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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Sohil Mehta" <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 16/28] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2026 22:14:07 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260911221408.13E3A1F00893@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260911213659.2025974-17-sohil.mehta@intel.com>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] Missing architectural check for CR4.FRED when clearing CR0.PG leads to VM-entry failure and VM crash.
--

commit 8a690b67e3843377a671848b2a774dffef3545bc
Author: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>

KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved

The CR4.FRED bit, i.e., CR4[32], is no longer a reserved bit when
guest cpu cap has FRED. Otherwise it is still a reserved bit.

> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/regs.c b/arch/x86/kvm/regs.c
> index 8f66438989e47..ba6c8856b4ffa 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/regs.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/regs.c
> @@ -429,6 +429,13 @@ int kvm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
>  			return 1;
>  	}
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * FRED can not be enabled when EFER.LMA=0.  Note, MOV to CR4 outside
> +	 * 64-bit mode clears CR4[63:32] so only emulation can get here.
> +	 */
> +	if ((cr4 & X86_CR4_FRED) && !is_long_mode(vcpu))
> +		return 1;
> +

[Severity: High]
Does unreserving CR4.FRED also require an update to kvm_set_cr0() when
clearing CR0.PG?

If a guest operating in compatibility mode (CS.L=0) with CR4.FRED=1 executes
MOV CR0 to clear the CR0.PG bit, kvm_set_cr0() will allow the operation
because it only checks for is_64_bit_mode() and X86_CR4_PCIDE:

arch/x86/kvm/regs.c:kvm_set_cr0() {
	...
	if (!(cr0 & X86_CR0_PG) &&
	    (is_64_bit_mode(vcpu) || kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_PCIDE)))
		return 1;
	...
}

Because kvm_set_cr0() fails to check for X86_CR4_FRED, KVM allows the
operation, clears CR0.PG, and subsequently clears EFER.LMA and the
VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE control.

This results in a hardware VM-entry failure ("invalid guest state") because
the hardware checks require CR4.FRED to be 0 if the IA-32e mode guest control
is 0. This hardware failure leads to KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY and crashes the
hypervisor process hosting the VM, whereas KVM should have injected a #GP.

>  	if ((cr4 & X86_CR4_CET) && !kvm_is_cr0_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR0_WP))
>  		return 1;
>

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260911213659.2025974-1-sohil.mehta@intel.com?part=16

  reply	other threads:[~2026-09-11 22:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-11 21:36 [PATCH v10 00/28] KVM: Enable FRED support with KVM VMX Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 01/28] KVM: VMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 02/28] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:00   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 03/28] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:08   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 04/28] x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_ Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 05/28] x86/cea: Use array indexing to simplify exception stack access Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:57   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 06/28] x86/fred: Export this_cpu_fred_rsp() for KVM usage Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 07/28] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:10   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 08/28] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 09/28] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 10/28] KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 11/28] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 12/28] KVM: x86: Add a new save/restore flag for FRED metadata Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 13/28] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:09   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 14/28] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 15/28] KVM: x86: Include CR4.FRED in the emulator CR4 write mask Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:14   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 16/28] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:14   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 17/28] KVM: x86: Handle CR4.FRED when emulating RSM Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:15   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 18/28] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:11   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 19/28] KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 20/28] KVM: nVMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 21/28] KVM: nVMX: Handle FRED VMCS fields in nested VMX context Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:34   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 22/28] KVM: nVMX: Restrict event data VMCS fields to FRED-supported hosts Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:20   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 23/28] KVM: nVMX: Shadow ORIGINAL_EVENT_DATA and INJECTED_EVENT_DATA fields Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 24/28] KVM: nVMX: Validate FRED-related VMCS fields Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:29   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 25/28] KVM: nVMX: Enable VMX FRED controls Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:37   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 26/28] KVM: selftests: Add FRED MSRs to msrs_test Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 27/28] KVM: selftests: Add a new VM guest mode to run user level code Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 28/28] KVM: selftests: Add fred exception tests Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 22:32   ` sashiko-bot

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