Linux Confidential Computing Development
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
To: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
	Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <borislav.petkov@amd.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Naveen Rao <naveen.rao@amd.com>,
	David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <stable@kernel.org>,
	kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 02/10] cpu/bugs: Allow forcing Automatic IBRS with SNP active using spectre_v2=eibrs
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2026 18:05:59 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <776393b0-f35d-4b08-9089-8599eb3fe514@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <lctyimdlenyb5kvfxarzajs2ggzkwn4yehxu233lojynqwa7ej@wjur3lh6szlr>

On 8/18/26 7:12 PM, Pawan Gupta wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 04, 2026 at 06:56:03PM -0500, Kim Phillips wrote:
> ...
>> @@ -2192,7 +2193,12 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
>>   			break;
>>   		fallthrough;
>>   	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
>> -		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
>> +		/*
>> +		 * Don't use AutoIBRS when SNP is enabled because it degrades
>> +		 * host userspace indirect branch performance.
>> +		 */
>> +		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) &&
>> +		    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP)) {
>>   			spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
>>   			break;
>>   		}
> Can we also account for retpoline availability here? If both SNP and
> retpoline are available, then only avoid AutoIBRS:
>
>            case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
>                    /*
>                     * Prefer retpoline when SNP is enabled because Auto-IBRS
>                     * degrades host userspace indirect branch performance.
>                     */
>                    if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) &&
>                       !(boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP) &&
>                         IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE))) {
>                            spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
>                            break;
>                    }
>
> With this, patch 1 & 3 can be omitted. Also avoids the ping pong: we don't
> want AutoIBRS -> We don't have retpoline -> Lets have AutoIBRS.
Thank you for your constructive review - I have addressed this comment 
in v5:

https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20260826223510.3669875-1-kim.phillips@amd.com/

Thanks,

Kim

  reply	other threads:[~2026-08-26 23:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-04 23:56 [PATCH v4 00/10] KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry and BTB Isolation Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 01/10] x86/bugs: Only log missing retpoline when it's actually the missing mitigation Kim Phillips
2026-08-05  0:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-05 14:51     ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-05 22:49       ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-06 20:12         ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-07  5:44           ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-10 23:21             ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-11  0:48               ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 02/10] cpu/bugs: Allow forcing Automatic IBRS with SNP active using spectre_v2=eibrs Kim Phillips
2026-08-18 23:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-26 22:52     ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-19  0:12   ` Pawan Gupta
2026-08-26 23:05     ` Kim Phillips [this message]
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 03/10] cpu/bugs: Fall back to AutoIBRS when retpoline unavailable on SNP CPUs Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 04/10] cpu/bugs: Allow spectre_v2=ibrs on x86 vendors other than Intel Kim Phillips
2026-08-19  1:17   ` Pawan Gupta
2026-08-26 23:06     ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 05/10] KVM: SEV: Define SVM_SEV_FEAT_* flags using BIT_ULL() Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 06/10] KVM: selftests: sev_init2: Use BIT_ULL for VMSA feature bit definition Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 07/10] KVM: SEV: Disallow setting SNP-only features for non-SNP guests via a single mask Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 08/10] KVM: SEV: Advertise SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 09/10] KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 10/10] KVM: SEV: Add support for SNP BTB Isolation Kim Phillips

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=776393b0-f35d-4b08-9089-8599eb3fe514@amd.com \
    --to=kim.phillips@amd.com \
    --cc=borislav.petkov@amd.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=david.kaplan@amd.com \
    --cc=kprateek.nayak@amd.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-coco@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=lkp@intel.com \
    --cc=michael.roth@amd.com \
    --cc=naveen.rao@amd.com \
    --cc=nikunj@amd.com \
    --cc=pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=stable@kernel.org \
    --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox