From: Manali Shukla <manali.shukla@amd.com>
To: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: <seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <mingo@redhat.com>,
<bp@alien8.de>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
<santosh.shukla@amd.com>, <nikunj.dadhania@amd.com>,
<Naveen.Rao@amd.com>, <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>,
<ravi.bangoria@amd.com>, <peterz@infradead.org>,
<Sandipan.Das@amd.com>, Yosry Ahmed <yosry@kernel.org>,
<manali.shukla@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 6/9] KVM: SVM: Add support for IBS Virtualization
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2026 17:00:21 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a156f924-a430-47ff-9fb9-22723acccdfc@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261008191950.816113-1-jmattson@google.com>
Hi Jim,
Thank you for reviewing my patches.
On 10/9/2026 12:49 AM, Jim Mattson wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 10, 2026 at 06:00:18AM +0000, Manali Shukla wrote:
>> From: Santosh Shukla <santosh.shukla@amd.com>
>>
>> IBS virtualization (VIBS) allows a guest to collect Instruction-Based
>> Sampling (IBS) data using hardware-assisted virtualization. With VIBS
>> enabled, the hardware automatically saves and restores guest IBS state
>> during VM-Entry and VM-Exit via the VMCB State Save Area.
>>
>> IBS-generated interrupts are delivered directly to the guest without
>> causing a VMEXIT.
>>
>> VIBS depends on mediated PMU mode and requires either AVIC or NMI
>> virtualization for interrupt delivery. However, since AVIC can be
>> dynamically inhibited, VIBS requires VNMI to be enabled to ensure
>> reliable interrupt delivery. If AVIC is inhibited and VNMI is
>> disabled, the guest can encounter a VMEXIT_INVALID when IBS
>> virtualization is enabled for the guest.
>
> APM vol. 2, section 15.38, disagrees. Without virtualized interrupt
> delivery, "an IBS interrupt occurring in the guest will not be delivered to
> either the guest or the hypervisor." The only VMEXIT_INVALID that section
> 15.38 describes is for VMRUN of an SEV-ES or SEV-SNP guest with IbsFetchEn
> or IbsOpEn set.
This is what I have observed: when I tested IBS virtualization with
kvm_amd.avic=1 and kvm_amd.vnmi=0, VMRUN fails with VMEXIT_INVALID
whenever AVIC is inhibited. The APM might have missed mentioning it.
>
>> Because IBS state is classified as swap type C, the hypervisor must
>> save its own IBS state before VMRUN and restore it after VMEXIT. It
>> must also disable IBS before VMRUN and re-enable it afterward. This
>> will be handled using mediated PMU support in subsequent patches by
>> enabling mediated PMU capability for IBS PMUs.
>
> On hardware with IBS_CAPS_DIS, perf_ibs_stop() does not clear IbsFetchEn or
> IbsOpEn. perf_ibs_disable_event() only sets CTL2[Dis], and
> IBS_{FETCH|OP}_CTL[En] stays 1. Section 15.38 says that these bits must be
> 0 at VMRUN of an SEV-ES or SEV-SNP guest with IBS virtualization enabled
> (otherwise VMRUN fails with VMEXIT_INVALID), and that they should be 0 for
> other guests, "to prevent host IBS interrupts from leaking across a world
> switch." Section 15.38 does not say that CTL2[Dis]=1 is sufficient. Is it?
> If not, the host must also clear En before VMRUN on hardware with
> IBS_CAPS_DIS.
>
Yes, Hardware checks the effective IBS op and fetch enables in VMRUN to
a SEV-SE/SEV-SNP guest. And it is already updated in APM.
https://docs.amd.com/v/u/en-US/40332_4.11_APM_Vol1-5
>> More details about IBS virtualization can be found at [1].
>>
>> [1]: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=306250
>> AMD64 Architecture Programmer’s Manual, Vol 2, Section 15.38
>> Instruction-Based Sampling Virtualization.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Santosh Shukla <santosh.shukla@amd.com>
>> Co-developed-by: Manali Shukla <manali.shukla@amd.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Manali Shukla <manali.shukla@amd.com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 2 ++
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>> 2 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
>> index 4296efc1dafe..17aa6bf76bce 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
>> @@ -226,6 +226,8 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_control_area {
>>
>> #define SVM_INT_VECTOR_MASK GENMASK(7, 0)
>>
>> +#define SVM_MISC_ENABLE_V_IBS BIT_ULL(2)
>> +
>
> This bit is in misc_ctl2, not misc_ctl. Please name it SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_IBS
> and place it after SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE.
