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From: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
To: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
	Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <borislav.petkov@amd.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Naveen Rao <naveen.rao@amd.com>,
	David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <stable@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 04/10] cpu/bugs: Allow spectre_v2=ibrs on x86 vendors other than Intel
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2026 18:06:05 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <f1d8833d-7c7c-473c-baff-62dd2fe54270@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ga63o6nf7xebndlo66qqasjx7axpopyph7ilkwhvx3enfaqs4w@r4qfr6eo6kcw>

On 8/18/26 8:17 PM, Pawan Gupta wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 04, 2026 at 06:56:05PM -0500, Kim Phillips wrote:
> ...
>> @@ -2297,13 +2299,26 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_apply_mitigation(void)
>>   	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
>>   		pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
>>   
>> -	if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) {
>> -		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) {
>> +	/*
>> +	 * head_64.S preserves EFER.AUTOIBRS across boot, so a kexec from a
>> +	 * kernel that ran in AutoIBRS mode carries the bit into the new kernel.
>> +	 * Explicitly set or clear it to match the selected mitigation, regardless
>> +	 * of which mode is in effect.  The boot CPU does this before
>> +	 * init_real_mode() snapshots EFER for the AP trampoline, so APs inherit
>> +	 * the correct value too.
>> +	 */
>> +	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) {
>> +		if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
>>   			msr_set_bit(MSR_EFER, _EFER_AUTOIBRS);
>> -		} else {
>> -			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
>> -			update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
>> -		}
>> +		else
>> +			msr_clear_bit(MSR_EFER, _EFER_AUTOIBRS);
> Clearing the old kernel state should be done well before the mitigation
> selection starts, below already does it for the SPEC_CTRL MSR:
>
>    void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
>    {
>            /*
>             * Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may
>             * have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD
>             * init code as it is not enumerated and depends on the family.
>             */
>            if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
>                    rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
>
>                    /*
>                     * Previously running kernel (kexec), may have some controls
>                     * turned ON. Clear them and let the mitigations setup below
>                     * rediscover them based on configuration.
>                     */
>                    x86_spec_ctrl_base &= ~SPEC_CTRL_MITIGATIONS_MASK;
>            }

Thanks, I've addressed this in v5.

>> +	}
>> +
>> +	if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled) &&
>> +	    !(boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS) &&
>> +	      spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))) {
>> +		x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
>> +		update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
>>   	}
> Nit, I find this a bit confusing. IIUC when AutoIBRS is supported, you want
> SPEC_CTRL[IBRS] to be set when legacy IBRS mitigation is deployed. If you
> move MSR write down after legacy IBRS mode is set(KERNEL_IBRS), you can do:
>
>            if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) {
>                   if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS) &&
>                       !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS)) {    <---- just adding KERNEL_IBRS check to existing code
>                            msr_set_bit(MSR_EFER, _EFER_AUTOIBRS);
>                    } else {
>                            x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
>                            update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
>                    }
>            }
>
> Otherwise, a comment explaining the intent would be helpful.

Right, also addressed in v5.

Please take another look.

Thanks,

Kim


  reply	other threads:[~2026-08-26 23:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-04 23:56 [PATCH v4 00/10] KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry and BTB Isolation Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 01/10] x86/bugs: Only log missing retpoline when it's actually the missing mitigation Kim Phillips
2026-08-05  0:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-05 14:51     ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-05 22:49       ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-06 20:12         ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-07  5:44           ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-10 23:21             ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-11  0:48               ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 02/10] cpu/bugs: Allow forcing Automatic IBRS with SNP active using spectre_v2=eibrs Kim Phillips
2026-08-18 23:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-26 22:52     ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-19  0:12   ` Pawan Gupta
2026-08-26 23:05     ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 03/10] cpu/bugs: Fall back to AutoIBRS when retpoline unavailable on SNP CPUs Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 04/10] cpu/bugs: Allow spectre_v2=ibrs on x86 vendors other than Intel Kim Phillips
2026-08-19  1:17   ` Pawan Gupta
2026-08-26 23:06     ` Kim Phillips [this message]
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 05/10] KVM: SEV: Define SVM_SEV_FEAT_* flags using BIT_ULL() Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 06/10] KVM: selftests: sev_init2: Use BIT_ULL for VMSA feature bit definition Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 07/10] KVM: SEV: Disallow setting SNP-only features for non-SNP guests via a single mask Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 08/10] KVM: SEV: Advertise SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 09/10] KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 10/10] KVM: SEV: Add support for SNP BTB Isolation Kim Phillips

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