From: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com>
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Kernel Team <kernel-team@fb.com>,
Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/2] bpf: Support private stack for bpf progs
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2024 00:02:05 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <923e0ac6-edd6-49f8-a977-53ad14f5c4b2@linux.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <7dce9923-2a18-4b41-8b40-420e1cfa82e8@linux.dev>
On 7/22/24 10:30 PM, Yonghong Song wrote:
>
> On 7/22/24 6:05 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>> On Mon, Jul 22, 2024 at 1:58 PM Andrii Nakryiko
>> <andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> On Fri, Jul 19, 2024 at 8:28 PM Andrii Nakryiko
>>> <andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> On Thu, Jul 18, 2024 at 1:52 PM Yonghong Song
>>>> <yonghong.song@linux.dev> wrote:
>>>>> The main motivation for private stack comes from nested
>>>>> scheduler in sched-ext from Tejun. The basic idea is that
>>>>> - each cgroup will its own associated bpf program,
>>>>> - bpf program with parent cgroup will call bpf programs
>>>>> in immediate child cgroups.
>>>>>
>>>>> Let us say we have the following cgroup hierarchy:
>>>>> root_cg (prog0):
>>>>> cg1 (prog1):
>>>>> cg11 (prog11):
>>>>> cg111 (prog111)
>>>>> cg112 (prog112)
>>>>> cg12 (prog12):
>>>>> cg121 (prog121)
>>>>> cg122 (prog122)
>>>>> cg2 (prog2):
>>>>> cg21 (prog21)
>>>>> cg22 (prog22)
>>>>> cg23 (prog23)
>>>>>
>>>>> In the above example, prog0 will call a kfunc which will
>>>>> call prog1 and prog2 to get sched info for cg1 and cg2 and
>>>>> then the information is summarized and sent back to prog0.
>>>>> Similarly, prog11 and prog12 will be invoked in the kfunc
>>>>> and the result will be summarized and sent back to prog1, etc.
>>>>>
>>>>> Currently, for each thread, the x86 kernel allocate 8KB stack.
>>>>> The each bpf program (including its subprograms) has maximum
>>>>> 512B stack size to avoid potential stack overflow.
>>>>> And nested bpf programs increase the risk of stack overflow.
>>>>> To avoid potential stack overflow caused by bpf programs,
>>>>> this patch implemented a private stack so bpf program stack
>>>>> space is allocated dynamically when the program is jited.
>>>>> Such private stack is applied to tracing programs like
>>>>> kprobe/uprobe, perf_event, tracepoint, raw tracepoint and
>>>>> tracing.
>>>>>
>>>>> But more than one instance of the same bpf program may
>>>>> run in the system. To make things simple, percpu private
>>>>> stack is allocated for each program, so if the same program
>>>>> is running on different cpus concurrently, we won't have
>>>>> any issue. Note that the kernel already have logic to prevent
>>>>> the recursion for the same bpf program on the same cpu
>>>>> (kprobe, fentry, etc.).
>>>>>
>>>>> The patch implemented a percpu private stack based approach
>>>>> for x86 arch.
>>>>> - The stack size will be 0 and any stack access is from
>>>>> jit-time allocated percpu storage.
>>>>> - In the beginning of jit, r9 is used to save percpu
>>>>> private stack pointer.
>>>>> - Each rbp in the bpf asm insn is replaced by r9.
>>>>> - For each call, push r9 before the call and pop r9
>>>>> after the call to preserve r9 value.
>>>>>
>>>>> Compared to previous RFC patch [1], this patch added
>>>>> some conditions to enable private stack, e.g., verifier
>>>>> calculated stack size, prog type, etc. The new patch
>>>>> also added a performance test to compare private stack
>>>>> vs. no private stack.