>
Will update it in V4.
> [...]
>
>> @@ -779,6 +782,26 @@ static void svm_recalc_pmu_msr_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
>> }
>>
>> +static void svm_recalc_ibs_msr_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> +{
>> + bool intercept = !(guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBS) &&
>> + kvm_vcpu_has_mediated_pmu(vcpu));
>> +
>> + if (!enable_mediated_pmu || !vibs)
>> + return;
>> +
>> + svm_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCHCTL, MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept);
>
> For SEV-ES and SEV-SNP guests, section 15.38 says that IBS virtualization
> is enabled by bit 12 of SEV_FEATURES in the VMSA, not by bit 2 at offset
> B8h in the VMCB. This patch sets only the VMCB bit, but it disables these
> intercepts for every vCPU that has X86_FEATURE_IBS and a mediated PMU,
> *including* SEV-ES guests. IBS virtualization is not enabled for SEV-ES
> guests, so they will be able to read and write the host's IBS MSRs!
>
You are right. I will fix it in V4. IBS MSRs for SEV-ES/SEV-SNP guests
will be passed through only when bit 12 of SEV_FEATURES in VMSA is enabled.
> Since nested_vmcb02_prepare_control() does not set SVM_MISC_ENABLE_V_IBS in
> vmcb02->control.misc_ctl2, nested SVM has a similar problem. If L1 does not
> set INTERCEPT_MSR_PROT in vmcb12, vmcb02 uses vmcb01's msrpm, which
> disables these MSR intercepts. Because VIBS is disabled in vmcb02, L2 can
> read and write the host's physical IBS MSRs.
>
> OTOH, if L1 sets INTERCEPT_MSR_PROT in vmcb12 and clears the IBS MSR
> intercept bits in msrpm12, nested_svm_init_msrpm_merge_offsets() does not
> include the IBS MSRs in merge_msrs[], so msrpm02 still intercepts them, and
> L0 injects #GP into L2 on accesses to IBS_FETCH_CTL, IBS_OP_CTL, etc.
>
You are right. Both the scenarios are not handled currently. I will fix
them in V4.
> Furthermore, the guest's IBS state is in the VMCB save area, but userspace
> has no way to save or restore it. The IBS MSRs are not in msrs_to_save[],
> and svm_get_msr() and svm_set_msr() reject them, so KVM_{GET,SET}_MSRS will
> fail. Hence, the IBS state is lost on suspend/resume.
>
Right. I will add the IBS MSRs to msrs_to_save[] and handle them in
svm_get_msr() and svm_set_msr() in V4.
> [...]
>
>> @@ -2880,6 +2904,27 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>> case MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG:
>> msr_info->data = svm->msr_decfg;
>> break;
>> +
>> + case MSR_AMD64_IBSCTL:
>> + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBS))
>> + msr_info->data = IBSCTL_LVT_OFFSET_VALID;
>> + else
>> + msr_info->data = 0;
>> + break;
>
> Before this patch, KVM synthesized a #GP when a guest without
> X86_FEATURE_IBS read MSR_AMD64_IBSCTL. Now it returns 0.
>
> The condition should also test for kvm_vcpu_has_mediated_pmu(vcpu).
Agreed. I will take care of this in V4.
>
>> +
>> +
>
> Nit: there is an extra blank line above.
>
Ack.
>> + /*
>> + * When IBS virtualization is enabled, guest reads from
>> + * MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCHPHYSAD and MSR_AMD64_IBSDCPHYSAD must return 0.
>> + * This is done for security reasons, as guests should not be allowed to
>> + * access or infer any information about the system's physical
>> + * addresses.
>> + */
>> + case MSR_AMD64_IBSDCPHYSAD:
>> + case MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCHPHYSAD:
>> + msr_info->data = 0;
>> + break;
>> +
>
> These new cases should be conditional. Before this patch, KVM synthesized
> a #GP for a guest without X86_FEATURE_IBS. Now it returns 0.
