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From: Lorenzo Stoakes <ljs@kernel.org>
To: Xie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, david@kernel.org, liam@infradead.org,
	 liaohua4@huawei.com, lilinjie8@huawei.com, linusw@kernel.org,
	 linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	 linux@armlinux.org.uk, mhocko@suse.com, rppt@kernel.org,
	sunnanyong@huawei.com,  surenb@google.com, vbabka@kernel.org,
	xiqi2@huawei.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] ARM: mm: fix use-after-free in __do_user_fault() under CONFIG_DEBUG_USER
Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2026 07:43:38 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <alHl8C1gva6jrAV3@lucifer> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260707133527.81833-1-xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>

On Tue, Jul 07, 2026 at 09:35:27PM +0800, Xie Yuanbin wrote:
> On Tue, 7 Jul 2026 13:46:19 +0100, Lorenzo Stoakes wrote:
> > On Mon, Jul 06, 2026 at 09:32:47PM +0800, Xie Yuanbin wrote:
> >> I have read this article:
> >> Link: https://docs.kernel.org/mm/process_addrs.html
> >> `mmap_read_lock(&init_mm)` should be able to ensure that the kernel
> >> address's page tables can be traversed. But I'm not quite sure if
> >
> > I added a section specifically about this -
> >
> > https://docs.kernel.org/mm/process_addrs.html#traversing-non-vma-page-tables
> >
> > But note:
> >
> > "Since, aside from vmalloc and memory hot plug, kernel page tables are not torn
> > down all that often - this usually suffices, however any caller of this
> > functionality must ensure that any additionally required locks are acquired in
> > advance."
> >
> > With the latter part being particularly important - you really need to be sure
> > you aren't going to be raced on page table teardown by anything.
> >
> > However:
> >
> > 	* You're safe from vmalloc trying to install a huge page table (only way
> >	  it removes intermediate page tables) since !HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP.
> >
> >	* And since arm32 !ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTPLUG you're safe from that too
> >          :)
> >
> > (Really I think you should be using walk_page_range_debug() here ultimately but
> > that's a future refactor).
> >
> > BUT see below:
> >
> >> `mmap_read_lock(&current->mm)` provides protection for user-space non-VMA
> >> addresses?
> >
> > OK so this _does_ need addressing, and I covered it in the document:
> >
> >	We also permit a truly unusual case is the traversal of non-VMA ranges
> >	in userland ranges, as provided for by walk_page_range_debug().
> >
> >	We must take great care in this case, as the munmap() implementation
> >	detaches VMAs under an mmap write lock before tearing down page tables
> >	under a downgraded mmap read lock.
> >
> >	This means such an operation could race with this, and thus an mmap
> >	write lock is required.
> >
> > I.e. you need a write lock.
>
> Thank you very much for your reply. Now I fully understand: to traverse
> the page tables of non-VMA addr in user address space, the mmap write
> lock is required.

You're welcome! :)

>
> But I still want like to ask a question:
> > However:
> >
> > 	* You're safe from vmalloc trying to install a huge page table (only way
> > 	  it removes intermediate page tables) since !HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP.
> >
> >	* And since arm32 !ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTPLUG you're safe from that too
> >          :)
>
> If (just hypothetically), the ARM32 architecture supports huge pages
> and memory hotplug, what kind of lock do I need to safely traverse the
> page tables of non-VMA addr in kernel space?

hotplug lock, mmap write lock.

>
> Thanks again.

Cheers, Lorenzo


  reply	other threads:[~2026-07-11  6:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-26  7:30 [PATCH v3 0/2] ARM: mm: fix use-after-free in show_pte() Qi Xi
2026-06-26  7:30 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] ARM: mm: fix use-after-free in __do_user_fault() under CONFIG_DEBUG_USER Qi Xi
2026-06-26  9:44   ` Russell King
2026-06-27  1:39     ` Qi Xi
2026-07-06 13:32   ` Xie Yuanbin
2026-07-07 11:48     ` Qi Xi
2026-07-07 11:57       ` Russell King
2026-07-07 12:47         ` Qi Xi
2026-07-07 12:47         ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-07-07 13:14         ` Xie Yuanbin
2026-07-07 13:20           ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-07-07 14:04             ` Xie Yuanbin
2026-07-07 15:34             ` Russell King
2026-07-10  2:32               ` Qi Xi
2026-07-11  7:27                 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-07-11  7:56                   ` Xie Yuanbin
2026-07-11  8:05                     ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-07-11  8:13                       ` Xie Yuanbin
2026-07-07 12:46     ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-07-07 13:35       ` Xie Yuanbin
2026-07-11  6:43         ` Lorenzo Stoakes [this message]
2026-06-26  7:30 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] ARM: mm: protect show_pte() in do_DataAbort() fallback path Qi Xi
2026-06-26  9:45   ` Russell King
2026-06-26 10:16   ` Xie Yuanbin
2026-06-26 12:37     ` Russell King
2026-06-27  1:22       ` Xie Yuanbin

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