From: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
To: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>,
kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com>,
Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH 07/17] KVM: arm64: Add system register reset framework for protected VMs
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 17:34:11 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260831163421.272420-8-fuad.tabba@linux.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260831163421.272420-1-fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
Reset a protected VM's system registers at EL2 rather than taking the
host's values: add kvm_reset_pvm_sys_regs() and the
pvm_sys_reg_reset_vals[] table that drives it, and call it from
init_pkvm_hyp_vcpu() for protected vCPUs. The values follow the
host-side reset in sys_regs.c, with a poison value where it resets to
UNKNOWN, and for VBAR_EL1 and CONTEXTIDR_EL1 in place of the 0 it
resets them to. MPIDR_EL1 is derived from vcpu_id, as for any KVM
guest.
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
---
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/pkvm.h | 1 +
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 5 ++
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/sys_regs.c | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/pkvm.h b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/pkvm.h
index 49a0a992047ba..a04b7c04d5135 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/pkvm.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/pkvm.h
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ bool kvm_handle_pvm_hvc64(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code);
bool kvm_handle_pvm_sysreg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code);
bool kvm_handle_pvm_restricted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code);
void kvm_init_pvm_id_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_reset_pvm_sys_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int kvm_check_pvm_sysreg_table(void);
#endif /* __ARM64_KVM_NVHE_PKVM_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
index e85f13233da08..af334318d0a03 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
@@ -551,6 +551,11 @@ static int init_pkvm_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu,
goto done;
ret = pkvm_vcpu_init_sve(hyp_vcpu, host_vcpu);
+ if (ret)
+ goto done;
+
+ if (pkvm_hyp_vcpu_is_protected(hyp_vcpu))
+ kvm_reset_pvm_sys_regs(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu);
done:
if (ret)
unpin_host_vcpu(host_vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/sys_regs.c
index 8758c68017765..ebfd48aa15b56 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/sys_regs.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/sys_regs.c
@@ -525,6 +525,84 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc pvm_sys_reg_descs[] = {
/* Performance Monitoring Registers are restricted. */
};
+struct sys_reg_desc_reset {
+ int reg;
+ void (*reset)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct sys_reg_desc_reset *rd);
+ u64 value;
+};
+
+/* Hardware value, as sys_regs.c's reset_actlr()/reset_amair_el1(). */
+static void reset_actlr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct sys_reg_desc_reset *r)
+{
+ __vcpu_assign_sys_reg(vcpu, r->reg, read_sysreg(actlr_el1));
+}
+
+static void reset_amair_el1(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct sys_reg_desc_reset *r)
+{
+ __vcpu_assign_sys_reg(vcpu, r->reg, read_sysreg(amair_el1));
+}
+
+static void reset_mpidr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct sys_reg_desc_reset *r)
+{
+ __vcpu_assign_sys_reg(vcpu, r->reg, kvm_calculate_mpidr(vcpu));
+}
+
+static void reset_value(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct sys_reg_desc_reset *r)
+{
+ __vcpu_assign_sys_reg(vcpu, r->reg, r->value);
+}
+
+#define RESET_VAL(REG, RESET_VAL) { REG, reset_value, RESET_VAL }
+
+#define RESET_ZERO(REG) RESET_VAL(REG, 0)
+
+#define RESET_UNKNOWN(REG) RESET_VAL(REG, 0x1de7ec7edbadc0deULL)
+
+#define RESET_FUNC(REG, RESET_FUNC) { REG, RESET_FUNC, 0 }
+
+/* Sorted ascending by reg; kvm_check_pvm_sysreg_table() enforces it. */
+static const struct sys_reg_desc_reset pvm_sys_reg_reset_vals[] = {
+ RESET_FUNC(MPIDR_EL1, reset_mpidr),
+ RESET_UNKNOWN(TPIDR_EL0),
+ RESET_UNKNOWN(TPIDRRO_EL0),
+ RESET_UNKNOWN(TPIDR_EL1),
+ RESET_ZERO(CNTKCTL_EL1),
+ RESET_UNKNOWN(PAR_EL1),
+ RESET_ZERO(MDCCINT_EL1),
+ RESET_ZERO(DISR_EL1),
+ RESET_ZERO(PMCCFILTR_EL0),
+ RESET_ZERO(PMUSERENR_EL0),
+ RESET_ZERO(CPACR_EL1),
+ RESET_VAL(CONTEXTIDR_EL1, 0x00000000dbadc0deULL),
+ RESET_VAL(SCTLR_EL1, 0x00C50078ULL),
+ RESET_FUNC(ACTLR_EL1, reset_actlr),
+ RESET_ZERO(TCR_EL1),
+ RESET_UNKNOWN(AFSR0_EL1),
+ RESET_UNKNOWN(AFSR1_EL1),
+ RESET_UNKNOWN(ESR_EL1),
+ RESET_UNKNOWN(MAIR_EL1),
+ RESET_FUNC(AMAIR_EL1, reset_amair_el1),
+ RESET_ZERO(MDSCR_EL1),
+ RESET_ZERO(ZCR_EL1),
+ RESET_UNKNOWN(TTBR0_EL1),
+ RESET_UNKNOWN(TTBR1_EL1),
+ RESET_UNKNOWN(FAR_EL1),
+ RESET_VAL(VBAR_EL1, 0x1de7ec7edbadc000ULL),
+ RESET_UNKNOWN(PIRE0_EL1),
+ RESET_UNKNOWN(PIR_EL1),
+};
+
+void kvm_reset_pvm_sys_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ unsigned long i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pvm_sys_reg_reset_vals); i++) {
+ const struct sys_reg_desc_reset *r = &pvm_sys_reg_reset_vals[i];
+
+ r->reset(vcpu, r);
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Initializes feature registers for protected vms.