>
> But, is this even necessary? APM vol. 2, section 15.38, says that when IBS
> virtualization is enabled in the VMCB, the processor returns 0 on guest
> reads from IbsFetchPhysAd and IbsDcPhysAd and ignores guest writes to
> them. Can't we just disable interception of these MSRs when VIBS is enabled
> for the vCPU, and let the hardware handle them?
>
I agree. This is an oversight from my side. I missed to disable the
interception of these MSRs when VIBS is enabled. I will disable the
interception in V4.
>> default:
>> return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
>> }
>> @@ -3171,6 +3216,16 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
>> svm->msr_decfg = data;
>> break;
>> }
>> + /*
>> + * When IBS virtualization is enabled, guest writes to
>> + * MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCHPHYSAD and MSR_AMD64_IBSDCPHYSAD must be ignored.
>> + * This is done for security reasons, as guests should not be allowed to
>> + * access or infer any information about the system's physical
>> + * addresses.
>> + */
>> + case MSR_AMD64_IBSDCPHYSAD:
>> + case MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCHPHYSAD:
>> + return 1;
>
> Returning 1 does not "ignore" the write; it induces a #GP. But, see the
> point I made above.
Ack.
>
> [...]
>
>> @@ -4678,6 +4733,11 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> if (guest_cpuid_is_intel_compatible(vcpu))
>> guest_cpu_cap_clear(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD);
>>
>> + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBS))
>> + svm->vmcb->control.misc_ctl2 |= SVM_MISC_ENABLE_V_IBS;
>> + else
>> + svm->vmcb->control.misc_ctl2 &= ~SVM_MISC_ENABLE_V_IBS;
>> +
>
> The condition should also check kvm_vcpu_has_mediated_pmu(vcpu), as in
> svm_recalc_ibs_msr_intercepts().
Ack. I will add it in V4.
-Manali
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-10 11:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-10 6:00 [PATCH v3 0/9] Implement support for IBS virtualization Manali Shukla
2026-03-10 6:00 ` [PATCH v3 1/9] perf/amd/ibs: Fix race condition in IBS Manali Shukla
2026-10-08 17:19 ` Jim Mattson
2026-03-10 6:00 ` [PATCH v3 2/9] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID feature bit for VIBS in SVM/SEV guests Manali Shukla
2026-10-08 17:28 ` Jim Mattson
2026-03-10 6:00 ` [PATCH v3 3/9] KVM: x86/cpuid: Add a KVM-only leaf for IBS capabilities Manali Shukla
2026-10-08 17:44 ` Jim Mattson
2026-10-22 10:16 ` Manali Shukla
2026-03-10 6:00 ` [PATCH v3 4/9] KVM: x86: Extend CPUID range to include new leaf Manali Shukla
2026-10-08 17:59 ` Jim Mattson
2026-10-22 12:00 ` Manali Shukla
2026-10-22 17:15 ` Jim Mattson
2026-03-10 6:00 ` [PATCH v3 5/9] KVM: SVM: Extend VMCB area for virtualized IBS registers Manali Shukla
2026-10-08 18:01 ` Jim Mattson
2026-03-10 6:00 ` [PATCH v3 6/9] KVM: SVM: Add support for IBS Virtualization Manali Shukla
2026-10-08 19:19 ` Jim Mattson
2026-10-08 21:28 ` Jim Mattson
2026-10-16 16:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-11-10 12:03 ` Manali Shukla
2026-11-10 11:30 ` Manali Shukla [this message]
2026-03-10 6:00 ` [PATCH v3 7/9] perf/x86/amd: Enable VPMU passthrough capability for IBS PMU Manali Shukla
2026-10-08 19:32 ` Jim Mattson
2026-11-18 13:39 ` Manali Shukla
2026-03-10 6:00 ` [PATCH v3 8/9] perf/x86/amd: Remove exclude_guest check from perf_ibs_init() Manali Shukla
2026-10-08 19:38 ` Jim Mattson
2026-11-18 13:38 ` Manali Shukla
2026-03-10 6:00 ` [PATCH v3 9/9] KVM: SVM: Add newly added IBS capabilities and MSRs Manali Shukla
2026-10-08 21:03 ` Jim Mattson
2026-11-11 12:11 ` Manali Shukla
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