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From: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
To: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>,
	kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
	Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>,
	Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
	Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com>,
	Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
	Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH 10/17] KVM: arm64: Restrict KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT and PSCI version for protected VMs
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 17:34:14 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260831163421.272420-11-fuad.tabba@linux.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260831163421.272420-1-fuad.tabba@linux.dev>

EL2 masks a protected VM's vCPU features down to the set pKVM allows,
so a KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT that requests more succeeds and produces a
guest without them. Reject such an init with -EINVAL. The host and
EL2 both take the allowed set from kvm_pkvm_vcpu_allowed_features().

EL2 returns 1.1 for a protected guest's PSCI_VERSION whatever the
host is configured for, and forwards the platform calls to the host.
Require KVM_ARM_VCPU_PSCI_0_2: without it the host dispatches the
forwarded calls as PSCI 0.1. Reject a KVM_REG_ARM_PSCI_VERSION write
below 1.1: below it the host rejects the SYSTEM_RESET2 that EL2
advertises. KVM_CAP_ARM_PSCI is no longer advertised to protected VMs.

Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pkvm.h | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c              | 13 +++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c    | 17 ++---------------
 arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c       |  7 +++++++
 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pkvm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pkvm.h
index c4c834d55e503..ee3ab505b01f7 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pkvm.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pkvm.h
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ static inline bool kvm_pkvm_ext_allowed(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
 {
 	switch (ext) {
 	case KVM_CAP_IRQCHIP:
-	case KVM_CAP_ARM_PSCI:
 	case KVM_CAP_ARM_PSCI_0_2:
 	case KVM_CAP_NR_VCPUS:
 	case KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS:
@@ -62,6 +61,30 @@ static inline bool kvm_pkvm_ext_allowed(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
 	}
 }
 
+/*
+ * The vCPU features a protected VM may use: checked by the host at
+ * KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT, applied by EL2 when the hyp VM is created.
+ */
+static inline void kvm_pkvm_vcpu_allowed_features(struct kvm *kvm,
+						  unsigned long *allowed)
+{
+	bitmap_zero(allowed, KVM_VCPU_MAX_FEATURES);
+
+	set_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_PSCI_0_2, allowed);
+
+	if (kvm_pkvm_ext_allowed(kvm, KVM_CAP_ARM_PMU_V3))
+		set_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_PMU_V3, allowed);
+
+	if (kvm_pkvm_ext_allowed(kvm, KVM_CAP_ARM_PTRAUTH_ADDRESS))
+		set_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_ADDRESS, allowed);
+
+	if (kvm_pkvm_ext_allowed(kvm, KVM_CAP_ARM_PTRAUTH_GENERIC))
+		set_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_GENERIC, allowed);
+
+	if (kvm_pkvm_ext_allowed(kvm, KVM_CAP_ARM_SVE))
+		set_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_SVE, allowed);
+}
+
 /*
  * Check whether the KVM VM IOCTL is allowed in pKVM.
  *
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
index 8b080804bc90b..3e00edce23a99 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
@@ -1620,6 +1620,19 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_init_check_features(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	if (features & ~system_supported_vcpu_features())
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/* Reject features EL2 would drop when it creates the hyp VM. */
+	if (kvm_vm_is_protected(vcpu->kvm)) {
+		DECLARE_BITMAP(allowed, KVM_VCPU_MAX_FEATURES);
+
+		kvm_pkvm_vcpu_allowed_features(vcpu->kvm, allowed);
+		if (!bitmap_subset(&features, allowed, KVM_VCPU_MAX_FEATURES))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		/* EL2 implements PSCI 1.1; the host must not dispatch as 0.1. */
+		if (!test_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_PSCI_0_2, &features))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * For now make sure that both address/generic pointer authentication
 	 * features are requested by the userspace together.
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
index 4dce489837cd2..4fb4c3c6ee92a 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
@@ -367,23 +367,10 @@ static void pkvm_init_features_from_host(struct pkvm_hyp_vm *hyp_vm, const struc
 	if (kvm_pkvm_ext_allowed(kvm, KVM_CAP_ARM_MTE))
 		kvm->arch.flags |= host_arch_flags & BIT(KVM_ARCH_FLAG_MTE_ENABLED);
 
