0;"
+ /* r6 = ktime_get_ns() */
+ "call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
+ "r6 = r0;"
+ /* scratch .id from r0 */
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ /* if r6 > r7 is an unpredictable jump */
+ "if r6 > r7 goto l1_%=;"
+ /* tie r6 and r7 .id */
+ "r6 = r7;"
+"l0_%=:"
+ /* if r7 > 4 exit(0) */
+ "if r7 > 4 goto l2_%=;"
+ /* Access memory at r9[r7] */
+ "r9 += r6;"
+ "r0 = *(u8*)(r9 + 0);"
+"l2_%=:"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+"l1_%=:"
+ /* tie r6 and r8 .id */
+ "r6 = r8;"
+ "goto l0_%=;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
--
2.40.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-05-30 17:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-05-30 17:27 [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/4] verify scalar ids mapping in regsafe() Eduard Zingerman
2023-05-30 17:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/4] bpf: verify scalar ids mapping in regsafe() using check_ids() Eduard Zingerman
2023-05-30 21:37 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-30 23:02 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-01 2:05 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-06-01 16:57 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-01 17:13 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-06-01 18:52 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-02 18:50 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-02 19:13 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-02 19:27 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-06-02 19:37 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-02 19:43 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-06-02 19:51 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-02 20:03 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-06-02 20:22 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-02 20:17 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-02 21:13 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-02 22:07 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-02 23:20 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-05 20:43 ` Eduard Zingerman
[not found] ` <f2abf39bcd4de841a89bb248de9e242a880aaa93.camel@gmail.com>
2023-05-31 18:29 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-31 19:30 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-05-31 20:12 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-31 20:31 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-05-31 21:14 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-31 22:15 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-05-31 22:54 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-31 23:42 ` Eduard Zingerman
2023-06-01 0:23 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-30 17:27 ` Eduard Zingerman [this message]
2023-05-30 17:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 3/4] bpf: filter out scalar ids not used for range transfer in regsafe() Eduard Zingerman
2023-05-30 17:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 4/4] selftests/bpf: check env->that range_transfer_ids has effect Eduard Zingerman
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