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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Sohil Mehta" <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 05/28] x86/cea: Use array indexing to simplify exception stack access
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2026 21:57:58 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260911215759.6C04F1F000FF@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260911213659.2025974-6-sohil.mehta@intel.com>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Medium] Unnecessary out-of-line function calls and runtime bounds checks introduced in highly performance-sensitive #VC exception entry paths.
--

commit 6ef3745e3d1d46a5989ce999cb84609a2d082888
Author: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>

x86/cea: Use array indexing to simplify exception stack access

Refactors struct cea_exception_stacks to leverage array indexing for
exception stack access, improving code clarity. Converts
__this_cpu_ist_{bottom,top}_va() from macros to functions.

> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
> index 9fa371af8abc7..a47dfd686bd33 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
> @@ -18,6 +18,26 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct entry_stack_page, entry_stack_storage)
>  static DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct exception_stacks, exception_stacks);
>  DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct cea_exception_stacks*, cea_exception_stacks);
>  
> +/*
> + * Typically invoked by entry code, so must be noinstr.
> + */
> +noinstr unsigned long __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va(enum exception_stack_ordering stack)
> +{
> +	struct cea_exception_stacks *s;
> +
> +	BUILD_BUG_ON(ESTACK_DF != 0);
> +	BUG_ON(stack >= N_EXCEPTION_STACKS);

[Severity: Medium]
Does moving these helpers from macros in the header to out-of-line functions
introduce an unintended performance regression?

Because the functions are defined out-of-line in a different translation unit,
the compiler cannot statically evaluate the BUG_ON(stack >= N_EXCEPTION_STACKS)
bounds checks nor inline the pointer math.

This incurs a penalty of multiple function calls and dynamic checks in
performance-sensitive #VC exception entry paths. For example, hot paths like
is_vc2_stack() in arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c repeatedly call these functions,
which are evaluated on every #VC exception:

arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c:is_vc2_stack() {
    ...
    return (sp >= __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va(ESTACK_VC2) &&
            sp < __this_cpu_ist_top_va(ESTACK_VC2));
}

Could this regression in a noinstr entry path be avoided by defining these
helpers as static __always_inline in the header instead?

> +
> +	s = __this_cpu_read(cea_exception_stacks);
> +
> +	return (unsigned long)&s->event_stacks[stack].stack;
> +}

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260911213659.2025974-1-sohil.mehta@intel.com?part=5

  reply	other threads:[~2026-09-11 21:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-11 21:36 [PATCH v10 00/28] KVM: Enable FRED support with KVM VMX Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 01/28] KVM: VMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 02/28] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:00   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 03/28] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:08   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 04/28] x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_ Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 05/28] x86/cea: Use array indexing to simplify exception stack access Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:57   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 06/28] x86/fred: Export this_cpu_fred_rsp() for KVM usage Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 07/28] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:10   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 08/28] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 09/28] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 10/28] KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 11/28] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 12/28] KVM: x86: Add a new save/restore flag for FRED metadata Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 13/28] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 14/28] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 15/28] KVM: x86: Include CR4.FRED in the emulator CR4 write mask Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:14   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 16/28] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:14   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 17/28] KVM: x86: Handle CR4.FRED when emulating RSM Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:15   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 18/28] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:11   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 19/28] KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 20/28] KVM: nVMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 21/28] KVM: nVMX: Handle FRED VMCS fields in nested VMX context Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:34   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 22/28] KVM: nVMX: Restrict event data VMCS fields to FRED-supported hosts Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:20   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 23/28] KVM: nVMX: Shadow ORIGINAL_EVENT_DATA and INJECTED_EVENT_DATA fields Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 24/28] KVM: nVMX: Validate FRED-related VMCS fields Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:29   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 25/28] KVM: nVMX: Enable VMX FRED controls Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:37   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 26/28] KVM: selftests: Add FRED MSRs to msrs_test Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 27/28] KVM: selftests: Add a new VM guest mode to run user level code Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 28/28] KVM: selftests: Add fred exception tests Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:32   ` sashiko-bot

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