From: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
To: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <x86@kernel.org>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <borislav.petkov@amd.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Naveen Rao <naveen.rao@amd.com>,
David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <stable@kernel.org>,
kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 02/10] cpu/bugs: Allow forcing Automatic IBRS with SNP active using spectre_v2=eibrs
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2026 18:05:59 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <776393b0-f35d-4b08-9089-8599eb3fe514@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <lctyimdlenyb5kvfxarzajs2ggzkwn4yehxu233lojynqwa7ej@wjur3lh6szlr>
On 8/18/26 7:12 PM, Pawan Gupta wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 04, 2026 at 06:56:03PM -0500, Kim Phillips wrote:
> ...
>> @@ -2192,7 +2193,12 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
>> break;
>> fallthrough;
>> case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
>> - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
>> + /*
>> + * Don't use AutoIBRS when SNP is enabled because it degrades
>> + * host userspace indirect branch performance.
>> + */
>> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) &&
>> + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP)) {
>> spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
>> break;
>> }
> Can we also account for retpoline availability here? If both SNP and
> retpoline are available, then only avoid AutoIBRS:
>
> case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
> /*
> * Prefer retpoline when SNP is enabled because Auto-IBRS
> * degrades host userspace indirect branch performance.
> */
> if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) &&
> !(boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP) &&
> IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE))) {
> spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
> break;
> }
>
> With this, patch 1 & 3 can be omitted. Also avoids the ping pong: we don't
> want AutoIBRS -> We don't have retpoline -> Lets have AutoIBRS.
Thank you for your constructive review - I have addressed this comment
in v5:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20260826223510.3669875-1-kim.phillips@amd.com/
Thanks,
Kim
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-26 23:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-04 23:56 [PATCH v4 00/10] KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry and BTB Isolation Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 01/10] x86/bugs: Only log missing retpoline when it's actually the missing mitigation Kim Phillips
2026-08-05 0:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-05 14:51 ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-05 22:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-06 20:12 ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-07 5:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-10 23:21 ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-11 0:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 02/10] cpu/bugs: Allow forcing Automatic IBRS with SNP active using spectre_v2=eibrs Kim Phillips
2026-08-18 23:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-26 22:52 ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-19 0:12 ` Pawan Gupta
2026-08-26 23:05 ` Kim Phillips [this message]
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 03/10] cpu/bugs: Fall back to AutoIBRS when retpoline unavailable on SNP CPUs Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 04/10] cpu/bugs: Allow spectre_v2=ibrs on x86 vendors other than Intel Kim Phillips
2026-08-19 1:17 ` Pawan Gupta
2026-08-26 23:06 ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 05/10] KVM: SEV: Define SVM_SEV_FEAT_* flags using BIT_ULL() Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 06/10] KVM: selftests: sev_init2: Use BIT_ULL for VMSA feature bit definition Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 07/10] KVM: SEV: Disallow setting SNP-only features for non-SNP guests via a single mask Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 08/10] KVM: SEV: Advertise SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 09/10] KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 10/10] KVM: SEV: Add support for SNP BTB Isolation Kim Phillips
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