*/
@@ -550,16 +628,21 @@ void kvm_init_pvm_id_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
/*
- * Checks that the sysreg table is unique and in-order.
- *
- * Returns 0 if the table is consistent, or 1 otherwise.
+ * Both tables must be unique and sorted ascending. pvm_sys_reg_descs.reg is the
+ * sys_reg() encoding, pvm_sys_reg_reset_vals.reg the vcpu_sysreg index, so they
+ * compare differently. BUG_ON() at __pkvm_init: fatal at boot.
*/
int kvm_check_pvm_sysreg_table(void)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 1; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pvm_sys_reg_descs); i++) {
- if (cmp_sys_reg(&pvm_sys_reg_descs[i-1], &pvm_sys_reg_descs[i]) >= 0)
+ if (cmp_sys_reg(&pvm_sys_reg_descs[i - 1], &pvm_sys_reg_descs[i]) >= 0)
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 1; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pvm_sys_reg_reset_vals); i++) {
+ if (pvm_sys_reg_reset_vals[i - 1].reg >= pvm_sys_reg_reset_vals[i].reg)
return 1;
}
--
2.39.5
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-31 16:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-31 16:34 [PATCH 00/17] KVM: arm64: Confine protected VM vCPU state to EL2 Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 01/17] KVM: arm64: Sync HCR_EL2.VSE back to the host vCPU under pKVM Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 02/17] KVM: arm64: Advertise the capabilities that protected VMs support Fuad Tabba
2026-09-02 13:22 ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-03 16:20 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 03/17] KVM: arm64: Reject the PVTIME vCPU attribute for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-02 13:30 ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-03 16:21 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 04/17] KVM: arm64: Introduce per-EC entry handlers for pKVM Fuad Tabba
2026-09-02 10:12 ` Joey Gouly
2026-09-02 11:35 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 05/17] KVM: arm64: Skip fixed-feature state flush for protected vCPUs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-02 15:05 ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-02 15:26 ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-03 16:22 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 06/17] KVM: arm64: Add {flush,sync}_hyp_timer_state() primitives Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` Fuad Tabba [this message]
2026-09-02 15:14 ` [PATCH 07/17] KVM: arm64: Add system register reset framework for protected VMs Joey Gouly
2026-09-03 16:24 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 08/17] KVM: arm64: Implement HVC handling for protected guests at EL2 Fuad Tabba
2026-09-03 15:12 ` Joey Gouly
2026-09-03 16:25 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 09/17] KVM: arm64: Handle PSCI calls for protected VMs " Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 10/17] KVM: arm64: Restrict KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT and PSCI version for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 11/17] KVM: arm64: Prevent host PC adjustments for protected vCPUs Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 12/17] KVM: arm64: Inject an UNDEF at EL2 for unhandled protected guest exits Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 13/17] KVM: arm64: Add per-EC entry/exit state marshalling for protected guests Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 14/17] KVM: arm64: Pend a protected guest's SError with HCR_EL2.VSE only Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 15/17] KVM: arm64: Reject host access to protected VM private state Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 16/17] KVM: arm64: Reject host power-on of a vCPU that EL2 holds powered off Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 17/17] KVM: arm64: Document the protected VM userspace API Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 19:27 ` [PATCH 00/17] KVM: arm64: Confine protected VM vCPU state to EL2 Fuad Tabba
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