From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Sohil Mehta" <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 13/28] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2026 22:09:33 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260911220933.AC0831F0089B@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260911213659.2025974-14-sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] KVM incorrectly flags an exception as nested when it replaces an un-injected, merely pending exception.
--
commit a3ba5314358330c25b6d179842584793ca6f0e34
Author: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking
This commit adds virtualization support for FRED nested exception tracking in
KVM by setting the VMX nested exception bit in the VM-entry interruption
information field. It also updates exception queueing to track and save the
nested flag across VM migrations.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 01198aba27cf0..94d684210cf6c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -510,6 +516,9 @@ static void kvm_multiple_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int nr,
>
> kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, DF_VECTOR, 0);
> } else {
> + /* The new exception arrived while delivering the previous one. */
> + is_nested = true;
> +
[Severity: High]
Is it correct to unconditionally set is_nested = true here even if the
previous exception was only pending and not yet injected?
If KVM queues an exception in software (vcpu->arch.exception.pending = true,
injected = false) and a second exception is queued before the next VM-entry
(e.g., a #PF during subsequent KVM request processing or emulation), this
path replaces the purely pending exception with the new one.
Since an exception that hasn't commenced hardware delivery cannot cause a
nested exception, setting is_nested = true here will inject the new exception
with INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK. Could this violate the FRED architecture
specification by causing the guest hardware to incorrectly interpret the event
as occurring during event delivery, pushing a FRED stack frame with the nested
bit set and potentially selecting an incorrect ring 0 stack level (such as
IA32_FRED_RSP1 instead of IA32_FRED_RSP0)?
> /* replace previous exception with a new one in a hope
> that instruction re-execution will regenerate lost
> exception */
> @@ -538,7 +547,8 @@ static void kvm_queue_exception_e_p(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr,
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260911213659.2025974-1-sohil.mehta@intel.com?part=13
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-11 22:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-11 21:36 [PATCH v10 00/28] KVM: Enable FRED support with KVM VMX Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 01/28] KVM: VMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 02/28] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:00 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 03/28] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:08 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 04/28] x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_ Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 05/28] x86/cea: Use array indexing to simplify exception stack access Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:57 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 06/28] x86/fred: Export this_cpu_fred_rsp() for KVM usage Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 07/28] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:10 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 08/28] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 09/28] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 10/28] KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 11/28] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 12/28] KVM: x86: Add a new save/restore flag for FRED metadata Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 13/28] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:09 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 14/28] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 15/28] KVM: x86: Include CR4.FRED in the emulator CR4 write mask Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:14 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 16/28] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:14 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 17/28] KVM: x86: Handle CR4.FRED when emulating RSM Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:15 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 18/28] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:11 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 19/28] KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 20/28] KVM: nVMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 21/28] KVM: nVMX: Handle FRED VMCS fields in nested VMX context Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:34 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 22/28] KVM: nVMX: Restrict event data VMCS fields to FRED-supported hosts Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:20 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 23/28] KVM: nVMX: Shadow ORIGINAL_EVENT_DATA and INJECTED_EVENT_DATA fields Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 24/28] KVM: nVMX: Validate FRED-related VMCS fields Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:29 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 25/28] KVM: nVMX: Enable VMX FRED controls Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:37 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 26/28] KVM: selftests: Add FRED MSRs to msrs_test Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 27/28] KVM: selftests: Add a new VM guest mode to run user level code Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 28/28] KVM: selftests: Add fred exception tests Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:32 ` sashiko-bot
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