[PATCH v3 0/5] random: use computational hash for entropy extraction, and related fixes

[PATCH v3 0/5] random: use computational hash for entropy extraction, and related fixes

[Jason A. Donenfeld]

The bulk of the motivation for this and description of crypto
vulnerabilities is in the first patch of this series. The following
three patches then fix up entropy accounting for the new model. The last
patch fixes a minor code safety issue.

This v3 fixes comments and commit message wording, simplifies a bit of
code in a cmpxchg loop, and adjusts semantics around the poll write
wakeup threshold.

Jason A. Donenfeld (5):
  random: use computational hash for entropy extraction
  random: simplify entropy debiting
  random: use linear min-entropy accumulation crediting
  random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction
  random: make credit_entropy_bits() always safe

 drivers/char/random.c         | 501 ++++++----------------------------
 include/trace/events/random.h |  30 +-
 2 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 444 deletions(-)

-- 
2.35.0

[PATCH v3 1/5] random: use computational hash for entropy extraction

[Jason A. Donenfeld]

The current 4096-bit LFSR used for entropy collection had a few
desirable attributes for the context in which it was created. For
example, the state was huge, which meant that /dev/random would be able
to output quite a bit of accumulated entropy before blocking. It was
also, in its time, quite fast at accumulating entropy byte-by-byte,
which matters given the varying contexts in which mix_pool_bytes() is
called. And its diffusion was relatively high, which meant that changes
would ripple across several words of state rather quickly.

However, it also suffers from a few security vulnerabilities. In
particular, inputs learned by an attacker can be undone, but moreover,
if the state of the pool leaks, its contents can be controlled and
entirely zeroed out. I've demonstrated this attack with this SMT2
script, <https://xn--4db.cc/5o9xO8pb>, which Boolector/CaDiCal solves in
a matter of seconds on a single core of my laptop, resulting in little
proof of concept C demonstrators such as <https://xn--4db.cc/jCkvvIaH/c>.

For basically all recent formal models of RNGs, these attacks represent
a significant cryptographic flaw. But how does this manifest
practically? If an attacker has access to the system to such a degree
that he can learn the internal state of the RNG, arguably there are
other lower hanging vulnerabilities -- side-channel, infoleak, or
otherwise -- that might have higher priority. On the other hand, seed
files are frequently used on systems that have a hard time generating
much entropy on their own, and these seed files, being files, often leak
or are duplicated and distributed accidentally, or are even seeded over
the Internet intentionally, where their contents might be recorded or
tampered with. Seen this way, an otherwise quasi-implausible
vulnerability is a bit more practical than initially thought.

Another aspect of the current mix_pool_bytes() function is that, while
its performance was arguably competitive for the time in which it was
created, it's no longer considered so. This patch improves performance
significantly: on a high-end CPU, an i7-11850H, it improves performance
of mix_pool_bytes() by 225%, and on a low-end CPU, a Cortex-A7, it
improves performance by 103%.

This commit replaces the LFSR of mix_pool_bytes() with a straight-
forward cryptographic hash function, BLAKE2s, which is already in use
for pool extraction. Universal hashing with a secret seed was considered
too, something along the lines of <https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/338>,
but the requirement for a secret seed makes for a chicken & egg problem.
Instead we go with a formally proven scheme using a computational hash
function, described in sections 5.1, 6.4, and B.1.8 of
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/198>.

BLAKE2s outputs 256 bits, which should give us an appropriate amount of
min-entropy accumulation, and a wide enough margin of collision
resistance against active attacks. mix_pool_bytes() becomes a simple
call to blake2s_update(), for accumulation, while the extraction step
becomes a blake2s_final() to generate a seed, with which we can then do
a HKDF-like or BLAKE2X-like expansion, the first part of which we fold
back as an init key for subsequent blake2s_update()s, and the rest we
produce to the caller. This then is provided to our CRNG like usual. In
that expansion step, we make opportunistic use of 32 bytes of RDRAND
output, just as before. We also always reseed the crng with 32 bytes,
unconditionally, or not at all, rather than sometimes with 16 as before,
as we don't win anything by limiting beyond the 16 byte threshold.

Going for a hash function as an entropy collector is a conservative,
proven approach. The result of all this is a much simpler and much less
bespoke construction than what's there now, which not only plugs a
vulnerability but also improves performance considerably.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
 drivers/char/random.c | 304 ++++++++----------------------------------
 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 249 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 4801a52cb72a..3c676897583f 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -42,61 +42,6 @@
  */
 