-	bitmap_zero(allowed_features, KVM_VCPU_MAX_FEATURES);
+	kvm_pkvm_vcpu_allowed_features(kvm, allowed_features);
 
-	set_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_PSCI_0_2, allowed_features);
-
-	if (kvm_pkvm_ext_allowed(kvm, KVM_CAP_ARM_PMU_V3))
-		set_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_PMU_V3, allowed_features);
-
-	if (kvm_pkvm_ext_allowed(kvm, KVM_CAP_ARM_PTRAUTH_ADDRESS))
-		set_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_ADDRESS, allowed_features);
-
-	if (kvm_pkvm_ext_allowed(kvm, KVM_CAP_ARM_PTRAUTH_GENERIC))
-		set_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_GENERIC, allowed_features);
-
-	if (kvm_pkvm_ext_allowed(kvm, KVM_CAP_ARM_SVE)) {
-		set_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_SVE, allowed_features);
+	if (kvm_pkvm_ext_allowed(kvm, KVM_CAP_ARM_SVE))
 		kvm->arch.flags |= host_arch_flags & BIT(KVM_ARCH_FLAG_GUEST_HAS_SVE);
-	}
 
 	bitmap_and(kvm->arch.vcpu_features, host_kvm->arch.vcpu_features,
 		   allowed_features, KVM_VCPU_MAX_FEATURES);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c
index b11b8821c9fbc..121199bda1add 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c
@@ -580,6 +580,13 @@ int kvm_arm_set_fw_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
 
 		wants_02 = vcpu_has_feature(vcpu, KVM_ARM_VCPU_PSCI_0_2);
 
+		/*
+		 * EL2 advertises PSCI 1.1; the host handles the forwarded calls
+		 * by this version.
+		 */
+		if (kvm_vm_is_protected(vcpu->kvm) && val < KVM_ARM_PSCI_1_1)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
 		switch (val) {
 		case KVM_ARM_PSCI_0_1:
 			if (wants_02)
-- 
2.39.5



  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-08-31 16:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-31 16:34 [PATCH 00/17] KVM: arm64: Confine protected VM vCPU state to EL2 Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 01/17] KVM: arm64: Sync HCR_EL2.VSE back to the host vCPU under pKVM Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 02/17] KVM: arm64: Advertise the capabilities that protected VMs support Fuad Tabba
2026-09-02 13:22   ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-03 16:20     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 03/17] KVM: arm64: Reject the PVTIME vCPU attribute for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-02 13:30   ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-03 16:21     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 04/17] KVM: arm64: Introduce per-EC entry handlers for pKVM Fuad Tabba
2026-09-02 10:12   ` Joey Gouly
2026-09-02 11:35     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 05/17] KVM: arm64: Skip fixed-feature state flush for protected vCPUs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-02 15:05   ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-02 15:26     ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-03 16:22       ` Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 06/17] KVM: arm64: Add {flush,sync}_hyp_timer_state() primitives Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 07/17] KVM: arm64: Add system register reset framework for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-02 15:14   ` Joey Gouly
2026-09-03 16:24     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 08/17] KVM: arm64: Implement HVC handling for protected guests at EL2 Fuad Tabba
2026-09-03 15:12   ` Joey Gouly
2026-09-03 16:25     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 09/17] KVM: arm64: Handle PSCI calls for protected VMs " Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` Fuad Tabba [this message]
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 11/17] KVM: arm64: Prevent host PC adjustments for protected vCPUs Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 12/17] KVM: arm64: Inject an UNDEF at EL2 for unhandled protected guest exits Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 13/17] KVM: arm64: Add per-EC entry/exit state marshalling for protected guests Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 14/17] KVM: arm64: Pend a protected guest's SError with HCR_EL2.VSE only Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 15/17] KVM: arm64: Reject host access to protected VM private state Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 16/17] KVM: arm64: Reject host power-on of a vCPU that EL2 holds powered off Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 17/17] KVM: arm64: Document the protected VM userspace API Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 19:27 ` [PATCH 00/17] KVM: arm64: Confine protected VM vCPU state to EL2 Fuad Tabba

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