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From: David Laight <david.laight.linux@gmail.com>
To: Richard Patel <ripatel@wii.dev>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] Usermode Indirect Branch Tracking
Date: Tue, 19 May 2026 14:28:08 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260519142808.0d3605ab@pumpkin> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <agxiORpLBErOxLin@wii.dev>

On Tue, 19 May 2026 13:14:33 +0000
Richard Patel <ripatel@wii.dev> wrote:

> On Tue, May 19, 2026 at 10:33:45AM +0100, David Laight wrote:
> > Isn't using 'notrack jmp *reg' for jump tables actually more secure?
> > If an attacker can write code it doesn't matter.
> > The jump table in is RO memory so can't be written.
> > But if there are ENDBR on all the jump table targets they become
> > possibly useful code addresses to arrange to write into some RW
> > function pointer table - which might be useful.  
> 
> You're right. I was worried about an invalid jump table index at first.
> Clang 22 happily optimizes away jump table index bounds checks. GCC 16
> seems to be more careful. We should probably patch LLVM to never
> optimize it away, e.g.:
> 
> 	// funny.c
> 	// clang -c -fcf-protection=branch -O2 -o funny.o funny.c
> 	// objdump -d funny.o -M intel
> 	int t0(void), t1(void), t2(void), t3(void);
> 	int funny(unsigned long target) {
> 		__builtin_assume(target < 4);

If you use __builtin_assume() you get to clear up the mess.

I don't know if userspace ever cares about speculative array access.
If it does you need one of the mitigration - eg using cmp+cmov
to generate a jump table index that references the 'default'.

-- David

> 		switch (target) {
> 		case 0: return t0();
> 		case 1: return t1();
> 		case 2: return t2();
> 		case 3: return t3();
> 		}
> 	}
> 
> 	// Clang 22
> 	0000000000000000 <funny>:
> 	       0: f3 0f 1e fa                  endbr64
> 	       4: 55                           push rbp
> 	       5: 48 89 e5                     mov rbp, rsp
> 	       8: 3e ff 24 fd 00 00 00 00      notrack jmp qword ptr [rdi*8+0x0] // vulnerable
> 	      10: 5d                           pop rbp
> 	      11: e9 00 00 00 00               jmp 0x16 <funny+0x16>
> 	      16: 5d                           pop rbp
> 	      17: e9 00 00 00 00               jmp 0x1c <funny+0x1c>
> 	      1c: 5d                           pop rbp
> 	      1d: e9 00 00 00 00               jmp 0x22 <funny+0x22>
> 	      22: 5d                           pop rbp
> 	      23: e9 00 00 00 00               jmp 0x28 <funny+0x28>
> 
> -Richard


  reply	other threads:[~2026-05-19 13:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-17 18:30 [PATCH 0/7] Usermode Indirect Branch Tracking Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 1/7] x86: add userspace IBT config option Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 2/7] x86: shstk: don't clobber IBT bits in U_CET MSR Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 3/7] x86: signal handler support for IBT Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 4/7] x86: ban 32-bit sigreturn when user IBT enabled Richard Patel
2026-05-18 20:22   ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-05-19  0:14     ` Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 5/7] x86: expose user IBT via PR_CFI_BRANCH_LANDING_PADS Richard Patel
2026-05-18  6:46   ` Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 6/7] x86/entry/vdso: build with IBT support Richard Patel
2026-05-17 18:30 ` [PATCH 7/7] selftests/x86: test usermode IBT Richard Patel
2026-05-18  7:36 ` [PATCH 0/7] Usermode Indirect Branch Tracking Peter Zijlstra
2026-05-18 16:25   ` Richard Patel
2026-05-18 19:31     ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-05-19  9:33 ` David Laight
2026-05-19  9:40   ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-05-19 13:14   ` Richard Patel
2026-05-19 13:28     ` David Laight [this message]
2026-05-19 14:18       ` Richard Patel
2026-05-19 14:42         ` Peter Zijlstra

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