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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Sohil Mehta" <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 03/28] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2026 22:08:42 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260911220842.DEE9E1F000FF@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260911213659.2025974-4-sohil.mehta@intel.com>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Flawed boolean logic in `vmx_check_entry_exit_pairs` allows KVM to expose FRED on nested hypervisors or broken hardware with incomplete exit controls, bypassing the intended mitigation.
--

commit 125b825fe12cce02b0f6ac3d6d7b8bd72cd92cfb
Author: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>

KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail

This commit adds a check to disable the FRED CPU capability if FRED
consistency checks fail during VMX initialization. It clears the
X86_FEATURE_FRED capability by verifying the presence of
VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED in the entry controls.

> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c

[ ... ]

> @@ -8122,6 +8122,9 @@ static __init void vmx_set_cpu_caps(void)
>  		kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_DTES64);
>  	}
>  
> +	if (!cpu_has_vmx_fred())
> +		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_FRED);
> +

[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but is it possible that this
mitigation can be bypassed due to a logical flaw in the pre-existing
vmx_check_entry_exit_pairs() macro?

This new mitigation clears X86_FEATURE_FRED if cpu_has_vmx_fred() returns
false, which checks for VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED. The presence of this entry
control relies on the consistency checks performed earlier.

Looking at the pre-existing vmx_check_entry_exit_pairs() macro in
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:

        if (!(entry_controls & n_ctrl) == !(exit_controls & x_ctrl))    \
                continue;                                               \

The x_ctrl parameter used for FRED is a multi-bit mask:

        { VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED,
          SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED | SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED },

If the underlying hardware (or a nested hypervisor) provides incomplete
support and only sets one of the exit bits (for example, just SAVE), the
bitwise AND (exit_controls & x_ctrl) evaluates to a non-zero value. The
logical NOT of this non-zero value evaluates to 0.

If the entry control bit is present, its logical NOT is also 0. Thus, the
equality check passes (0 == 0), the macro skips clearing the entry bit, and
VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED incorrectly remains set.

Because VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED is still set, cpu_has_vmx_fred() evaluates
to true, and this new mitigation is bypassed. This could allow a guest to
escalate privileges if the CPU fails to restore the host's FRED MSRs on
VM-exit due to the incomplete exit controls.

Does the macro need to be updated to ensure all bits in a multi-bit mask are
present before considering the controls consistent?

>  	if (!enable_pmu)
>  		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_PDCM);
>  	kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap = vmx_get_perf_capabilities();

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260911213659.2025974-1-sohil.mehta@intel.com?part=3

  reply	other threads:[~2026-09-11 22:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-11 21:36 [PATCH v10 00/28] KVM: Enable FRED support with KVM VMX Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 01/28] KVM: VMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 02/28] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:00   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 03/28] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:08   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 04/28] x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_ Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 05/28] x86/cea: Use array indexing to simplify exception stack access Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:57   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 06/28] x86/fred: Export this_cpu_fred_rsp() for KVM usage Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 07/28] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:10   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 08/28] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 09/28] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 10/28] KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 11/28] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 12/28] KVM: x86: Add a new save/restore flag for FRED metadata Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 13/28] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 14/28] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 15/28] KVM: x86: Include CR4.FRED in the emulator CR4 write mask Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:14   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 16/28] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:14   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 17/28] KVM: x86: Handle CR4.FRED when emulating RSM Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:15   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 18/28] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:11   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 19/28] KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 20/28] KVM: nVMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 21/28] KVM: nVMX: Handle FRED VMCS fields in nested VMX context Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:34   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 22/28] KVM: nVMX: Restrict event data VMCS fields to FRED-supported hosts Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:20   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 23/28] KVM: nVMX: Shadow ORIGINAL_EVENT_DATA and INJECTED_EVENT_DATA fields Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 24/28] KVM: nVMX: Validate FRED-related VMCS fields Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:29   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 25/28] KVM: nVMX: Enable VMX FRED controls Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:37   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 26/28] KVM: selftests: Add FRED MSRs to msrs_test Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 27/28] KVM: selftests: Add a new VM guest mode to run user level code Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 28/28] KVM: selftests: Add fred exception tests Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:32   ` sashiko-bot

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