From: Xie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>
To: <ljs@kernel.org>
Cc: <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, <david@kernel.org>,
<liam@infradead.org>, <liaohua4@huawei.com>,
<lilinjie8@huawei.com>, <linusw@kernel.org>,
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
<linux@armlinux.org.uk>, <mhocko@suse.com>, <rppt@kernel.org>,
<sunnanyong@huawei.com>, <surenb@google.com>, <vbabka@kernel.org>,
<xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>, <xiqi2@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] ARM: mm: fix use-after-free in __do_user_fault() under CONFIG_DEBUG_USER
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2026 21:35:27 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260707133527.81833-1-xieyuanbin1@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <akzgsZi6aKCFWg_U@lucifer>
On Tue, 7 Jul 2026 13:46:19 +0100, Lorenzo Stoakes wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 06, 2026 at 09:32:47PM +0800, Xie Yuanbin wrote:
>> I have read this article:
>> Link: https://docs.kernel.org/mm/process_addrs.html
>> `mmap_read_lock(&init_mm)` should be able to ensure that the kernel
>> address's page tables can be traversed. But I'm not quite sure if
>
> I added a section specifically about this -
>
> https://docs.kernel.org/mm/process_addrs.html#traversing-non-vma-page-tables
>
> But note:
>
> "Since, aside from vmalloc and memory hot plug, kernel page tables are not torn
> down all that often - this usually suffices, however any caller of this
> functionality must ensure that any additionally required locks are acquired in
> advance."
>
> With the latter part being particularly important - you really need to be sure
> you aren't going to be raced on page table teardown by anything.
>
> However:
>
> * You're safe from vmalloc trying to install a huge page table (only way
> it removes intermediate page tables) since !HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP.
>
> * And since arm32 !ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTPLUG you're safe from that too
> :)
>
> (Really I think you should be using walk_page_range_debug() here ultimately but
> that's a future refactor).
>
> BUT see below:
>
>> `mmap_read_lock(¤t->mm)` provides protection for user-space non-VMA
>> addresses?
>
> OK so this _does_ need addressing, and I covered it in the document:
>
> We also permit a truly unusual case is the traversal of non-VMA ranges
> in userland ranges, as provided for by walk_page_range_debug().
>
> We must take great care in this case, as the munmap() implementation
> detaches VMAs under an mmap write lock before tearing down page tables
> under a downgraded mmap read lock.
>
> This means such an operation could race with this, and thus an mmap
> write lock is required.
>
> I.e. you need a write lock.
Thank you very much for your reply. Now I fully understand: to traverse
the page tables of non-VMA addr in user address space, the mmap write
lock is required.
But I still want like to ask a question:
> However:
>
> * You're safe from vmalloc trying to install a huge page table (only way
> it removes intermediate page tables) since !HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP.
>
> * And since arm32 !ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTPLUG you're safe from that too
> :)
If (just hypothetically), the ARM32 architecture supports huge pages
and memory hotplug, what kind of lock do I need to safely traverse the
page tables of non-VMA addr in kernel space?
Thanks again.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-07 13:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-26 7:30 [PATCH v3 0/2] ARM: mm: fix use-after-free in show_pte() Qi Xi
2026-06-26 7:30 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] ARM: mm: fix use-after-free in __do_user_fault() under CONFIG_DEBUG_USER Qi Xi
2026-06-26 9:44 ` Russell King
2026-06-27 1:39 ` Qi Xi
2026-07-06 13:32 ` Xie Yuanbin
2026-07-07 11:48 ` Qi Xi
2026-07-07 11:57 ` Russell King
2026-07-07 12:47 ` Qi Xi
2026-07-07 12:47 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-07-07 13:14 ` Xie Yuanbin
2026-07-07 13:20 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-07-07 14:04 ` Xie Yuanbin
2026-07-07 15:34 ` Russell King
2026-07-10 2:32 ` Qi Xi
2026-07-11 7:27 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-07-11 7:56 ` Xie Yuanbin
2026-07-11 8:05 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-07-11 8:13 ` Xie Yuanbin
2026-07-07 12:46 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-07-07 13:35 ` Xie Yuanbin [this message]
2026-07-11 6:43 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-06-26 7:30 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] ARM: mm: protect show_pte() in do_DataAbort() fallback path Qi Xi
2026-06-26 9:45 ` Russell King
2026-06-26 10:16 ` Xie Yuanbin
2026-06-26 12:37 ` Russell King
2026-06-27 1:22 ` Xie Yuanbin
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