>>>>>
>>>>> The following are some code example to illustrate the idea
>>>>> for selftest cgroup_skb_sk_lookup:
>>>>>
>>>>> the existing code the private-stack
>>>>> approach code
>>>>> endbr64 endbr64
>>>>> nop DWORD PTR [rax+rax*1+0x0] nop DWORD PTR
>>>>> [rax+rax*1+0x0]
>>>>> xchg ax,ax xchg ax,ax
>>>>> push rbp push rbp
>>>>> mov rbp,rsp mov rbp,rsp
>>>>> endbr64 endbr64
>>>>> sub rsp,0x68
>>>>> push rbx push rbx
>>>>> ... ...
>>>>> ... mov r9d,0x8c1c860
>>>>> ... add r9,QWORD PTR
>>>>> gs:0x21a00
>>>>> ... ...
>>>>> mov rdx,rbp mov rdx, r9
>>>>> add rdx,0xffffffffffffffb4 rdx,0xffffffffffffffb4
>>>>> ... ...
>>>>> mov ecx,0x28 mov ecx,0x28
>>>>> push r9
>>>>> call 0xffffffffe305e474 call 0xffffffffe305e524
>>>>> pop r9
>>>>> mov rdi,rax mov rdi,rax
>>>>> ... ...
>>>>> movzx rdi,BYTE PTR [rbp-0x46] movzx rdi,BYTE PTR
>>>>> [r9-0x46]
>>>>> ... ...
>>>>>
>>>> Eduard nerd-sniped me today with this a bit... :)
>>>>
>>>> I have a few questions and suggestions.
>>>>
>>>> So it seems like each *subprogram* (not the entire BPF program) gets
>>>> its own per-CPU private stack allocation. Is that intentional? That
>>>> seems a bit unnecessary. It also prevents any sort of actual
>>>> recursion. Not sure if it's possible to write recursive BPF subprogram
>>>> today, verifier seems to reject obvious limited recursion cases, but
>>>> still, eventually we might need/want to support that, and this will be
>>>> just another hurdle to overcome (so it's best to avoid adding it in
>>>> the first place).
>>>>
>>>> I'm sure Eduard is going to try something like below and it will
>>>> probably break badly (I haven't tried, sorry):
>>>>
>>>> int entry(void *ctx);
>>>>
>>>> struct {
>>>> __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY);
>>>> __uint(max_entries, 1);
>>>> __uint(key_size, sizeof(__u32));
>>>> __array(values, int (void *));
>>>> } prog_array_init SEC(".maps") = {
>>>> .values = {
>>>> [0] = (void *)&entry,
>>>> },
>>>> };
>>>>
>>>> static __noinline int subprog1(void)
>>>> {
>>>> <some state on the stack>
>>>>
>>>> /* here entry will replace subprog1, and so we'll have
>>>> * entry -> entry -> entry -> ..... <tail call limit> -> subprog1
>>>> */
>>>> bpf_tail_call(ctx, &prog_array_init, 0);
>>>>
>>>> return 0;
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> SEC("raw_tp/sys_enter")
>>>> int entry(void *ctx)
>>>> {
>>>> <some state on the stack>
>>>>
>>>> subprog1();
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> And we effectively have limited recursion where the entry's stack
>>>> state is clobbered, no?
>>>>
>>>> So it seems like we need to support recursion.
>>>>
>>> How come everyone just completely ignored the main point of my entire
>>> email and a real problem that has to be solved?...
