From: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
To: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>,
kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com>,
Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH 15/17] KVM: arm64: Reject host access to protected VM private state
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 17:34:19 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260831163421.272420-16-fuad.tabba@linux.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260831163421.272420-1-fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
A protected vCPU's register and debug state is no longer exposed to
the host. Host ioctls that would reach that state now fail rather
than operate on a copy that is not the guest's:
- KVM_GET_ONE_REG and KVM_SET_ONE_REG return -EPERM once the vCPU has
run: the copy then holds reset values plus what the exit handlers
marshal out. Pre-run access still builds the guest's boot state.
- KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT returns -EPERM once the vCPU has run: it would
reset the host copy alone and rewrite mp_state, which EL2 reads
only at hyp vCPU creation, so a vCPU the guest powered off would
come back RUNNABLE.
- KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS rejects external-abort injection with -EPERM;
SError injection is forwarded and stays permitted.
- KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG returns -EPERM: a protected guest's debug state
is hypervisor-owned.
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
---
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 7 +++++++
arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
index 3e00edce23a99..8caacdd4de020 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
@@ -1750,6 +1750,13 @@ static int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_vcpu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
bool power_off = false;
int ret;
+ /*
+ * Re-init would reset the host copy alone and rewrite mp_state
+ * after EL2 has read it. Pre-run init stays allowed.
+ */
+ if (kvm_vm_is_protected(vcpu->kvm) && vcpu_has_run_once(vcpu))
+ return -EPERM;
+
/*
* Treat the power-off vCPU feature as ephemeral. Clear the bit to avoid
* reflecting it in the finalized feature set, thus limiting its scope
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c
index 23f725e2cf745..3a0ea2ae4a307 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c
@@ -701,6 +701,10 @@ int kvm_arm_copy_reg_indices(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uindices)
int kvm_arm_get_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
{
+ /* Once the vCPU has run, the host copy is not the guest's state. */
+ if (kvm_vm_is_protected(vcpu->kvm) && vcpu_has_run_once(vcpu))
+ return -EPERM;
+
/* We currently use nothing arch-specific in upper 32 bits */
if ((reg->id & ~KVM_REG_SIZE_MASK) >> 32 != KVM_REG_ARM64 >> 32)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -718,6 +722,10 @@ int kvm_arm_get_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
int kvm_arm_set_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
{
+ /* Writes build the boot state; once run, EL2 owns the registers. */
+ if (kvm_vm_is_protected(vcpu->kvm) && vcpu_has_run_once(vcpu))
+ return -EPERM;
+
/* We currently use nothing arch-specific in upper 32 bits */
if ((reg->id & ~KVM_REG_SIZE_MASK) >> 32 != KVM_REG_ARM64 >> 32)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -786,6 +794,13 @@ int __kvm_arm_vcpu_set_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
u64 esr = events->exception.serror_esr;
int ret = 0;
+ /*
+ * EL2 injects an external abort only to complete a forwarded abort.
+ * SError injection is forwarded.
+ */
+ if (kvm_vm_is_protected(vcpu->kvm) && ext_dabt_pending)
+ return -EPERM;
+
/*
* Immediately commit the pending SEA to the vCPU's architectural
* state which is necessary since we do not return a pending SEA
@@ -883,6 +898,10 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_guest_debug(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
{
trace_kvm_set_guest_debug(vcpu, dbg->control);
+ /* A protected guest's debug state is not exposed to the host. */
+ if (kvm_vm_is_protected(vcpu->kvm))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (dbg->control & ~KVM_GUESTDBG_VALID_MASK)
return -EINVAL;
--
2.39.5
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-31 16:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-31 16:34 [PATCH 00/17] KVM: arm64: Confine protected VM vCPU state to EL2 Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 01/17] KVM: arm64: Sync HCR_EL2.VSE back to the host vCPU under pKVM Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 02/17] KVM: arm64: Advertise the capabilities that protected VMs support Fuad Tabba
2026-09-02 13:22 ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-03 16:20 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 03/17] KVM: arm64: Reject the PVTIME vCPU attribute for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-02 13:30 ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-03 16:21 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 04/17] KVM: arm64: Introduce per-EC entry handlers for pKVM Fuad Tabba
2026-09-02 10:12 ` Joey Gouly
2026-09-02 11:35 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 05/17] KVM: arm64: Skip fixed-feature state flush for protected vCPUs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-02 15:05 ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-02 15:26 ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-03 16:22 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 06/17] KVM: arm64: Add {flush,sync}_hyp_timer_state() primitives Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 07/17] KVM: arm64: Add system register reset framework for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-02 15:14 ` Joey Gouly
2026-09-03 16:24 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 08/17] KVM: arm64: Implement HVC handling for protected guests at EL2 Fuad Tabba
2026-09-03 15:12 ` Joey Gouly
2026-09-03 16:25 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 09/17] KVM: arm64: Handle PSCI calls for protected VMs " Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 10/17] KVM: arm64: Restrict KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT and PSCI version for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 11/17] KVM: arm64: Prevent host PC adjustments for protected vCPUs Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 12/17] KVM: arm64: Inject an UNDEF at EL2 for unhandled protected guest exits Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 13/17] KVM: arm64: Add per-EC entry/exit state marshalling for protected guests Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 14/17] KVM: arm64: Pend a protected guest's SError with HCR_EL2.VSE only Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` Fuad Tabba [this message]
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 16/17] KVM: arm64: Reject host power-on of a vCPU that EL2 holds powered off Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 16:34 ` [PATCH 17/17] KVM: arm64: Document the protected VM userspace API Fuad Tabba
2026-08-31 19:27 ` [PATCH 00/17] KVM: arm64: Confine protected VM vCPU state to EL2 Fuad Tabba
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