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From: Qi Xi <xiqi2@huawei.com>
To: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Xie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>, <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	<david@kernel.org>, <ljs@kernel.org>, <liam@infradead.org>,
	<vbabka@kernel.org>, <rppt@kernel.org>, <surenb@google.com>,
	<mhocko@suse.com>, <linusw@kernel.org>,
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <sunnanyong@huawei.com>,
	<linux-mm@kvack.org>, <lilinjie8@huawei.com>,
	<liaohua4@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] ARM: mm: fix use-after-free in __do_user_fault() under CONFIG_DEBUG_USER
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2026 20:47:00 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5d00c0d4-89ab-40eb-ba50-6eafe4957f50@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <akzpuerKqOY7qfFi@shell.armlinux.org.uk>


On 07/07/2026 19:57, Russell King wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 07, 2026 at 07:48:12PM +0800, Qi Xi wrote:
>>
>> On 06/07/2026 21:32, Xie Yuanbin wrote:
>>> On Fri, 26 Jun 2026 15:30:47 +0800, Qi Xi wrote:
>>>> @@ -181,7 +181,9 @@ __do_user_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, unsigned int sig,
>>>>    		pr_err("8<--- cut here ---\n");
>>>>    		pr_err("%s: unhandled page fault (%d) at 0x%08lx, code 0x%03x\n",
>>>>    		       tsk->comm, sig, addr, fsr);
>>>> +		mmap_read_lock(tsk->mm);
>>>>    		show_pte(KERN_ERR, tsk->mm, addr);
>>>> +		mmap_read_unlock(tsk->mm);
>>>>    		show_regs(regs);
>>>>    	}
>>>>    #endif
>>> I found that this fix does not completely solve the problem. For a user
>>> fault, the addr could also be a kernel address. For arm32/x86, the kernel
>>> address space and user address space share the same pgd page table,
>>> but the kernel address space's page table is not protected by
>>> current->mm->mmap_lock.
>>>
>>> I have written a use case to construct and verify this point. When A user
>>> program accesses a kernel address and triggers __do_user_fault(),
>>> show_pte() will directly print the kernel page table.
>>>
>>> So, I suggest that:
>>> ```c
>>> 	if (user_mode(regs)) {
>>> 		struct mm_struct *const pt_mm = addr >= TASK_SIZE ?
>>> 			&init_mm : current->mm;
>>>
>>> 		mmap_read_lock(pt_mm);
>>> 		show_pte(KERN_ALERT, pt_mm, addr);
>>> 		mmap_read_unlock(pt_mm);
>>> 	} else {
>>> 		// .. keep nothing change
>>> 		show_pte(KERN_ALERT, current->mm, addr);
>>> 	}
>>> ```
>>>
>>> I have read this article:
>>> Link: https://docs.kernel.org/mm/process_addrs.html
>>> `mmap_read_lock(&init_mm)` should be able to ensure that the kernel
>>> address's page tables can be traversed. But I'm not quite sure if
>>> `mmap_read_lock(&current->mm)` provides protection for user-space non-VMA
>>> addresses?
>> You're right. And I think the fix is to simply skip show_pte() for kernel
>> addresses.
> No. This information is useful debug for kernel oops.
>
For addr >= TASK_SIZE, concurrent munmap cannot free the kernel page tables.
So there is no uaf risk, and show_pte() is still called without the lock 
as before.

Does the following change look acceptable?
if (user_mode(regs) && addr < TASK_SIZE) {
mmap_read_lock(current->mm);
show_pte(KERN_ALERT, current->mm, addr);
mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
} else {
// .. keep nothing change
show_pte(KERN_ALERT, current->mm, addr);
}


  reply	other threads:[~2026-07-07 12:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-26  7:30 [PATCH v3 0/2] ARM: mm: fix use-after-free in show_pte() Qi Xi
2026-06-26  7:30 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] ARM: mm: fix use-after-free in __do_user_fault() under CONFIG_DEBUG_USER Qi Xi
2026-06-26  9:44   ` Russell King
2026-06-27  1:39     ` Qi Xi
2026-07-06 13:32   ` Xie Yuanbin
2026-07-07 11:48     ` Qi Xi
2026-07-07 11:57       ` Russell King
2026-07-07 12:47         ` Qi Xi [this message]
2026-07-07 12:47         ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-07-07 13:14         ` Xie Yuanbin
2026-07-07 13:20           ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-07-07 14:04             ` Xie Yuanbin
2026-07-07 15:34             ` Russell King
2026-07-10  2:32               ` Qi Xi
2026-07-11  7:27                 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-07-11  7:56                   ` Xie Yuanbin
2026-07-11  8:05                     ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-07-11  8:13                       ` Xie Yuanbin
2026-07-07 12:46     ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-07-07 13:35       ` Xie Yuanbin
2026-07-11  6:43         ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-06-26  7:30 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] ARM: mm: protect show_pte() in do_DataAbort() fallback path Qi Xi
2026-06-26  9:45   ` Russell King
2026-06-26 10:16   ` Xie Yuanbin
2026-06-26 12:37     ` Russell King
2026-06-27  1:22       ` Xie Yuanbin

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