 /*
- * (now, with legal B.S. out of the way.....)
- *
- * This routine gathers environmental noise from device drivers, etc.,
- * and returns good random numbers, suitable for cryptographic use.
- * Besides the obvious cryptographic uses, these numbers are also good
- * for seeding TCP sequence numbers, and other places where it is
- * desirable to have numbers which are not only random, but hard to
- * predict by an attacker.
- *
- * Theory of operation
- * ===================
- *
- * Computers are very predictable devices.  Hence it is extremely hard
- * to produce truly random numbers on a computer --- as opposed to
- * pseudo-random numbers, which can easily generated by using a
- * algorithm.  Unfortunately, it is very easy for attackers to guess
- * the sequence of pseudo-random number generators, and for some
- * applications this is not acceptable.  So instead, we must try to
- * gather "environmental noise" from the computer's environment, which
- * must be hard for outside attackers to observe, and use that to
- * generate random numbers.  In a Unix environment, this is best done
- * from inside the kernel.
- *
- * Sources of randomness from the environment include inter-keyboard
- * timings, inter-interrupt timings from some interrupts, and other
- * events which are both (a) non-deterministic and (b) hard for an
- * outside observer to measure.  Randomness from these sources are
- * added to an "entropy pool", which is mixed using a CRC-like function.
- * This is not cryptographically strong, but it is adequate assuming
- * the randomness is not chosen maliciously, and it is fast enough that
- * the overhead of doing it on every interrupt is very reasonable.
- * As random bytes are mixed into the entropy pool, the routines keep
- * an *estimate* of how many bits of randomness have been stored into
- * the random number generator's internal state.
- *
- * When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the BLAKE2s
- * hash of the contents of the "entropy pool".  The BLAKE2s hash avoids
- * exposing the internal state of the entropy pool.  It is believed to
- * be computationally infeasible to derive any useful information
- * about the input of BLAKE2s from its output.  Even if it is possible to
- * analyze BLAKE2s in some clever way, as long as the amount of data
- * returned from the generator is less than the inherent entropy in
- * the pool, the output data is totally unpredictable.  For this
- * reason, the routine decreases its internal estimate of how many
- * bits of "true randomness" are contained in the entropy pool as it
- * outputs random numbers.
- *
- * If this estimate goes to zero, the routine can still generate
- * random numbers; however, an attacker may (at least in theory) be
- * able to infer the future output of the generator from prior
- * outputs.  This requires successful cryptanalysis of BLAKE2s, which is
- * not believed to be feasible, but there is a remote possibility.
- * Nonetheless, these numbers should be useful for the vast majority
- * of purposes.
- *
  * Exported interfaces ---- output
  * ===============================
  *
@@ -298,23 +243,6 @@
  *
  *	mknod /dev/random c 1 8
  *	mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9
- *
- * Acknowledgements:
- * =================
- *
- * Ideas for constructing this random number generator were derived
- * from Pretty Good Privacy's random number generator, and from private
- * discussions with Phil Karn.  Colin Plumb provided a faster random
- * number generator, which speed up the mixing function of the entropy
- * pool, taken from PGPfone.  Dale Worley has also contributed many
- * useful ideas and suggestions to improve this driver.
- *
- * Any flaws in the design are solely my responsibility, and should
- * not be attributed to the Phil, Colin, or any of authors of PGP.
- *
- * Further background information on this topic may be obtained from
- * RFC 1750, "Randomness Recommendations for Security", by Donald
- * Eastlake, Steve Crocker, and Jeff Schiller.
  */
 
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
@@ -358,79 +286,15 @@
 
 /* #define ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH */
 
-/*
- * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we
- * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write
- * access to /dev/random.
- */
-static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * (1 << 5);
-
-/*
- * Originally, we used a primitive polynomial of degree .poolwords
- * over GF(2).  The taps for various sizes are defined below.  They
- * were chosen to be evenly spaced except for the last tap, which is 1
- * to get the twisting happening as fast as possible.
- *
- * For the purposes of better mixing, we use the CRC-32 polynomial as
- * well to make a (modified) twisted Generalized Feedback Shift
- * Register.  (See M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1992.  Twisted GFSR
- * generators.  ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation
- * 2(3):179-194.  Also see M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1994.  Twisted
- * GFSR generators II.  ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer
- * Simulation 4:254-266)
- *
- * Thanks to Colin Plumb for suggesting this.
- *
- * The mixing operation is much less sensitive than the output hash,
- * where we use BLAKE2s.  All that we want of mixing operation is that
- * it be a good non-cryptographic hash; i.e. it not produce collisions
- * when fed "random" data of the sort we expect to see.  As long as
- * the pool state differs for different inputs, we have preserved the
- * input entropy and done a good job.  The fact that an intelligent
- * attacker can construct inputs that will produce controlled
- * alterations to the pool's state is not important because we don't
- * consider such inputs to contribute any randomness.  The only
- * property we need with respect to them is that the attacker can't
- * increase his/her knowledge of the pool's state.  Since all
- * additions are reversible (knowing the final state and the input,
- * you can reconstruct the initial state), if an attacker has any
- * uncertainty about the initial state, he/she can only shuffle that
- * uncertainty about, but never cause any collisions (which would
- * decrease the uncertainty).
- *
- * Our mixing functions were analyzed by Lacharme, Roeck, Strubel, and
- * Videau in their paper, "The Linux Pseudorandom Number Generator
- * Revisited" (see: http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/251.pdf).  In their
- * paper, they point out that we are not using a true Twisted GFSR,
- * since Matsumoto & Kurita used a trinomial feedback polynomial (that
- * is, with only three taps, instead of the six that we are using).
- * As a result, the resulting polynomial is neither primitive nor
- * irreducible, and hence does not have a maximal period over
- * GF(2**32).  They suggest a slight change to the generator
- * polynomial which improves the resulting TGFSR polynomial to be
- * irreducible, which we have made here.
- */
 enum poolinfo {
-	POOL_WORDS = 128,
-	POOL_WORDMASK = POOL_WORDS - 1,
-	POOL_BYTES = POOL_WORDS * sizeof(u32),
-	POOL_BITS = POOL_BYTES * 8,
+	POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8,
 	POOL_BITSHIFT = ilog2(POOL_BITS),
 
 	/* To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is
 	 * denominated in units of 1/8th bits. */
 	POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT = 3,
 #define POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() (input_pool.entropy_count >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT)
-	POOL_FRACBITS = POOL_BITS << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT,
-
-	/* x^128 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */
-	POOL_TAP1 = 104,
-	POOL_TAP2 = 76,
-	POOL_TAP3 = 51,
-	POOL_TAP4 = 25,
-	POOL_TAP5 = 1,
-
-	EXTRACT_SIZE = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE / 2
+	POOL_FRACBITS = POOL_BITS << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT
 };
 
 /*
@@ -438,6 +302,12 @@ enum poolinfo {
  */
 static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);
 static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
+/*
+ * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we
+ * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write
+ * access to /dev/random.
+ */
+static int random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_BITS * 3 / 4;
 
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock);
 static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list);
@@ -493,73 +363,31 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression");
  *
  **********************************************************************/
 
-static u32 input_pool_data[POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;
-
 static struct {
+	struct blake2s_state hash;
 	spinlock_t lock;
-	u16 add_ptr;
-	u16 input_rotate;
 	int entropy_count;
 } input_pool = {
+	.hash.h = { BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ (0x01010000 | BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE),
+		    BLAKE2S_IV1, BLAKE2S_IV2, BLAKE2S_IV3, BLAKE2S_IV4,
+		    BLAKE2S_IV5, BLAKE2S_IV6, BLAKE2S_IV7 },
+	.hash.outlen = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE,
 	.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
 };
 
-static ssize_t extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min);
-static ssize_t _extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
+static bool extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min);
+static void _extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
 
 static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng);
 
-static const u32 twist_table[8] = {
-	0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
-	0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 };
-
 /*
  * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool".  It does not
  * update the entropy estimate.  The caller should call
  * credit_entropy_bits if this is appropriate.
- *
- * The pool is stirred with a primitive polynomial of the appropriate
- * degree, and then twisted.  We twist by three bits at a time because
- * it's cheap to do so and helps slightly in the expected case where
- * the entropy is concentrated in the low-order bits.
  */
 static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, int nbytes)
 {
-	unsigned long i;
-	int input_rotate;
-	const u8 *bytes = in;
-	u32 w;
-
-	input_rotate = input_pool.input_rotate;
-	i = input_pool.add_ptr;
-
-	/* mix one byte at a time to simplify size handling and churn faster */
-	while (nbytes--) {
-		w = rol32(*bytes++, input_rotate);
-		i = (i - 1) & POOL_WORDMASK;
-
-		/* XOR in the various taps */
-		w ^= input_pool_data[i];
-		w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP1) & POOL_WORDMASK];
-		w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP2) & POOL_WORDMASK];
-		w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP3) & POOL_WORDMASK];
-		w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP4) & POOL_WORDMASK];
-		w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP5) & POOL_WORDMASK];
-
-		/* Mix the result back in with a twist */
-		input_pool_data[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7];
-
-		/*
-		 * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool.
-		 * At the beginning of the pool, add an extra 7 bits
-		 * rotation, so that successive passes spread the
-		 * input bits across the pool evenly.
-		 */
-		input_rotate = (input_rotate + (i ? 7 : 14)) & 31;
-	}
-
-	input_pool.input_rotate = input_rotate;
-	input_pool.add_ptr = i;
+	blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, in, nbytes);
 }
 
 static void __mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, int nbytes)
@@ -953,15 +781,14 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len)
 static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
-	int i, num;
+	int i;
 	union {
 		u8 block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
 		u32 key[8];
 	} buf;
 
 	if (crng == &primary_crng) {
-		num = extract_entropy(&buf, 32, 16);
-		if (num == 0)
+		if (!extract_entropy(&buf, 32, 16))
 			return;
 	} else {
 		_extract_crng(&primary_crng, buf.block);
@@ -1329,74 +1156,48 @@ static size_t account(size_t nbytes, int min)
 }
 
 /*
- * This function does the actual extraction for extract_entropy.
- *
- * Note: we assume that .poolwords is a multiple of 16 words.
+ * This is an HKDF-like construction for using the hashed collected entropy
+ * as a PRF key, that's then expanded block-by-block.
  */
-static void extract_buf(u8 *out)
+static void _extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
 {
-	struct blake2s_state state __aligned(__alignof__(unsigned long));
-	u8 hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
-	unsigned long *salt;
 	unsigned long flags;
-
-	blake2s_init(&state, sizeof(hash));
-
-	/*
-	 * If we have an architectural hardware random number
-	 * generator, use it for BLAKE2's salt & personal fields.
-	 */
-	for (salt = (unsigned long *)&state.h[4];
-	     salt < (unsigned long *)&state.h[8]; ++salt) {
-		unsigned long v;
-		if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
-			break;
-		*salt ^= v;
+	u8 seed[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE], next_key[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
+	struct {
+		unsigned long rdrand[32 / sizeof(long)];
+		size_t counter;
+	} block;
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(block.rdrand); ++i) {
+		if (!arch_get_random_long(&block.rdrand[i]))
+			block.rdrand[i] = random_get_entropy();
 	}
 
-	/* Generate a hash across the pool */
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-	blake2s_update(&state, (const u8 *)input_pool_data, POOL_BYTES);
-	blake2s_final(&state, hash); /* final zeros out state */
 
-	/*
-	 * We mix the hash back into the pool to prevent backtracking
-	 * attacks (where the attacker knows the state of the pool
-	 * plus the current outputs, and attempts to find previous
-	 * outputs), unless the hash function can be inverted. By
-	 * mixing at least a hash worth of hash data back, we make
-	 * brute-forcing the feedback as hard as brute-forcing the
-	 * hash.
-	 */
-	__mix_pool_bytes(hash, sizeof(hash));
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+	/* seed = HASHPRF(last_key, entropy_input) */
+	blake2s_final(&input_pool.hash, seed);
 
-	/* Note that EXTRACT_SIZE is half of hash size here, because above
-	 * we've dumped the full length back into mixer. By reducing the
-	 * amount that we emit, we retain a level of forward secrecy.
-	 */
-	memcpy(out, hash, EXTRACT_SIZE);
-	memzero_explicit(hash, sizeof(hash));
-}
+	/* next_key = HASHPRF(seed, RDRAND || 0) */
+	block.counter = 0;
+	blake2s(next_key, (u8 *)&block, seed, sizeof(next_key), sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
+	blake2s_init_key(&input_pool.hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, next_key, sizeof(next_key));
 
-static ssize_t _extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
-{
-	ssize_t ret = 0, i;
-	u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+	memzero_explicit(next_key, sizeof(next_key));
 
 	while (nbytes) {
-		extract_buf(tmp);
-		i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE);
-		memcpy(buf, tmp, i);
+		i = min_t(size_t, nbytes, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+		/* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDRAND || ++counter) */
+		++block.counter;
+		blake2s(buf, (u8 *)&block, seed, i, sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
 		nbytes -= i;
 		buf += i;
-		ret += i;
 	}
 
-	/* Wipe data just returned from memory */
-	memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
-
-	return ret;
+	memzero_explicit(seed, sizeof(seed));
+	memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block));
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1404,13 +1205,18 @@ static ssize_t _extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
  * returns it in a buffer.
  *
  * The min parameter specifies the minimum amount we can pull before
- * failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding.
+ * failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding. If we
+ * have less than min entropy available, we return false and buf is
+ * not filled.
  */
-static ssize_t extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min)
+static bool extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min)
 {
 	trace_extract_entropy(nbytes, POOL_ENTROPY_BITS(), _RET_IP_);
-	nbytes = account(nbytes, min);
-	return _extract_entropy(buf, nbytes);
+	if (account(nbytes, min)) {
+		_extract_entropy(buf, nbytes);
+		return true;
+	}
+	return false;
 }
 
 #define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \
@@ -1674,7 +1480,7 @@ static void __init init_std_data(void)
 	unsigned long rv;
 
 	mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now));
-	for (i = POOL_BYTES; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) {
+	for (i = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) {
 		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
 		    !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
 			rv = random_get_entropy();
-- 
2.35.0

[PATCH v3 2/5] random: simplify entropy debiting

[Jason A. Donenfeld]

Our pool is 256 bits, and we only ever use all of it or don't use it at
all, which is decided by whether or not it has at least 128 bits in it.
So we can drastically simplify the accounting and cmpxchg loop to do
exactly this.  While we're at it, we move the minimum bit size into a
constant so it can be shared between the two places where it matters.

The reason we want any of this is for the case in which an attacker has
compromised the current state, and then bruteforces small amounts of
entropy added to it. By demanding a particular minimum amount of entropy
be present before reseeding, we make that bruteforcing difficult.

Note that this rationale no longer includes anything about /dev/random
blocking at the right moment, since /dev/random no longer blocks (except
for at ~boot), but rather uses the crng. In a former life, /dev/random
was different and therefore required a more nuanced account(), but this
is no longer.

Behaviorally, nothing changes here. This is just a simplification of
the code.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
 drivers/char/random.c         | 91 ++++++++---------------------------
 include/trace/events/random.h | 30 +++---------
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 94 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 3c676897583f..85b0b6241729 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -289,12 +289,14 @@
 enum poolinfo {
 	POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8,
 	POOL_BITSHIFT = ilog2(POOL_BITS),
+	POOL_MIN_BITS = POOL_BITS / 2,
 
 	/* To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is
 	 * denominated in units of 1/8th bits. */
 	POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT = 3,
 #define POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() (input_pool.entropy_count >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT)
-	POOL_FRACBITS = POOL_BITS << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT
+	POOL_FRACBITS = POOL_BITS << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT,
+	POOL_MIN_FRACBITS = POOL_MIN_BITS << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT
 };
 
 /*
@@ -375,8 +377,7 @@ static struct {
 	.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
 };
 
-static bool extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min);
-static void _extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
+static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
 
 static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng);
 
@@ -467,7 +468,7 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(void)
  */
 static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbits)
 {
-	int entropy_count, entropy_bits, orig;
+	int entropy_count, orig;
 	int nfrac = nbits << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT;
 
 	/* Ensure that the multiplication can avoid being 64 bits wide. */
@@ -527,8 +528,7 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbits)
 
 	trace_credit_entropy_bits(nbits, entropy_count >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT, _RET_IP_);
 
-	entropy_bits = entropy_count >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT;
-	if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_bits >= 128)
+	if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_FRACBITS)
 		crng_reseed(&primary_crng);
 }
 
@@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ static void crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng)
 
 static void __init crng_initialize_primary(void)
 {
-	_extract_entropy(&primary_crng.state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12);
+	extract_entropy(&primary_crng.state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12);
 	if (crng_init_try_arch_early() && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) {
 		invalidate_batched_entropy();
 		numa_crng_init();
@@ -788,8 +788,17 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng)
 	} buf;
 
 	if (crng == &primary_crng) {
-		if (!extract_entropy(&buf, 32, 16))
-			return;
+		int entropy_count;
+		do {
+			entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
+			if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_FRACBITS)
+				return;
+		} while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count);
+		extract_entropy(buf.key, sizeof(buf.key));
+		if (random_write_wakeup_bits) {
+			wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
+			kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
+		}
 	} else {
 		_extract_crng(&primary_crng, buf.block);
 		_crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block,
@@ -1114,52 +1123,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);
  *
  *********************************************************************/
 
-/*
- * This function decides how many bytes to actually take from the
- * given pool, and also debits the entropy count accordingly.
- */
-static size_t account(size_t nbytes, int min)
-{
-	int entropy_count, orig;
-	size_t ibytes, nfrac;
-
-	BUG_ON(input_pool.entropy_count > POOL_FRACBITS);
-
-	/* Can we pull enough? */
-retry:
-	entropy_count = orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
-	if (WARN_ON(entropy_count < 0)) {
-		pr_warn("negative entropy count: count %d\n", entropy_count);
-		entropy_count = 0;
-	}
-
-	/* never pull more than available */
-	ibytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, entropy_count >> (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3));
-	if (ibytes < min)
-		ibytes = 0;
-	nfrac = ibytes << (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
-	if ((size_t)entropy_count > nfrac)
-		entropy_count -= nfrac;
-	else
-		entropy_count = 0;
-
-	if (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
-		goto retry;
-
-	trace_debit_entropy(8 * ibytes);
-	if (ibytes && POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() < random_write_wakeup_bits) {
-		wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
-		kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
-	}
-
-	return ibytes;
-}
-
 /*
  * This is an HKDF-like construction for using the hashed collected entropy
  * as a PRF key, that's then expanded block-by-block.
  */
-static void _extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	u8 seed[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE], next_key[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
@@ -1169,6 +1137,8 @@ static void _extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
 	} block;
 	size_t i;
 
+	trace_extract_entropy(nbytes, POOL_ENTROPY_BITS());
+
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(block.rdrand); ++i) {
 		if (!arch_get_random_long(&block.rdrand[i]))
 			block.rdrand[i] = random_get_entropy();
@@ -1200,25 +1170,6 @@ static void _extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
 	memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block));
 }
 
-/*
- * This function extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and
- * returns it in a buffer.
- *
- * The min parameter specifies the minimum amount we can pull before
- * failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding. If we
- * have less than min entropy available, we return false and buf is
- * not filled.
- */
-static bool extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min)
-{
-	trace_extract_entropy(nbytes, POOL_ENTROPY_BITS(), _RET_IP_);
-	if (account(nbytes, min)) {
-		_extract_entropy(buf, nbytes);
-		return true;
-	}
-	return false;
-}
-
 #define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \
 	_warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, (previous))
 
diff --git a/include/trace/events/random.h b/include/trace/events/random.h
index a2d9aa16a5d7..ad149aeaf42c 100644
--- a/include/trace/events/random.h
+++ b/include/trace/events/random.h
@@ -79,22 +79,6 @@ TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits,
 		  __entry->bits, __entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP)
 );
 
-TRACE_EVENT(debit_entropy,
-	TP_PROTO(int debit_bits),
-
-	TP_ARGS( debit_bits),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field(	  int,	debit_bits		)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->debit_bits	= debit_bits;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("input pool: debit_bits %d", __entry->debit_bits)
-);
-
 TRACE_EVENT(add_input_randomness,
 	TP_PROTO(int input_bits),
 
@@ -161,31 +145,29 @@ DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes_arch,
 );
 
 DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__extract_entropy,
-	TP_PROTO(int nbytes, int entropy_count, unsigned long IP),
+	TP_PROTO(int nbytes, int entropy_count),
 
-	TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count, IP),
+	TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count),
 
 	TP_STRUCT__entry(
 		__field(	  int,	nbytes			)
 		__field(	  int,	entropy_count		)
-		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
 	),
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
 		__entry->nbytes		= nbytes;
 		__entry->entropy_count	= entropy_count;
-		__entry->IP		= IP;
 	),
 
-	TP_printk("input pool: nbytes %d entropy_count %d caller %pS",
-		  __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP)
+	TP_printk("input pool: nbytes %d entropy_count %d",
+		  __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count)
 );
 
 
 DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy,
-	TP_PROTO(int nbytes, int entropy_count, unsigned long IP),
+	TP_PROTO(int nbytes, int entropy_count),
 
-	TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count, IP)
+	TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count)
 );
 
 TRACE_EVENT(urandom_read,
-- 
2.35.0

[PATCH v3 3/5] random: use linear min-entropy accumulation crediting

[Jason A. Donenfeld]

30e37ec516ae ("random: account for entropy loss due to overwrites")
assumed that adding new entropy to the LFSR pool probabilistically
cancelled out old entropy there, so entropy was credited asymptotically,
approximating Shannon entropy of independent sources (rather than a
stronger min-entropy notion) using 1/8th fractional bits and replacing
a constant 2-2/√𝑒 term (~0.786938) with 3/4 (0.75) to slightly
underestimate it. This wasn't superb, but it was perhaps better than
nothing, so that's what was done. Which entropy specifically was being
cancelled out and how much precisely each time is hard to tell, though
as I showed with the attack code in my previous commit, a motivated
adversary with sufficient information can actually cancel out
everything.

Since we're no longer using an LFSR for entropy accumulation, this
probabilistic cancellation is no longer relevant. Rather, we're now
using a computational hash function as the accumulator and we've
switched to working in the random oracle model, from which we can now
revisit the question of min-entropy accumulation, which is done in
detail in <https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/198>.

Consider a long input bit string that is built by concatenating various
smaller independent input bit strings. Each one of these inputs has a
designated min-entropy, which is what we're passing to
credit_entropy_bits(h). When we pass the concatenation of these to a
random oracle, it means that an adversary trying to receive back the
same reply as us would need to become certain about each part of the
concatenated bit string we passed in, which means becoming certain about
all of those h values. That means we can estimate the accumulation by
simply adding up the h values in calls to credit_entropy_bits(h);
there's no probabilistic cancellation at play like there was said to be
for the LFSR. Incidentally, this is also what other entropy accumulators
based on computational hash functions do as well.

So this commit replaces credit_entropy_bits(h) with essentially `total =
min(POOL_BITS, total + h)`, done with a cmpxchg loop as before.

What if we're wrong and the above is nonsense? It's not, but let's
assume we don't want the actual _behavior_ of the code to change much.
Currently that behavior is not extracting from the input pool until it
has 128 bits of entropy in it. With the old algorithm, we'd hit that
magic 128 number after roughly 256 calls to credit_entropy_bits(1). So,
we can retain more or less the old behavior by waiting to extract from
the input pool until it hits 256 bits of entropy using the new code. For
people concerned about this change, it means that there's not that much
practical behavioral change. And for folks actually trying to model
the behavior rigorously, it means that we have an even higher margin
against attacks.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
 drivers/char/random.c | 114 ++++++++----------------------------------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 94 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 85b0b6241729..d0ec8503941e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -286,17 +286,9 @@
 
 /* #define ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH */
 
-enum poolinfo {
+enum {
 	POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8,
-	POOL_BITSHIFT = ilog2(POOL_BITS),
-	POOL_MIN_BITS = POOL_BITS / 2,
-
-	/* To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is
-	 * denominated in units of 1/8th bits. */
-	POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT = 3,
-#define POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() (input_pool.entropy_count >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT)
-	POOL_FRACBITS = POOL_BITS << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT,
-	POOL_MIN_FRACBITS = POOL_MIN_BITS << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT
+	POOL_MIN_BITS = POOL_BITS /* No point in settling for less. */
 };
 
 /*
@@ -309,7 +301,7 @@ static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
  * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write
  * access to /dev/random.
  */
-static int random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_BITS * 3 / 4;
+static int random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_MIN_BITS;
 
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock);
 static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list);
@@ -469,66 +461,18 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(void)
 static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbits)
 {
 	int entropy_count, orig;
-	int nfrac = nbits << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT;
-
-	/* Ensure that the multiplication can avoid being 64 bits wide. */
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(2 * (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + POOL_BITSHIFT) > 31);
 
 	if (!nbits)
 		return;
 
-retry:
-	entropy_count = orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
-	if (nfrac < 0) {
-		/* Debit */
-		entropy_count += nfrac;
-	} else {
-		/*
-		 * Credit: we have to account for the possibility of
-		 * overwriting already present entropy.	 Even in the
-		 * ideal case of pure Shannon entropy, new contributions
-		 * approach the full value asymptotically:
-		 *
-		 * entropy <- entropy + (pool_size - entropy) *
-		 *	(1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size))
-		 *
-		 * For add_entropy <= pool_size/2 then
-		 * (1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size)) >=
-		 *    (add_entropy/pool_size)*0.7869...
-		 * so we can approximate the exponential with
-		 * 3/4*add_entropy/pool_size and still be on the
-		 * safe side by adding at most pool_size/2 at a time.
-		 *
-		 * The use of pool_size-2 in the while statement is to
-		 * prevent rounding artifacts from making the loop
-		 * arbitrarily long; this limits the loop to log2(pool_size)*2
-		 * turns no matter how large nbits is.
-		 */
-		int pnfrac = nfrac;
-		const int s = POOL_BITSHIFT + POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + 2;
-		/* The +2 corresponds to the /4 in the denominator */
-
-		do {
-			unsigned int anfrac = min(pnfrac, POOL_FRACBITS / 2);
-			unsigned int add =
-				((POOL_FRACBITS - entropy_count) * anfrac * 3) >> s;
-
-			entropy_count += add;
-			pnfrac -= anfrac;
-		} while (unlikely(entropy_count < POOL_FRACBITS - 2 && pnfrac));
-	}
-
-	if (WARN_ON(entropy_count < 0)) {
-		pr_warn("negative entropy/overflow: count %d\n", entropy_count);
-		entropy_count = 0;
-	} else if (entropy_count > POOL_FRACBITS)
-		entropy_count = POOL_FRACBITS;
-	if (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
-		goto retry;
+	do {
+		orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
+		entropy_count = min(POOL_BITS, orig + nbits);
+	} while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig);
 
-	trace_credit_entropy_bits(nbits, entropy_count >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT, _RET_IP_);
+	trace_credit_entropy_bits(nbits, entropy_count, _RET_IP_);
 
-	if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_FRACBITS)
+	if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS)
 		crng_reseed(&primary_crng);
 }
 
@@ -791,7 +735,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng)
 		int entropy_count;
 		do {
 			entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
-			if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_FRACBITS)
+			if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS)
 				return;
 		} while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count);
 		extract_entropy(buf.key, sizeof(buf.key));
@@ -1014,7 +958,7 @@ void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
 	last_value = value;
 	add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state,
 			     (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value);
-	trace_add_input_randomness(POOL_ENTROPY_BITS());
+	trace_add_input_randomness(input_pool.entropy_count);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness);
 
@@ -1112,7 +1056,7 @@ void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
 		return;
 	/* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */
 	add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk));
-	trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), POOL_ENTROPY_BITS());
+	trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), input_pool.entropy_count);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);
 #endif
@@ -1137,7 +1081,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
 	} block;
 	size_t i;
 
-	trace_extract_entropy(nbytes, POOL_ENTROPY_BITS());
+	trace_extract_entropy(nbytes, input_pool.entropy_count);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(block.rdrand); ++i) {
 		if (!arch_get_random_long(&block.rdrand[i]))
@@ -1486,9 +1430,9 @@ static ssize_t urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3));
+	nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> 6);
 	ret = extract_crng_user(buf, nbytes);
-	trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, POOL_ENTROPY_BITS());
+	trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, input_pool.entropy_count);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -1527,7 +1471,7 @@ static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
 	mask = 0;
 	if (crng_ready())
 		mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
-	if (POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() < random_write_wakeup_bits)
+	if (input_pool.entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_bits)
 		mask |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
 	return mask;
 }
@@ -1582,8 +1526,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case RNDGETENTCNT:
 		/* inherently racy, no point locking */
-		ent_count = POOL_ENTROPY_BITS();
-		if (put_user(ent_count, p))
+		if (put_user(input_pool.entropy_count, p))
 			return -EFAULT;
 		return 0;
 	case RNDADDTOENTCNT:
@@ -1734,23 +1677,6 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
 	return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
 }
 
-/*
- * Return entropy available scaled to integral bits
- */
-static int proc_do_entropy(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
-			   size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
-{
-	struct ctl_table fake_table;
-	int entropy_count;
-
-	entropy_count = *(int *)table->data >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT;
-
-	fake_table.data = &entropy_count;
-	fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(entropy_count);
-
-	return proc_dointvec(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
-}
-
 static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS;
 static struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
 	{
@@ -1762,10 +1688,10 @@ static struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
 	},
 	{
 		.procname	= "entropy_avail",
+		.data		= &input_pool.entropy_count,
 		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
 		.mode		= 0444,
-		.proc_handler	= proc_do_entropy,
-		.data		= &input_pool.entropy_count,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
 	},
 	{
 		.procname	= "write_wakeup_threshold",
@@ -1972,7 +1898,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
 	 */
 	wait_event_interruptible_timeout(random_write_wait,
 			!system_wq || kthread_should_stop() ||
-			POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() <= random_write_wakeup_bits,
+			input_pool.entropy_count <= random_write_wakeup_bits,
 			CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL);
 	mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count);
 	credit_entropy_bits(entropy);
-- 
2.35.0

[PATCH v3 4/5] random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction

[Jason A. Donenfeld]

Now that POOL_BITS == POOL_MIN_BITS, we must unconditionally wake up
entropy writers after every extraction. Therefore there's no point of
write_wakeup_threshold, so we can move it to the dustbin of unused
compatibility sysctls. While we're at it, we can fix a small comparison
where we were waking up after <= min rather than < min.

Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
 drivers/char/random.c | 35 ++++++++++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index d0ec8503941e..82ec3a0399fb 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -296,12 +296,6 @@ enum {
  */
 static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);
 static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
-/*
- * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we
- * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write
- * access to /dev/random.
- */
-static int random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_MIN_BITS;
 
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock);
 static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list);
@@ -739,10 +733,8 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng)
 				return;
 		} while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count);
 		extract_entropy(buf.key, sizeof(buf.key));
-		if (random_write_wakeup_bits) {
-			wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
-			kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
-		}
+		wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
+		kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
 	} else {
 		_extract_crng(&primary_crng, buf.block);
 		_crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block,
@@ -1471,7 +1463,7 @@ static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
 	mask = 0;
 	if (crng_ready())
 		mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
-	if (input_pool.entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_bits)
+	if (input_pool.entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS)
 		mask |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
 	return mask;
 }
@@ -1556,7 +1548,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 		 */
 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 			return -EPERM;
-		if (xchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, 0) && random_write_wakeup_bits) {
+		if (xchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, 0)) {
 			wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
 			kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
 		}
@@ -1636,9 +1628,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int,
 
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
 
-static int min_write_thresh;
-static int max_write_thresh = POOL_BITS;
 static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60;
+static int random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_MIN_BITS;
+static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS;
 static char sysctl_bootid[16];
 
 /*
@@ -1677,7 +1669,6 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
 	return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
 }
 
-static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS;
 static struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
 	{
 		.procname	= "poolsize",
@@ -1697,10 +1688,8 @@ static struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
 		.procname	= "write_wakeup_threshold",
 		.data		= &random_write_wakeup_bits,
 		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
-		.mode		= 0644,
-		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax,
-		.extra1		= &min_write_thresh,
-		.extra2		= &max_write_thresh,
+		.mode		= 0444,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
 	},
 	{
 		.procname	= "urandom_min_reseed_secs",
@@ -1892,13 +1881,13 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
 	}
 
 	/* Throttle writing if we're above the trickle threshold.
-	 * We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh,
-	 * when the calling thread is about to terminate, or once
-	 * CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL has lapsed.
+	 * We'll be woken up again once below POOL_MIN_BITS, when
+	 * the calling thread is about to terminate, or once
+	 * CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL has elapsed.
 	 */
 	wait_event_interruptible_timeout(random_write_wait,
 			!system_wq || kthread_should_stop() ||
-			input_pool.entropy_count <= random_write_wakeup_bits,
+			input_pool.entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS,
 			CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL);
 	mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count);
 	credit_entropy_bits(entropy);
-- 
2.35.0

Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction

[Dominik Brodowski]

Am Sat, Feb 05, 2022 at 05:01:17PM +0100 schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
> Now that POOL_BITS == POOL_MIN_BITS, we must unconditionally wake up
> entropy writers after every extraction. Therefore there's no point of
> write_wakeup_threshold, so we can move it to the dustbin of unused
> compatibility sysctls. While we're at it, we can fix a small comparison
> where we were waking up after <= min rather than < min.
> 
> Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

	Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>

Thanks,
	Dominik

Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction

[Jason A. Donenfeld]

A small correction in this:

On Sat, Feb 5, 2022 at 5:02 PM Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> wrote:
> -               .mode           = 0644,
> +               .mode           = 0444,

We actually need to keep this at 644, so as not to break things that
rely on it. It will still do nothing, which is the same choice made
with "urandom_min_reseed_secs" - it's there but doesn't control
anything. So the above snippet is gone.

[PATCH v3 5/5] random: make credit_entropy_bits() always safe

[Jason A. Donenfeld]

This is called from various hwgenerator drivers, so rather than having
one "safe" version for userspace and one "unsafe" version for the
kernel, just make everything safe; the checks are cheap and sensible to
have anyway.

Reported-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
 drivers/char/random.c | 29 +++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 82ec3a0399fb..8ae2bf5ca606 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -447,18 +447,15 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(void)
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
 }
 
-/*
- * Credit (or debit) the entropy store with n bits of entropy.
- * Use credit_entropy_bits_safe() if the value comes from userspace
- * or otherwise should be checked for extreme values.
- */
 static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbits)
 {
 	int entropy_count, orig;
 
-	if (!nbits)
+	if (nbits <= 0)
 		return;
 
+	nbits = min(nbits, POOL_BITS);
+
 	do {
 		orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
 		entropy_count = min(POOL_BITS, orig + nbits);
@@ -470,18 +467,6 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbits)
 		crng_reseed(&primary_crng);
 }
 
-static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(int nbits)
-{
-	if (nbits < 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	/* Cap the value to avoid overflows */
-	nbits = min(nbits, POOL_BITS);
-
-	credit_entropy_bits(nbits);
-	return 0;
-}
-
 /*********************************************************************
  *
  * CRNG using CHACHA20
@@ -1526,7 +1511,10 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 			return -EPERM;
 		if (get_user(ent_count, p))
 			return -EFAULT;
-		return credit_entropy_bits_safe(ent_count);
+		if (ent_count < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		credit_entropy_bits(ent_count);
+		return 0;
 	case RNDADDENTROPY:
 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 			return -EPERM;
@@ -1539,7 +1527,8 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 		retval = write_pool((const char __user *)p, size);
 		if (retval < 0)
 			return retval;
-		return credit_entropy_bits_safe(ent_count);
+		credit_entropy_bits(ent_count);
+		return 0;
 	case RNDZAPENTCNT:
 	case RNDCLEARPOOL:
 		/*
-- 
2.35.0

Re: [PATCH v3 0/5] random: use computational hash for entropy extraction, and related fixes

[Eric Biggers]

On Sat, Feb 05, 2022 at 05:01:13PM +0100, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> The bulk of the motivation for this and description of crypto
> vulnerabilities is in the first patch of this series. The following
> three patches then fix up entropy accounting for the new model. The last
> patch fixes a minor code safety issue.
> 
> This v3 fixes comments and commit message wording, simplifies a bit of
> code in a cmpxchg loop, and adjusts semantics around the poll write
> wakeup threshold.
> 
> Jason A. Donenfeld (5):
>   random: use computational hash for entropy extraction
>   random: simplify entropy debiting
>   random: use linear min-entropy accumulation crediting
>   random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction
>   random: make credit_entropy_bits() always safe
> 
>  drivers/char/random.c         | 501 ++++++----------------------------
>  include/trace/events/random.h |  30 +-
>  2 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 444 deletions(-)

Looks good, thanks!  You can add for the series:

Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

- Eric