>>>
>>> Anyways, I did write a below program:
>>>
>>> $ cat minimal.bpf.c
>>> // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause
>>> /* Copyright (c) 2020 Facebook */
>>> #include <linux/bpf.h>
>>> #include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
>>>
>>> char LICENSE[] SEC("license") = "Dual BSD/GPL";
>>>
>>> int my_pid = 0;
>>>
>>> int handle_tp(void *ctx);
>>>
>>> struct {
>>> __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY);
>>> __uint(max_entries, 1);
>>> __uint(key_size, sizeof(__u32));
>>> __array(values, int (void *));
>>> } prog_array_init SEC(".maps") = {
>>> .values = {
>>> [0] = (void *)&handle_tp,
>>> },
>>> };
>>>
>>> static __noinline int subprog(void *ctx)
>>> {
>>> static int cnt;
>>>
>>> cnt++;
>>>
>>> bpf_printk("SUBPROG - BEFORE %d", cnt);
>>>
>>> bpf_tail_call(ctx, &prog_array_init, 0);
>>>
>>> bpf_printk("SUBPROG - AFTER %d", cnt);
>>>
>>> return 0;
>>> }
>>>
>>> SEC("tp/syscalls/sys_enter_write")
>>> int handle_tp(void *ctx)
>>> {
>>> static int cnt;
>>> int pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32;
>>>
>>> if (pid != my_pid)
>>> return 0;
>>>
>>> cnt++;
>>>
>>> bpf_printk("ENTRY - BEFORE %d", cnt);
>>>
>>> subprog(ctx);
>>>
>>> bpf_printk("ENTRY - AFTER %d", cnt);
>>>
>>> return 0;
>>> }
>>>
>>>
>>> And triggered one write syscall, getting the log above. You can see
>>> that only subprogs are replaced (we only get "SUBPROG - AFTER 34" due
>>> to the tail call limit). And we do indeed get lots of entry program
>>> recurrence.
>>>
>>> We *need to support recursion* is my main point.
>> Not quite.
>> It's not a recursion. The stack collapsed/gone/wiped out before
>> tail_call.
>> static int cnt counts stuff because it's static.
>>
>> So we don't need to support recursion with private stack,
>> but tail_calls and private stack are buggy indeed.
>>
>> emit_bpf_tail_call*() shouldn't be adjusting 'rsp' when the private
>> stack is used.
>
> Right, stack_depth argument in
> emit_bpf_tail_call_direct()/emit_bpf_tail_call_indirect()
> should be 0 if private stack is used. Will fix in next revision.
Actually, the current implementation is correct. We already set stack_depth to be 0
if private stack is used. So we should be fine here.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-07-23 7:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-07-18 20:51 [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/2] bpf: Support private stack for bpf progs Yonghong Song
2024-07-18 20:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 2/2] [no_merge] selftests/bpf: Benchmark runtime performance with private stack Yonghong Song
2024-07-18 21:44 ` Yonghong Song
2024-07-18 21:59 ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2024-07-19 3:01 ` Yonghong Song
2024-07-19 0:36 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-07-19 2:21 ` Yonghong Song
2024-07-20 0:14 ` bot+bpf-ci
2024-07-20 1:08 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-07-22 16:33 ` Yonghong Song
2024-07-20 3:28 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/2] bpf: Support private stack for bpf progs Andrii Nakryiko
2024-07-22 16:43 ` Yonghong Song
2024-07-24 5:08 ` Yonghong Song
2024-07-24 16:54 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-07-24 17:56 ` Yonghong Song
2024-07-22 20:57 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-07-23 1:05 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-07-23 3:26 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-07-24 3:17 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-07-24 4:06 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-07-24 4:46 ` Yonghong Song
2024-07-24 4:32 ` Yonghong Song
2024-07-23 5:30 ` Yonghong Song
2024-07-23 7:02 ` Yonghong Song [this message]
2024-07-22 3:33 ` Eduard Zingerman
2024-07-22 16:54 ` Yonghong Song
2024-07-22 17:53 ` Eduard Zingerman
2024-07-22 17:51 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-07-22 18:22 ` Eduard Zingerman
2024-07-22 20:08 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-07-24 21:28 ` Yonghong Song
2024-07-25 4:55 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-07-25 17:20 ` Eduard Zingerman
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=923e0ac6-edd6-49f8-a977-53ad14f5c4b2@linux.dev \
--to=yonghong.song@linux.dev \
--cc=alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com \
--cc=andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com \
--cc=andrii@kernel.org \
--cc=ast@kernel.org \
--cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=daniel@iogearbox.net \
--cc=kernel-team@fb.com \
--cc=martin.lau@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox